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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the human-factor problems in password authentication and 
proposes some usable solutions to these problems by focusing on both forms of 
knowledge based authentication: textual passwords and graphical passwords. It includes 
a range of empirical studies to examine users' password-related behaviour and practices 
in authentication, and helps users to adopt secure password behaviour.  
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part focuses on traditional text-based 
passwords. Design flaws and usability issues of existing text-password mechanisms used 
by many organisations cause employees to adopt insecure password practices. The first 
work in this thesis investigates the reasons for employees' lack of motivation regarding 
password protection against security failures. An empirical study is conducted to identify 
the factors causing employees’ insecure behaviours in organisations, and several 
persuasion strategies are tested to persuade employees to use passwords more safely. The 
results of the study revealed that some persuasion strategies are effective in motivating 
users to adopt good password practices. The study also found that the failure of password 
policies and authentication schemes deployed by organisations is a common problem 
among the organisations.  
Considering the results of the first study, in the second work of this thesis, a password 
guideline/advice study is conducted to help users to create stronger and more memorable 
passwords. A password guideline including a number of password creation methods and 
a persuasive message is proposed, and its effectiveness in improving the strength of user-
	 v	
chosen passwords is evaluated. The results show that the users who received the proposed 
guideline produced stronger and more memorable passwords than the users followed the 
usual password restrictions while creating their passwords. The results also demonstrate 
that the given password creation methods can be helpful and inspirational for users to 
create their own encryption formula. 
All these works reveal the weaknesses of user-chosen textual passwords and inefficacy 
of existing text-based password mechanisms. Although these studies show that text-based 
password mechanisms can be strengthened, they are still problematic where usability is 
concerned. Thus, the second part of this thesis focuses on another form of knowledge-
based authentication: graphical passwords. A novel hybrid authentication scheme 
integrating text and images is introduced to minimise the brute force and shoulder surfing 
attacks which text and graphical passwords suffer. In the last work of this thesis, the 
proposed hybrid scheme is implemented and evaluated. The evaluation shows that the 
proposed scheme provides security and usability at the same time, and it also makes the 
password creation process enjoyable for users.  
In summary, the thesis contributes to the analysis of some key security and usability 
problems which arise in knowledge-based authentication. A series of empirical studies 
has been conducted. Based on their results, usable solutions to the human-factor problems 
in password-based authentication are proposed and evaluated.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the general idea of the research; including the scope of the 
thesis, research questions and aims and objectives to find answers to those questions. It 
also briefly explains the research approach and the research methods used in the several 
empirical studies which are conducted to evaluate the proposed idea in this thesis. At the 
end of this chapter, the thesis contributions are presented and the organisation of the thesis 
is detailed.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND SCOPE 
As information technology is an inevitable necessity in today’s world, computer 
and information security has become critically important for many organisations. In 
computer systems, this issue has been mostly about ensuring confidentiality, integrity and 
accessibility to information. Because of the importance of the subject, numerous studies 
have been conducted in this area but unfortunately most of the researchers have primarily 
focussed on technical problems and solutions rather than human factors in information 
systems (Hoonakker, Bornoe and Carayon, 2009).  
 
Human factors in security systems are often overlooked although this is one of the 
most important aspects of computer security. In recent years, researchers have started to 
pay attention to this subject and some studies have emerged to show the effect of the 
human role on computer and information security. Also, recently, the security research 
community has stated that users’ behaviour plays an important role in many security 
failures (Cranor, 2008). Undesirable user behaviour causes the majority of the security 
failures in the organisations. There are many reported cases proving that user behaviours 
enabled or facilitated a security breach (Sasse, Brostoff and Weirich, 2001). The main 
reason for this situation is that end users generally have difficulties to understand 
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computer security properly. Computer security terms such as encryption, public key, 
private key or phishing or pharming techniques used in sophisticated attacks usually do 
not make any sense to most end users. This is not only about the complexity of the terms 
but also the proffered solutions to security problems are changing rapidly. End users are 
unable to cope (Zakaria, 2013). 
 
One of the important points about complexity is to consider that computer security 
is often investigated as a secondary task. Most users find the security mechanisms too 
burdensome so they prefer to avoid security efforts in order to perform their primary task. 
There is mostly a contradiction between the user’s idea of how the system works and how 
the system actually works which leads to making inappropriate security-related decisions. 
Users generally are not motivated to care about security because the effects or 
consequences of not behaving in a secure manner do not appear immediately. Therefore, 
they often only realize the situation after they have become the next victim of a security 
failure. 
 
There are two main research areas in which user behaviour issues are being 
currently studied. The first one is information security management (ISM) which mainly 
focuses on some approaches such as education, training and security awareness programs 
(Woodhouse, 2007; Herath and Rao, 2009). Yet these approaches have not been a solution 
for motivating users to behave securely. The second area is usable security in which 
researchers have studied the inclusion of usability elements into security mechanisms to 
make users engage in the task more willingly (Schultz et.al, 2001; Zurko, 2005). Despite 
these efforts, there is still a gap in the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) field in terms 
of designing usable security mechanisms to improve users’ motivation to adopt desired 
security behaviours.  
 
Whitten and Tygar (1999) stated that PGP 5.0, one of the most popular encryption 
software used in the past, is not usable by average computer users because it has user 
interface design flaws. Since then, security researchers began to realize the importance of 
investigating human factors on security systems, and designing usable systems 
accordingly (Smith, 2003; Schenier, 2004). 
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User authentication is usually the first stage of a security sensitive system which 
users have to confront with to prove their right of access (Smith, 2001). There is an 
identification phase where the user claims that he/she is the person who has right to access 
the system and authorization phase where the user has to provide credentials to prove 
his/her claims (Renaud, 2005). The three differing authentications are what the user has, 
who the user is and what the user knows (Smith, 2001; Renaud, 2005). What the user has 
commonly imply the possession of a device such as digital authentication tokens or smart 
cards to prove the identity of users. These tokens are commonly used as security tools in 
enterprises. A research study about tokens and smart cards points out usability issues 
emerged from the need of installing drivers on a range of machines to support different 
forms of tokens and cards (Piazzalunga et.al, 2005). In terms of authentication, who the 
user is refers to biometrics which measure user's physiological or behavioural 
characteristics. Biometrics are considered the best solution since they give accurate 
results about the claimed identity thus provide high level security. However, in practice, 
they have many usability and security issues. Non-adaptation of some user groups to 
biometrics systems (Coventry, 2005), the possibility of imitation of some biometrics such 
as mocking finger prints using special materials and also affordability problems of these 
systems are some of aforementioned issues. What the user knows (often referred to as 
knowledge based authentication) typically requires the user remember a secret he/she 
created before and provide it when asked to gain access a system. Text-based password 
is the oldest and most commonly used type of knowledge based authentication. Text 
password is ubiquitous on the Internet since it is affordable, widely deployed, familiar to 
users and easy to replace. 
 
Authentication, as one of the most important fields of computer security to allow 
authorized users to access information, has been studied by many usable security 
researchers. Various alternative authentication schemes to text-based passwords which 
aim at aligning security and usability, have been proposed so far. These proposals range 
from graphical password authentication to location-based authentication (Goldberg, 
Hagman and Sazaval, 2002; Forget, 2012; Thorpe, MacRae and Salehi-Abari, 2013). 
However, none of these schemes could overcome the simplicity and affordability of 
typing a sequence of keyboard characters to allow authenticating users (Bonneau, 2012). 
As a result, traditional text-based password is still the most popular authentication 
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mechanism on the Web, and it is likely to remain in the near future (Herley, Oorschot and 
Patrick, 2009). 
 
Unfortunately, in terms of usability, text- based password authentication is quite 
problematic. A good password needs to be “easy to remember and hard to guess” at the 
same time, as suggested by Wiedenbeck et al. (2005a). However, passwords which are 
easy to remember are generally short and/or meaningful words, or slight variations. 
Therefore, these passwords become vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Passwords including 
personal information are also memorable, but they might be easily guessable especially 
by family members and friends. 
 
A lot of work has been done to understand users’ password behaviour and 
practices. A landmark study involving half a million users was conducted by Microsoft 
Research and many interesting findings about users’ password habits were revealed 
(Florencio and Herley, 2007). Additionally, many researchers have focussed on password 
management, password guideline and advice issues and conducted laboratory studies, to 
understand the reasons behind particular password behaviours such as sharing or reusing 
passwords and to investigate possible security countermeasures (Gaw and Felten, 2006; 
Shay et al., 2010). 
 
Considering the above-mentioned issues, this thesis aims to bridge the gap 
between password security and usability by focusing on human factor issues in the 
password authentication domain. As password security is one of the most important areas 
where human factors play a crucial role, it is important to investigate further the effect of 
user behaviour on password practices. Text passwords’ popularity, despite their 
weaknesses, makes the subject more interesting to study in terms of user behaviours. The 
next section presents the research problems pertaining to password security.   
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEMS  
Password authentication is nowadays the most commonly used authentication 
mechanism and it seems likely that it will continue to be so for many years to come. This 
is because it is widely deployed, easy to use, affordable and familiar to users. Passwords 
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are used to protect users’ information in many platforms ranging from banking 
transactions to social networking sites. Thus, they play a key role in the protection of 
personal and financial information in online and offline environments.  
Passwords are considered one of the most significant risk factors in terms of 
security in information systems as they are vulnerable to attacks (Carstens, Mc-Cauley 
and DeMara, 2004). This vulnerability is mainly due to the user behaviours and practices, 
not related to the password system itself. The main problem arises from the memorability 
issue which ultimately causes the other problems related to passwords such as reusing, 
sharing and choosing weak passwords. These problems are well-known and they are 
called as ‘the human factor problems’ by researchers in the password authentication 
domain (Herley, Oorschot and Patrick, 2009; Summers and Bosworth, 2004). 
 
Most people are actually aware of the importance of choosing strong passwords 
to protect their information. However, there is a lack of password creation advice or 
guidelines to help and motivate them to compose strong passwords. It is commonly stated 
that a password should include a mix of keyboard characters and should not include the 
meaningful words from dictionaries (Yan et al., 2004). Similar advice can also be found 
in websites, policy papers and many other password security themed articles. 
Unfortunately, despite these guidelines and advice, most users do not adopt good security 
behaviours and care to choose strong passwords. Based on occurrences of security failures 
and the difficulty to determine which particular rules measure the importance or necessity 
of strong password creation, research shows that users commonly underestimate the risk 
associated with weak passwords. (Florencio and Herley, 2007; Zang and McDowell, 
2009). 
 
Shay et al. (2010) indicated that users often appear to lack motivation to produce 
strong passwords as they are not convinced of the importance of suggestions given in the 
guidelines. It was proved that users’ awareness of the problems is not enough to restrain 
them from adopting undesirable security practices such as using dictionary words, sharing 
and reusing their passwords. So, more effective approaches are needed to convince users 
to behave in a secure manner in the password authentication domain. Probably, rather 
than only telling them why they should choose strong passwords or restricting their 
choices with tedious password policy rules, showing how to create better passwords in 
efficient and fun ways is more convenient.  
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
From the issues mentioned above it is clear that the existing password guidelines 
and advice have not solved the problem of weak password creation. New techniques are 
needed to help users to create strong passwords by presenting new solutions which will 
make the password creation process more reasonable, interesting and fun. The new 
solutions must motivate and lead users to construct strong passwords and also show the 
consequences of bad password practices. Thus, this research aims to find out whether a 
change in password guidelines and advice can bring a new perspective for users and to 
improve their password security behaviour. Furthermore, since user behaviour issues are 
extremely complex as they are shaped according to different environments and conditions 
users have. Based on this point, this research also aims to include an experiment for users 
working in organisations to improve understanding of their security behaviours 
particularly related to password practices. Some chosen elements of persuasion 
technologies have been used to change users’ undesirable password behaviours and 
convince them to adopt desired ones. 
 
Although there should be efforts to persuade users to create strong passwords and 
abandon password sharing and reusing habits, the memorability problem will remain 
unchanged. To handle this problem, many studies have been conducted by researchers 
and various authentication mechanisms have been proposed in the industry. Among the 
mechanisms being proposed, a graphical password is the closest alternative to the 
traditional text-based password in terms of its implementation, affordability and easy 
usage. Various graphical password schemes recently emerged aiming to overcome the 
main weakness of traditional text-based (alphanumeric) passwords, which is 
memorability. They are indeed advantageous due to the fact that the human memory can 
recall graphical images better than text and numbers.  
 
Despite their advantages, since graphical passwords are still not commonly used, 
further investigation is needed to find out whether they can completely replace the text-
based passwords, or can only help to strengthen existing defences to attacks. Similar to 
other alternatives, graphical password schemes have many downsides particularly with 
regards to its weakness to spyware and shoulder surfing attacks. Thus, designing new 
graphical schemes to strengthen its defence to these attacks is crucial before it becomes 
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more established. At this point, hybrid authentication mechanisms are seen convenient to 
minimize the downsides of traditional text-based passwords and graphical passwords and 
use the advantages of both. We have investigated the potential of a hybrid password 
scheme as an alternative mechanism. Hence, this research has proposed a novel hybrid 
password authentication scheme which has upsides of text-based passwords and graphical 
passwords to offer a better solution than existing ones. This thesis presents solutions to 
these problems.  
 
The research questions guiding this research study are as below: 
 
1- “How can password related behaviours, which may potentially lead to security 
failures, be changed to improve overall password security in organisations?”  
 
2- “To what extent can users be directed and motivated to choose strong passwords 
through password advice?” 
 
3- “Can graphical passwords entirely replace the textual passwords?” 
 
4-  “Can a hybrid password authentication scheme integrating text and graphical 
passwords be solution to the password security and usability problems?” 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate user security behaviour in the 
password authentication domain and to offer usable solutions to decrease security risks 
caused by these behaviours. For this purpose, these research questions will be answered 
by achieving some objectives. The main objectives and concomitant research activities to 
be carried out for each question are listed below: 
 
Main Objectives:  
1- Conducting a broad literature review to address the key issues of the research topic 
and to follow the related studies.  
2- Identifying the research problems, questions and gaps in the research field. 
3- Proposing solutions to the research questions specified. 
4- Evaluating the proposed solutions. 
5- Providing an overall discussion of the findings when conducting the research.  
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Research Activities Related to Each Research Question  
 
1- “How can password related behaviours, which may potentially lead to security 
failures, be changed to improve overall password security in organisations?”  
 
Research Activities (1): 
 
- Reviewing the studies and cases on employees’ security behaviour in password 
authentication in organisations. 
- Examining the existing methods which aim to make employees adopt good 
security behaviours. 
- Reviewing the related persuasion approaches and methods to change user 
behaviour. 
- Applying the selected persuasion methods to change employees’ behaviour so 
they behave in a secure manner. 
- Conducting empirical studies to analyse these methods’ efficiency. 
- Drawing a conclusion from the results of the empirical studies.    
 
 
2- “To what extent can users be directed and motivated to choose strong passwords 
through password advice?” 
 
Research Activities (2):   
 
- Reviewing relevant studies on password policy rules and password advice. 
- Examining the existing password policies and guidelines.  
- Proposing a new idea which may solve the problems with the existing systems. 
- Conducting an empirical study to find out whether the new idea works better to 
direct and motivate users to choose strong passwords than existing solutions. 
- Drawing a conclusion from the results of the empirical study. 
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3- “Can graphical passwords entirely replace the textual passwords?” 
 
Research Activities (3): 
 
- Reviewing the alternative authentication mechanisms to the traditional text 
password passwords and assessing the alternatives according to certain criteria. 
- Examining the existing graphical password authentication schemes and deciding 
on the best alternative. 
- Specifying the upsides and downsides of the decided scheme. 
- Drawing a conclusion from the results of the research. 
 
4- “Can a hybrid password authentication scheme integrating text and graphical 
passwords be solution to the password security and usability problems?” 
 
Research Activities (4): 
 
- Based on the results of the research done for previous question, proposing a novel 
hybrid password authentication scheme including text and graphical passwords. 
- Designing a web application to apply the proposed authentication scheme. 
- Conducting an empirical study to test the proposed authentication scheme. 
- Evaluating the efficiency of the new scheme to find out whether it is convenient 
to use for users to create memorable and strong passwords. 
- Drawing a conclusion from the evaluation. 
 
An empirical study called improving password security in organizations which is 
presented in chapter 4 addresses the first research question. The password guideline-
advice study called persuading users to create stronger passwords which is presented in 
chapter 5 addresses the second research question. Chapter 6 which is a background 
chapter reviewing the existing authentication mechanisms and comparing the graphical 
password schemes aims to find solution to third research question. The last empirical 
study called evaluation of security and usability of a novel user authentication scheme 
integrating text and graphical passwords which is presented in chapter 7 addresses the 
final research question. The details of the empirical studies and results are provided in the 
related chapters and overall discussion is presented in the last chapter. 
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1.5 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research study aims to investigate user security behaviour issues related to 
the password authentication domain and offer usable solutions to direct and motivate 
users to adopt desired behaviours. Thus, throughout this study, an empirical-based 
approach is adopted conducting three empirical studies to achieve the proposed research 
aim. 
 
The first empirical study is conducting interviews and surveys with employees of 
big organisations to figure out the reasons behind bad password practices and find 
solutions to their lack of motivation to adopt good ones. A series of persuasion approach 
and methods have been reviewed and the selected ones have been used to convince and 
motivate users to avoid some security behaviours that put their personal information as 
well as the organisational information at risk. The study has been conducted in six 
organisations in Turkey including a hospital, a software company and a construction 
company. This involved 121 participants including IT managers, software specialists and 
other employees who do not have an IT background. The empirical study is detailed in 
Chapter 4.  
  
The second empirical study is a “password guideline-advice study” that has been 
conducted to investigate whether providing users a series of useful password creation 
methods alongside a motivating rationale is more effective than strict policy rules in terms 
of creating strong and memorable passwords. The password advice and the password 
creation methods have been specified after a broad literature review was conducted. This 
empirical study involved 380 participants including university students from UK, USA 
and Turkey. Details of the password guideline- advice study are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The third and final empirical study is evaluating a novel hybrid authentication 
scheme integrating text and graphical passwords. This novel authentication scheme has 
been designed after a broad literature review on alternative authentication mechanisms 
was conducted. This study involved 52 participants who are undergraduate and 
postgraduate students studying in the University of Sussex. Especially existing graphical 
password schemes were especially scrutinised, and eventually recall based graphical 
passwords were considered the best alternative to the traditional text-based passwords 
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considering certain criteria. The results of this study showed how a hybrid password 
authentication scheme can improve password strength by taking advantages of the 
upsides of text and graphical passwords as well as eliminating the vulnerabilities of both. 
The details of the study, including the usability and security evaluation, are discussed 
further in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
 
 
1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis aims to address security problems caused by human factors in textual 
and graphical password authentication, and to propose solutions for these problems while 
maintaining usability. This endeavour is detailed in the thesis through the following 
contributions to the field of user authentication and usable security:  
 
- A user study has been conducted with participants in several organisations from different 
sectors to understand the reasons for undesired password behaviour in password 
authentication. It gives interesting results that led us proposing different security solutions 
for different organisations as needs and ways to motivate users in each organisation vary. 
Persuasion Technology has been used to convince users in the organisations to adopt good 
password behaviour. At the end of the study, some recommendations for IT departments 
which can be useful in improving password security and decreasing the probability of 
security failures significantly is presented.  
- A new user-friendly password guideline and advice for motivating and influencing users 
to select more secure and memorable text passwords without overburdening their 
memory. A broad user study has been conducted to evaluate the efficiency of these 
password guideline and advice. It has yielded good results which suggests that the 
password creation tips and persuasive message provided to users convinced them to create 
cryptographically strong and memorable passwords. Also, the study suggests that this 
new password guideline and tips are much more efficient than strict password policy rules 
regarding creation of strong passwords. 
- Design and evaluation of a novel hybrid authentication scheme integrating text and 
graphical passwords. The proposed scheme is resistant to shoulder surfing attack, which 
is the main security problem of graphical passwords. Also, the new scheme is enjoyable 
	 12	
to use for users to motivate them to create strong but memorable passwords. Several user 
studies were performed to test the security and memorability of the passwords which users 
created with this scheme.  
The results of these studies and general discussion are presented in the Chapter 8.  
 
1.7 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis has two main parts. The first part focuses on traditional text-based 
passwords: it investigates the usability and security problems caused by user behaviour 
in text-based password authentication domain. Some empirical studies are described, 
which aim at finding usable solutions to motivate users to create strong and memorable 
passwords as well as persuading them to avoid undesirable password practices in 
organisations. The second part of the thesis investigates alternative password mechanisms 
to text-based passwords and mainly focuses on graphical passwords. After a review of 
the existing graphical password mechanisms, it introduces a novel hybrid password 
authentication scheme including text and graphical passwords.      
 
The thesis consists of eight chapters, broadly presenting background and related 
work, and analysing and discussing the findings of the empirical studies conducted to find 
usable solutions to password security problem.  
 
Following this introduction chapter, Chapter 2 presents the background 
information and potential security issues of knowledge based authentication mechanisms 
focusing on text passwords. It describes the human factors that play an important role in 
the password authentication, and discusses the significance of balancing security and 
usability issues in password authentication systems. This chapter also lists possible 
security attacks and countermeasures in password authentication and presents a broad 
review of previous works related to password security. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the related behaviour change theories and persuasion strategies. 
Several selected appropriate persuasion approaches presented in this chapter will be 
utilised and evaluated in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4 suggests the idea of utilising appropriate persuasion approaches to make 
users behave in a desired manner about password security. Although most organisations 
are aware of the importance of computer security, they have difficulties with teaching and 
influencing their users to behave securely. Existing studies on new instructions and 
security measures are still not enough to encourage users to avoid insecure password 
practices. Psychologists and other social scientists have suggested some methods and 
approaches for effective behavioural change which are discussed in the previous chapter 
in detail. This chapter includes some empirical studies which were conducted with 
employees of some big organisations using the aforementioned behavioural change 
methods and discusses whether using persuasive behavioural change methods can make 
users behave in a secure manner thus providing better password security in organisations.  
Since the results of the empirical study presented in Chapter 4, and some previous 
research proved that the traditional methods of imposing excessive restrictions have not 
been very successful, it is suggested that a system that subtly persuades users and offers 
concrete advice may be more successful. Thus, based on the information gathered from 
previous studies and cases, Chapter 5 explores whether motivating users with an effective 
password advice and useful instructions to create strong and memorable passwords is 
better than obliging users to apply strict password policy rules. This chapter provides a 
broad understanding of human factors-caused security problems and offers a reliable 
solution by encouraging users to create their own formula to compose passwords.       
 
Chapter 6 is a background chapter for the second part of this thesis, and presents 
a broad review of the existing authentication mechanisms. It emphasises the strong and 
weak sides of each mechanism, to find out whether a good alternative to traditional 
passwords exists considering certain criteria such as affordability, compatibility and ease 
of use. After analysing all the alternatives, it concludes that text-based passwords remain 
the most preferred mechanism followed by graphical passwords. Since text-based 
passwords are still the most prevalent method and graphical passwords are the most 
promising alternative, this chapter also discusses some solutions to improve security and 
usability of these passwords. 
In Chapter 7, a new password authentication scheme based on text and image is 
introduced. It suggests using an integrated authentication mechanism, and questions 
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whether the vulnerabilities of the text and graphical passwords are decreased thus 
resulting in an improved security level with this scheme. A web application has been 
designed to allow participants to test the hybrid scheme’s effectiveness.     
Finally, Chapter 8 presents an overall discussion and conclusions drawn from the 
thesis. It describes the further studies which could be done to extend the research question 
examined in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This thesis focuses on both forms of knowledge-based authentication (KBA): text-
based passwords and graphical passwords. KBA can be defined as a human entity 
providing some secret information which was previously shared with the system to 
authenticate itself (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005). Users are expected to remember the 
shared secret to be able to authenticate themselves but it does not matter if they apply 
coping strategies such as writing down the secret information to remember it.  
Other authentication mechanisms based on who the user is –biometrics- (Jain, 
Ross and Pankanti, 2006) and what the user has – token based authentication systems- 
(O’Gorman, 2003) do not require any secret knowledge to be remembered. Biometric 
systems use the biological and behavioural characteristics of user, such as fingerprint, iris 
or keystroke to identify and authenticate themselves. Token-based authentication systems 
require users to have and use an item, such as smart card or mobile phone. Key-based 
authentication systems, such as Kerberos (Neuman et al., 2005) and PGP (Callas et al., 
2007) typically work on secret keys which are supposed to be stored by a machine. Figure 
2.1 illustrates the most common user authentication methods.  
Knowledge based authentication is popular because it is relatively cheap to 
implement and typically does not require any additional hardware. In theory, KBA 
schemes are considered to be very secure, but in practice its security is not often adequate 
because of the lack of uniqueness and complexity of the shared secrets that users can 
remember. There has been proposed various forms of KBA schemes by researchers. In 
this chapter, we will primarily focus on the most common form of KBA which is text 
password. Next sections will review the literature on related usability and security issues 
of text passwords which emanate from use and research in the field, including password 
attacks and proposed solutions to text password problems. 
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Figure 2. 1 User Authentication Methods 
	
This thesis focuses on the usability and security issues of text and graphical 
password schemes. Regarding security, there are various kind of attacks to passwords, 
including brute force attack, social engineering, phishing and more. Within the scope of 
this thesis solutions to defend against password guessing attacks and shoulder surfing 
attacks will be specifically examined while maintaining security against other attacks. We 
will not take into consideration the additional mechanisms which can deter or prevent 
password guessing. We believe usability and security provided by these mechanisms 
which is in addition to the security of the main authentication scheme should be evaluated 
separately.  
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2.2 KNOWLEDGE BASED AUTHENTICATION  
From the beginning of computing, knowledge-based authentication (KBA) has 
been the most commonly used technique to provide users accessing to computer systems 
securely. It seems it will remain predominant for more years to come. Despite KBA 
schemes’ popularity, they have many known usability problems which have not yet been 
entirely solved. According to a study, a user has on average 25 online password-required 
accounts and uses eight passwords per day (Florencio and Herley, 2007). As users are 
expected to use different passwords for each account to avoid security failures, it is 
difficult for the brain to remember many discrete sets of illogical and random bits of 
information and then associate each set with which account. The user’s response to this 
situation is generally adopting strategies such as choosing weak passwords or writing 
them down, which ultimately undermine the security of the systems they use (Klein, 
1990). Some methods are used to replace this subversive behaviour with appropriately 
suitable behaviour for authentication (Wood, Bruner and Ross, 1976). These methods aim 
to direct user behaviour by implementing strict password creation guidelines (Inglesant 
and Sasse, 2010), proactive password checkers (Yan, 2001) or password expiry (Zhang, 
Monrose, Reiter, 2010), to ensure a high security level. However, recent research shows 
that these advices, measures or system features don’t always work as expected. They 
sometimes have negative effects upon usability and security, contrary to designers’ 
intentions. Where users are forced unreasonable constraints, they may more likely adopt 
insecure workarounds which are easy to use for them (Proctor et al., 2002). As it is well 
known, users mostly don’t follow the strict security guidelines prescribed within KBA 
schemes (Zviran and Haga, 1993). Both system administrators and end-users struggle 
with the scenario where it is difficult to balance the security and usability of the 
authentication system. Although compromising one of them leads more threatening 
scenarios, the system needs to be sustained somehow. This shows that the current forms 
of KBA schemes which are unable to offer solutions to current socio-technical 
authentication problems, have to be abandoned in the future (Kotadia, 2004). Thus, it is 
inevitable to reform the existing KBA schemes.  
In the recent years, security researchers have focused on designing secure and 
usable systems (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005). Implications of usability studies in human 
computer interaction (HCI) field have revealed (Rogers, Sharp and Preece, 2011). This 
immature research field of usable security (sometimes stated as user-centred security) 
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defends including users in the design and evaluation phases of security systems. Within 
this context, design of graphical passwords as an alternative method of KBA aims to 
provide desired balance between security and usability taking cognitive limitations in 
human memory into consideration (Biddle, Chiasson and Von Oorschot, 2011; Suo, 
2005). Cognitive theory of the picture superiority effect suggests that if a concept is 
presented as a picture rather than as words or numbers, it is more likely remembered 
(Shepard, 1967). Various graphical password schemes have emerged using the advantage 
of this superiority of human memory on recognizing images better then texts. 
Experiments and evaluations measuring memorability of these schemes have come up 
with promising results (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000; De Angeli et al., 2002; Wiedenbeck et 
al., 2005b).  
Despite the advantages of graphical passwords for their usability and flexibility of 
computer infrastructure supporting the graphical password schemes’ interfaces, graphical 
passwords are still rarely used. There are many reasons of this disapprobation, including 
cost issues and users’ habits. Actually, before proposing new graphical password 
schemes, user behaviour issues which already causes problems in traditional password 
based authentication should be examined in detail. This is because issues of human 
perceptions and their consequential responses often cause security failures no matter 
which authentication schemes are used. Moreover, different authentication requirements 
and designs of various platforms increases the difficulty for users to adopt each of them. 
Sasse et al. (2001) suggest that security engineers should adopt a more holistic approach 
by including the context, the technology and also the user in the phases of design and 
evaluation of security mechanisms. 
 
2.3 TEXT PASSWORDS 
Text passwords are the most widely deployed and used authentication scheme in 
computer systems. However, they have known security issues such as vulnerabilities to 
brute-force and dictionary attacks. Therefore, organisations seek solutions to store 
passwords securely.  Users’ plaintext account passwords were stored in a file through a 
simple text password system which was initially developed by Unix systems (Morris and 
Thompson, 1979). The system has serious security issues that put users’ passwords at risk 
of being compromised as a knowledgeable user could easily have access to the file.  
	 19	
Wilkes (1968) proposed to encrypt new passwords before storing them in database when 
the account is created. With this method, at the login phase, the password entered by the 
user would be first encrypted and then be compared to the previously stored encrypted-
password for that user. If there is a match, the user would be granted access. Although 
this encryption improved the security level of the password system, it is still too risky, 
because, if the encryption key was broken, then all the passwords would be compromised. 
To eliminate this risk, Evans, Kantrowitz and Weiss (1974) proposed to apply a one-way 
hashing function (Lamport, 1981) to the entered password, instead of using encryption. 
Such a hash function must be computationally infeasible to reverse and find two different 
inputs which result in the same output. Also, for two identical inputs, their outputs must 
also be identical.  
In case the file which contains hashed-passwords is compromised, the attacker 
will need to perform a password guessing attack to obtain the plaintext passwords. The 
attacker can select and hash a candidate password, and compare the result to each of the 
hashed password in the file. If there is a match, it means that the attacker’s guess is 
successful so that candidate password is the actual password of the related account.   
There are other techniques to store text passwords securely, such as salting and 
slow hash functions (Klein, 1990). These can be used not only with KBA schemes but 
also with other authentication mechanisms where users are granted access if they provide 
the right credentials that match the stored ones.  
Differences between system assigned and user chosen passwords, password 
spaces and password restrictions and advice are important issues that should be taken into 
consideration during the design and evaluation of any KBA schemes. These issues are 
listed in the following sections. 
 
2.3.1 Challenge Questions  
Challenge questions or personal verification questions (PVQs) are another form 
of text passwords. When users are registering for an account, the system may ask them to 
answer a few challenge questions. If the user is unable to access their account through the 
primary authentication method later (if they forgot their text password for example), the 
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system will prompt the user to answer some of the challenge questions that were asked 
during registration. If the user’s answers match their previous answers in the registration 
stage, then the user is directed to reset their passwords and allowed them to access their 
account.  
The earliest versions of challenge questions are cognitive and associative 
passwords (Haga and Zviran, 1991; Pond et al., 2000 and Zviran and Haga, 1993). 
Cognitive passwords require users to answer questions about something they probably 
intrinsically know such as users’ facts, interests, or opinions. They are easy to remember 
for users, but risky too, because it is highly possible that people who are close to the user 
can guess the password. Associative passwords were pairs of words, where the user 
responded to challenge words with the correct associated words (Haga and Zviran, 1991). 
No security analysis of either scheme was published at the time. A researcher has 
contributed to this area by classifying the most common types of challenge questions in 
a framework (Just, 2003, Just, 2004). Also, some usability and security experiments and 
analysis on user-chosen question and answers were performed (Just and Aspinall, 2009, 
Just and Aspinall, 2010). They found that although users select low-entropy questions 
they still have difficulty remembering the correct response. Schechter et al. (2009) found 
similar results in a study where users were asked to answer challenge questions taken 
from the four most popular webmail providers (AOL, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!). 
Challenge questions may be more insecure that originally thought, since personal 
information about users is becoming increasingly publicly available through social 
networking websites and the Internet in general (Rabkin, 2008). Thus, challenge 
questions may provide more assistance to password crackers than legitimate users.  
 
2.3.2 PINs 
Personal identification numbers (PINs) are a kind of text password which are 
composed of only digits, mostly four or five characters long. They are commonly used 
for the systems whose input was mainly numeric, such as telephone systems and 
automatic teller machines (ATMs). PINs have many security and usability problems such 
as small password space and memorability problems (Anderson, 1993; Clarke and 
Furnell, 2005).  
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2.4 GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS 
The other form of knowledge based authentication is graphical passwords. 
Graphical passwords will be detailed including classification of the graphical passwords 
and security-usability issues in Chapter 6. 
2.5 PASSWORD SECURITY  
The following sections discuss several password security-related issues including 
password space, password creation rules and advice as well as the password attacks.  
2.5.1 Password Space  
The total number of different passwords that can be supported by an authentication 
system is called theoretical password space (TPS). Password spaces tend to grow 
exponentially in size, and are typically expressed in bits, which is the base-2 logarithm of 
the total number of possible distinct passwords. Password length and alphabet size are the 
main factors in computing TPS.  
 
P = NL is the equation that expresses the relationship between P, N, and L where: 
 
P = password space 
N = number of alphabet symbols 
L = password length 
 
For example, a typical personal identification number (PIN) consisting of 4 digits using 
an alphabet of 10 digits (e.g., 0-9) are to be generated. 
P = 104 
That is, 10,000 unique 4-digit passwords could be generated.  
 
It has a TPS of log2 (104) ≈ 13.29 bits. 
 
Although TPS is often used to compare the security of authentication mechanisms, 
it is not an accurate measure of the security of the authentication systems which is based 
on user-chosen passwords. This is because calculating the TPS of a password starts from 
the assumption that the password is constructed of completely randomly selected 
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characters. However, users do not select passwords randomly. They choose passwords 
which are meaningful to them to remember easily. The space of passwords that are likely 
to be actually chosen by users is called effective password space (EPS). Since users must 
choose a password supported by the system EPS is always a subspace of the TPS.  
 
To improve the password security, it is important that an authentication scheme 
has a large EPS, that is desirably as close as possible in size to the TPS. To enlarge EPS, 
users should be guided to choose unpredictable passwords. Measuring an authentication 
system’s TPS is simple but there is no definitive way to measure the EPS. Text password 
restriction policies are used to guide users’ password selection to quantify EPS. NIST 
(Burr et al., 2006) is the most widely-known model to measure security. However, recent 
studies have proved this model’s inaccuracy to measure the actual security provided by 
password restriction policies (Castellucia et al., 2012; Clair et al.; 2006; Komanduri et al, 
2011; Weir et al., 2010).  Although the most likely chosen passwords can be used to 
measure the EPS, this measure would not be very accurate as it depends on how the most 
likely chosen passwords are determined.  
 
Other related studies to EPS which examine the content of users’ passwords do 
not directly indicate the general user behaviour. While lab studies (Vu et al., 2007) 
generally do not give generalizable results as they lack the ecological validity, field 
studies (Florencio and Herley, 2007; Weir et al., 2010) usually concern with specific type 
of systems protected by passwords (e.g. users’ different password choices for bank 
account and ordinary websites). There should be more studies to be conducted to produce 
more generalizable results.  
 
Florencio and Herley, in their later study (2010) revealed that popular websites 
which are likely targets for attacks chose the least restrictive password policies that 
requires users to create passwords of only 20 bits. This is probably the largest text 
password EPS that users can tolerate.   
 
2.5.2. Password Creation Policies    
Password restriction policies are a series of rules which determine the content and 
format of the passwords accepted by an authentication system. These policies are used by 
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system administrators to enhance computer security by guiding users to create more 
secure passwords.  
 
Firstly, Morris and Thompson (1979) proposed a password system that imposed 
password restrictions, with the aim of helping users choose more secure passwords. They 
suggested that if passwords consisting of single-case characters should be at least 6-
characters long otherwise 5-characters long.  
A standard for password usage was published by the Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) in 1985 (Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 
1985). It has many suggestions for end-users and security system administrators about 
content and general use of passwords. However, Sasse et al. (2001) suggested that 
password policies should not be based on these guidelines, as the computing environment 
and capabilities have changed considerably since 1985. The FIPS password usage 
guidelines were withdrawn in February of 2005 without being replaced or updated. In 
2006, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) updated the “Electronic 
Authentication Guideline” (Burr et al., 2006) to be used by security system administrators 
for the implementation of electronic authentication. This guideline provides heuristics to 
measure the strength and efficiency of a password restriction policy considering bits of 
entropy to determine a password value’s uncertainty. In this guideline, Estimation of 
Shannon’s Entropy (Shannon, 1951) was used for the entropy calculation. However, 
several studies (Castellucia et al., 2012; Komanduri et al., 2011; Clair et al., 2006; Weir 
et al., 2010) have found that passwords created with particular password policies were 
more difficult to guess than the ones created with NIST model suggestions.  
Komanduri et al. (2011) conducted a large web study to compare four different 
password restriction policies. They found that users have less difficulty to comply with 
creating a 16-character minimum password compared to an 8-character minimum 
excluding dictionary words or further restrictions. Beside the passwords at least 16-
character long provide the best security. They also measured the password strength using 
a calculation entropy (Shay et al., 2010) thus they showed some misconceptions about 
how restriction policies affect password strength. Their findings conclude that adding 
digits much increased the entropy of passwords, but excluding dictionary words increased 
the entropy less than expected. Also, the findings showed that passwords created by users 
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barely exceeded the minimum requirements.  
With another form of password restriction policy commonly known as proactive 
password checking, the system itself performs a dictionary guessing attack on the user’s 
password like an attacker during registration or reset. The researchers recommended the 
disallowance of some passwords which include dictionary words (and similar 
derivatives), repeated characters (“aaaaa”) and common keyboard patterns (“qwerty”). 
They also suggested that digits-only passwords should not be allowed by the system 
(Klein, 1990; Klein and Bishop, 1995). Similarly, Schechter et al. (2010), suggested that 
the authentication system should reject statistically the most frequent passwords chosen 
by system users.  
Contrary to what is believed, some researchers have claimed that password 
restriction policies do not improve password security (Adams and Sasse, 1999). There 
has been some lab (Vu et al., 2007) and field studies (Keith et al., 2007) conducted to test 
this claim. Results show that it is difficult to create and remember passwords for users 
when they are enforced to employ strict and complex password policies. To cope with 
remembering difficult passwords, users commonly adopt insecure password practices. 
These policies also help attackers to guess passwords more efficiently as they can 
decrease the number of candidate passwords based on the restriction policy. In their 
website study Florencio and Herley (2010) found that users only tolerate the restriction 
policies if they have no other choice. However, most of the systems use policies requiring 
passwords 20-bits strong. This causes a burden on users to deal with a cumbersome 
password restriction policy. The authors also note that websites which typically users do 
not care too much to create strong passwords to log in are often the most popular ones 
and also the most likely to be attacked as they have great amounts of assets for hackers. 
If such popular websites continue to force strict password policies, it might increase the 
security slightly in exchange for a considerable usability cost.  
 
2.5.3 Password Creation Advice  
Most systems that impose password restrictions offer their users password advice 
about creating passwords. The purpose of password advice is both making adoption of 
password policy rules easier and motivating users to create stronger passwords. In a study, 
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password practices of ten popular internet sites which enforce password policy rules and 
offer password advice was examined (Furnell, 2007). That the websites’ password 
restriction policies and password advice are vastly different sometimes caused conflict 
between them. In most of the websites, password advice was found ambiguous and 
unhelpful by users. As existing password policies and advice are far from being consistent 
and effective, it is not easy for users to form accurate mental models of how to create a 
secure and memorable password.  
 
2.5.3.1 Mnemonic Passwords: 
There is a wealth of research investigating the best way to advise users to create 
secure and memorable passwords. In an attempt to encourage users to create easy to 
remember passwords mnemonic phrase-based passwords have been first proposed by 
Barton and Barton (1984). Mnemonic passwords are derived from a memorable sentence 
where users generally use a letter of each word in the sentence. Although most of the 
password advice research is about mnemonic passwords they are rarely recommended to 
use in practice (Furnell, 2007).  
The first and largest experiment on mnemonic passwords is published by Yan et 
al. (2004). They conducted a field study with 288 student participants to compare 
mnemonic passwords along with a password advice and random passwords. The 
password advice was that the password should be at least seven characters long and 
contain at least one different character than a letter. After a month, they successfully 
cracked the 32%, 8%, and 6% of the control, random, and mnemonic groups’ passwords 
respectively. All the cracked mnemonic and random passwords contained dictionary 
words despite the password advice provided to users suggest not to use them. Only users 
who created mnemonic password used special characters, probably because the examples 
provided to them contained special characters. Therefore, the authors stated that password 
advice should definitely convince users to use special characters in their passwords 
although 10% of users did not comply with the advice. By measuring password 
memorability, the authors also found that mnemonic passwords were at least as 
memorable as typical passwords but much more secure than them, and they are at least 
as secure as random passwords but much more memorable than them.  
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However, Kuo et al. (2006) later showed that mnemonic passwords may not be 
really secure as thought. They conducted a study with 290 participants asking half of them 
to create a mnemonic password. They used John the Ripper (Openwall.com, n.d.) with a 
custom dictionary of 400,000 candidate mnemonic passwords from popular sources to 
test the security of the passwords. They managed to crack 4% of mnemonic passwords. 
The authors asked the other half of the participants to create standard passwords and 
cracked 11% of them with a 1,200,000 entry standard dictionary. The authors conclude 
that mnemonic passwords were not more secure than regular passwords, because users 
commonly use phrases which are easily found on the Internet to create their passwords. 
Besides, a higher percentage of passwords can likely be cracked by building a larger 
mnemonic dictionary by an attacker.  
There are more studies which present the different ways to generate a mnemonic 
password. Vu et al. (2007) used two mnemonic password generation methods in a user 
study and let all users choose their own sentence. In the first group, participants were told 
to use the first letter of every word in their sentence, and in the second group, participants 
were instructed to transform their chosen sentence into a mnemonic string of characters. 
For example, they would transform the “I had four snakes” sentence to 
“EyeH@4$nake$”. As the passwords created with the mnemonic string method typically 
have more characters, they were thought more secure. However, the authors found little 
difference in password creation times, login times, and recall error rates between two 
methods. In a previous study, they had also found that passwords which contain more 
characters were more resistant to cracking (Proctor et al., 2002). Unfortunately, as the 
way of substitute words and characters suggested in the study (Leet, 2016) are well known 
by attackers, mnemonic string method may not be very much secure as previously 
thought.  
2.5.3.2 Password Chunking: 
Very little research has been done in password advice apart from mnemonic 
passwords. There are studies on the use of chunking (Miller, 1956 and Cowan, 2001) to 
help users to create easy-to-remember passwords. Carstens et al. (2006) performed a field 
study applying chunking theory to an organisational password guideline. They compared 
common password advice (that the password should contain at least 7 characters, be a 
combination of symbols and letters, not contain repeated characters more than twice, not 
	 27	
be a dictionary word or personal data), to two-chunk, three-chunk, and four-chunk 
passwords. The authors found that four-chunk passwords were not only longer but also 
more memorable than the 7-character, two-chunk, or three-chunk passwords. However, 
they did not carry out a security analysis of the created passwords, or the password advice 
itself. Therefore, in fact four-chunk passwords may have been less secure, as they 
contained fewer distinct symbols than other passwords. Further- more, since participants 
were explicitly told what to use for their chunks such as participants’ first and last initials, 
spouse’s initials, employment start date in the password guideline, it would not have been 
difficult to predict participants’ passwords for an attacker, particularly one familiar with 
the user.  
 
2.5.3.3 Password Strength Meters: 
Password advice can also be represented with a tool measuring strength of the 
password and giving users a numerical result or statements such as ‘weak’, ‘strong’, ‘very 
strong’. These tools are called “password strength meters” which typically illustrate the 
strength of the currently chosen password when a user is registering for an account. The 
meters are commonly used by popular websites (Gmail, PayPal and eBay). In an online 
user study conducted with over 2000 participants, different password strength meters 
were evaluated (Ur et al, 2012). The results showed that the passwords created by users 
who used password meter were more difficult to guess than the passwords created by 
users who did not use a strength meter. Furthermore, users created much stronger 
passwords when they used stringent password meters. However, the authors found that 
meters which are too stringent may cause users to lose motivation and ignore the meter. 
In another study, a novel method called Adaptive Password Strength Meters (APSMs) 
were proposed to measure password strength (Castelluccia et al., 2012). Adaptive 
Password Strength Meters use Markov models (Manning and Schutze, 1999) to measure 
a password’s strength as the collective probability of each character following the 
previous characters in the password. These probabilities can be calculated either based on 
a training set of passwords or the passwords currently in use. Although the authors claim 
that APSMs is better than any other proposed password strength metric to date as it can 
score passwords closer to the “ideal” password strength meter, there has not been 
conducted any formal usability study of APSMs and a practical security evaluation. 
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Kelley et al. (2012) introduced different calculators for estimating the number of guesses 
required to crack a password using a particular cracking algorithm. They calculated the 
percentage of passwords which can be cracked with the implemented algorithm given a 
number of guesses. To compare cracking performance across algorithms, guess number 
calculators for several cracking algorithms on the same set of passwords can be 
implemented. Guess number calculators may be considered the more practical and 
efficient method of proactive password checking (Bishop and Klein, 1995) than running 
a computationally-intensive password cracking algorithm (Forget, 2012).  
 
2.5.4 Password Attacks 
Brute Force Attack: 	
This attack involves running through the combinations of potential passwords to 
find on the correct one. Attackers usually start trying the most common passwords 
(“password”, “123456”, “qwerty”) as well as the combinations of account holder’s 
personal information (name, birthday etc.) if they are known. Then they progress trying 
all the possibilities through mixtures of numbers, letters, and other keyboard characters. 
There are scripts and applications for hackers, written specifically for this purpose which 
can be found on internet (Finjan Blog, 2016). 
The theoretical password space of text based passwords is 94^N, where N is the 
length of password and 94 is the total number of alphabetical characters, numbers and the 
special keyboard characters. Text passwords are more vulnerable to these attacks than 
graphical passwords since it is difficult to track every movement of the mouse or input 
device (Bhanushali et al., 2015).  
Dictionary Attack:  
This is word-based brute force attack, in which attackers use a list of words 
dictionary to break the password. The dictionary includes the most likely chosen 
passwords by the users. If the hacker gains access to user data, it may be supplemented 
with existing usernames, birthdays, addresses, names of family members and so on. The 
difference with the brute force attack is that this attack uses a systematic key search to 
crack passwords. The key takes into consideration only the possibilities which are most 
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likely to succeed. Dictionary attack cannot guarantee to find the correct password as brute 
force attack eventually does.  
 
Key Logger Attack:  
In this type of attack, specific software is installed on the user’s computer 
recording the strokes on a keyboard, clicks and movements of a mouse or even captured 
screenshots to a log file. These log file is used to obtain sensitive data like passwords and 
usernames (Finjan Blog, 2016). The possibility of success of this attack is more with the 
textual passwords since movements and mouse input can change in many graphical 
password scheme.  
Shoulder Surfing Attack:  
This is an observation attack where attacker can obtain the password by simply 
looking over the person’s shoulder. This attack is more likely to succeed in crowded areas 
where people are not aware of the people looking at their screen and in the queues of 
ATMs. Most graphical passwords are susceptible to these attacks since it is easier to 
follow movements or clicks on an image rather than a series of keyboard characters. 
Social Engineering Attack:  
Social Engineering refers to manipulating people to reveal their confidential 
information. Attackers perform various tricks to exploit people. For example, they can 
call people, act as an authorized person and tell people that they need their password to 
resolve a network issue at people’s workplace (Finjan Blog, 2016). 
 
Phishing Attack: 
Phishing attack is a form of social engineering that often uses email, malicious 
websites or several other channels to solicit personal information from users by posing as 
a trustworthy connection (Lord, 2017). The goal of a phishing attempt is to trick users to 
provide login credentials or other sensitive information. For example, user might be sent 
a phishing email by attackers appearing to come from a bank telling the user that they 
should reset their password for a security reason, and direct users to a fraudulent website 
where they can collect user’s login information.   
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2.6 USABILITY OF PASSWORD SECURITY 
Passwords authentication mechanisms mostly involve a trade-off between 
security and usability. The main reason of the imbalance between them is memorability 
problem. When users are forced to create long, complex and randomly generated 
passwords they are likely to write them down or forget them. On the other hand, when 
users choose the weak and predictable passwords they are susceptible to attacks. The 
researchers who tried to crack passwords conducted several experiments and the results 
proved the weaknesses of the user chosen passwords (Klein, 1990; Garrison, 2008). It 
seems more secure password means the less usable password or vice versa (Burnett and 
Kleiman, 2006). Some authors investigated the relationship between password security 
and usability by conducting several studies (Hub, Capek and Myskova, 2011).  
User interface is another aspect of usability, which should be designed to provide 
effectiveness, efficiency and user satisfaction in a specified context of use. Usability 
consists of several criteria including learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors and 
satisfaction, and be examined in different types of user interface (Cerna and Poulova, 
2009) 
In relation to this study, the next section discusses the memorability criteria of 
usability causing the security-usability contradiction.   
 
2.6.1 Memorability   
Memorability is the most important issue in knowledge based authentication 
systems considering the limitation of human memory that puts systems security into high 
risk. Many studies pointed out the users’ difficulty in remembering passwords. Florencio 
and Herley (2007) predicted that each user has on average 25 accounts which should be 
protected with different and complex passwords. This is mostly a difficult requirement 
for users (Adams and Sasse, 1999). Thus, users typically adopt coping strategies to avoid 
forgetting and resetting passwords.  
 
Vu et al. (2007) tested the memorability of text passwords which are created 
obeying various password policy rules. They found that remembering five passwords is 
more difficult than remembering three passwords. Also, users tend to create passwords 
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which are obviously connected to the accounts, as a memory assistance coping strategy.  
 
Chiasson et al. (2009b) conducted a study to compare the memorability of 
multiple text passwords and multiple PassPoints graphical passwords. They found that 
after the passwords were created, graphical passwords were much more easily 
remembered than text passwords. As remembering different passwords across accounts 
is challenging for users, they commonly use coping strategies to overcome the 
memorability issue. One of these strategies is choosing similar passwords across accounts 
which causes multiple password interference. This issue has been studied in a few other 
graphical passwords related research papers (Chiasson et al., 2007; Everitt et al., 2009; 
Mancur and Leplatre, 2007). 
 
 
2.6.2 System-Assigned and User Chosen Passwords 
In text and graphical password authentication mechanisms, either users are 
allowed to set their own passwords or they are assigned a typically random password by 
the system itself. Generally, system-generated passwords are much more secure than user 
chosen passwords, since users mostly choose weak or predictable passwords to remember 
easily. Also, most users are not aware of the probability of guessing attacks and 
capabilities of attackers to compromise passwords (Adams and Sasse, 1999). However, 
passwords assigned by the system are harder for users to memorize and remember as they 
generally consist of combinations of unrelated characters (Yan et al., 2004). Therefore, 
users would not have the chance to use cognitive methods which help memorability in 
creating passwords. Also, passwords that have no meaning for users consequently make 
them harder to remember (Vu et al., 2007; Zviran and Haga, 1993). A research study 
proved that memorability of system-assigned passwords and system-assigned 
passphrases are equivalent regarding password strength (Shay et al., 2011). This means 
that remembering system-assigned passwords is a great burden on human memory 
without any memory aid provided by the authentication system. There are other methods 
which have been researched to aid text password memory such as using semantic content 
(Jeyaraman and Topkara, 2005; Topkara et al., 2007) and cueing. However, Wright et al. 
(2012) found that recognition passphrases which are entered by users by selecting the 
assigned words from a list are not more memorable than system-assigned passwords. This 
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proves that some forms of memory assistance are not sufficient, so further studies are 
needed to evaluate effective forms of memory aid. 
2.6.3 Coping Strategies  
Because of the limitation of human memory users tend to adopt coping strategies 
to remember their passwords (Adams and Sasse, 1999). Since it is not reasonable to 
expect users to remember different and complex text passwords across many accounts, 
these strategies are in use for many years (Gaw and Felten, 2006; Inglesand and Sasse, 
2010). Stobert (2014) conducted a series of interviews to investigate how users cope with 
the many accounts and passwords, and found that users develop rational personal 
strategies including password reuse and writing passwords down. 
The coping strategies for passwords are as follows: 
Writing Passwords Down: 
When users are required to follow strict password creation policies or to change 
their password frequently, they are likely to resort to writing their passwords down to 
overcome the memorability issues. Results of several experiments showed that most users 
tend to write down their passwords except those who were given less stringent password 
creation rules to follow which allow users to create more memorable passwords (Adams 
and Sasse, 1999; Inglesant and Sasse, 2010).  
Although writing passwords down is usually considered to be insecure, some 
security researchers defend writing passwords down if they are kept somewhere safe 
(Cheswick, 2012).  
Password Reuse:  
An alternative strategy to handle passwords is using the same or very similar 
passwords across multiple accounts. Previous research showed that password reuse 
strategy is widely employed by users (Chiasson et al., 2009a; Florencio and Herley, 2007; 
Stone-Gross et al., 2009). However, it has security risks since it increases the chance of 
obtaining passwords for attackers. Attackers could discover the reused password through 
a leaked password set and they can access several accounts (Das et al., 2014; Florencio 
and Herley, 2007; Gaw and Felten, 2006; Hayashi and Hong, 2011; Stobert, 2014).  
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Password Sharing:  
According to common password policy applied in organisations, each account 
which might contain confidential information should be controlled by an individual. 
However, this model can fail in organisations when teamwork is performed. Users 
generally share their passwords to work on same thing (Adams and Sasse, 1999). Patrick 
(2008) found that users’ share corporate and external accounts and password-protected 
documents although, security policy of their organisation do not allow them to do so.  
According to Singh et al. (2007), password or PIN sharing can be acceptable in 
some cases as it becomes necessary.  
Weak Password Selection: 
As is evident by many research, users tend to select predictable passwords 
(Florencio and Herley, 2007; Inglesant and Sasse, 2010; Morris and Thompson, 1979; 
Weir et al., 2010) because of the memorability issue.  According to Florencio, Herley and 
Coskun, (2007) when users perceive the low risk of threats or they do not care much the 
account protected by the password, they are more likely to choose memorable password 
instead secure ones (e.g. complex, long and meaningless passwords). This may be caused 
of users’ misunderstanding of actual threats or attackers’ capabilities (Gaw and Felten, 
2006). Some researchers argue that the solution to coping strategies for passwords could 
be informing users about threats (Herley, Van Oorschot and Patrick, 2009; Whitten and 
Tygar, 1999) 
 
2.6.4 Password Managers 
Another approach to memorability problem is password managers, which store 
passwords and enter them automatically to the associated accounts. Browser-based 
password managers save passwords for a specific website and automatically input them 
when the website is revisited. Dedicated password managers either generate a password 
at login phase by hashing the user’s master password with the website information, or 
they keep the user’s passwords in a password wallet which is protected by a master 
password (Chiasson, Van Oorschot and Biddle, 2006). In either way, users have to use a 
master password. In case the master password is hacked, the attacker can gain access to 
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user’s all accounts.  
2.7 SUMMARY  
This chapter has presented the background information to understand the research 
presented in this thesis. It has pointed out the security and usability issues of password 
authentication mainly focusing on text passwords. Since strong passwords are not 
memorable, and easy to remember ones are also easy to creak, many possible solutions 
have been offered by researchers so far. However, none of them seems to solve the 
problem completely because most of them put their focuses on technical issues rather 
than human factors.  
To align security and usability in password authentication, human factors problem 
should be investigated which is the main focus of this thesis. Proposing usable solutions 
to password problem will likely motivate users to behave in security-conscious way thus 
improve the password security.  
To increase the users’ motivation to adopt good password behaviour and abandon 
the bad ones some behaviour change theories and persuasion strategies can be used. In 
the next chapter, several related psychological behaviour change theories and persuasion 
approaches will be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF RELATED BEHAVIOUR CHANGE THEORIES AND 
PERSUASION STRATEGIES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are several psychological behaviour change theories such as theory of 
planned behaviour and protection motivation theory to be used to change employees’ 
insecure password related behaviours in organisations. In addition to these methods, in 
recent years, persuasion approaches have been commonly used to motivate employees to 
behave in a secure manner.  	
Following sections reviews the related behaviour change theories such as the 
theory of reasoned action, the theory of planned behaviour and protection motivation 
theory in general, and several persuasion strategies. Then several appropriate persuasion 
approaches to change unwanted password behaviours in organisations will be examined. 
 
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In order to achieve changing behaviour, firstly attitudes and intentions have to be 
changed. The related psychological behaviour change theories are presented below. 
3.2.1 Theory of Reasoned Action  
Theory of reasoned action by Fishbain and Ajzen (1975) states that the 
psychological requirements of intended behaviour are attitudes and perceived social 
norms. It assumes that people rationally calculate the costs and benefits of a certain action 
before engaging, and think how important others will see behaviours that need to be taken 
into consideration (Zakaria, 2013). 
The theory’s components are as follow (Figure 3.1):  
. Attitude towards the behaviour: the person’s consideration whether the behaviour 
is good or bad 
. Subjective norm: perceived social pressures by person to perform the particular 
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behaviour  
. Behavioural intention: the intent or plan to perform the behaviour   
. Behaviour: the action itself in a particular situation   
 The theory supports that changes in behaviour and normative beliefs of an individual 
will eventually affect the actual behaviour. 
 
	
Figure 3. 1 Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbain and Ajzen, 1975) 
 
According to the framework offered by the theory, behaviour can be predicted 
from attitudes and norms (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) Several researchers who tested these 
proposals have found that attitudes and subjective norms estimate intentions thus predict 
behaviour (Hale, Householder and Greene, 2002; Sutton, 1998).  
One of the limitations of this theory is its assumption that people have control over 
their behaviour which is not always possible (Fazio, Powell, Williams, 1989). If people 
fail to perform their intention, they do not act on attitude or norm. Ajzen attempted to fix 
this problem, by proposing an alternative approach known as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).  
3.2.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour  
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) developed by Ajzen (1988) is designed to 
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explain and predict human behaviours in a particular context. In fact, it is a social 
psychology theory, it has been widely used to explain the behaviour of many different 
disciplines. According to this theory, the intention is the primary explanation of 
individuals to carry out an act; and the intentions are influenced by attitudes toward the 
behaviour, perceived social pressure or subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control. In the theory of planned behaviour there are three basic factors that influence the 
underlying intentions of one's behaviour. These are: behavioural attitudes, perceived 
social pressure and behavioural control, or, in other words, perception of self-efficacy 
(Fishbain and Ajzen, 1975). Figure 3.2 illustrates the components of the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).  
	
Figure 3. 2 Theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) 
	
The TPB claims that behavioural achievement can be provided by intention and 
behavioural control. It is comprised of six constructs which are attitudes, behavioural 
intention, subjective norms, social norms, perceived power and perceived behavioural 
control that collectively represent a person's actual control over the behaviour (Bada and 
Sasse, 2014). As an additional component to the theory of reasoned action, perceived 
behavioural control, indicates the people’s perception of how much control they have 
over the behaviour.  
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3.2.3 Protection Motivation Theory  
Protection motivation theory (PMT) was originally developed as a framework to 
explain the influence of fear appeal on attitudes and health behaviour (Rogers, 
1975). The theory suggests that if the threat can be perceived by people as fearful, they 
will more likely act in a cautious manner, and try to prevent the possible threat (Humaidi 
and Balakrishnan, 2012).  
The theory has been later extended (Rogers, 1983) to provide more explanation of 
the impact of persuasive communications focusing on the cognitive processes which 
mediate behaviour change. PMT is organized around two cognitive processes: the process 
of threat appraisal and the process of coping appraisal. The following three threat 
appraisal factors explain how threats are perceived by people. 
Vulnerability:  Perception that the individual is sensitive to the threats. 
Perceived severity: the importance of the threat.  
Rewards/benefits: motivation for increasing or protecting the undesired behaviours.   
In addition to threat appraisals, PMT also includes three coping appraisal factors 
that explain an individual’s ability to handle the threat. These coping appraisal factors are 
as follows:  
Response efficacy: beliefs as to whether the recommended action step will actually avoid 
the threat.  
Self-efficacy: the extent of the belief in implementing the protective behaviour.   
Response cost: removing reinforcement for an undesirable or disruptive behaviour. 
 Figure 3.3 illustrates the PMT framework and its components. 
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Figure 3. 3 Protection Motivation Theory (Ajzen, 1991) 
 
Due to its wide scope of applicability, protection motivation theory has been 
applied by many researchers from different disciplines. In recent years, many security 
researchers especially those focusing on information security behaviour (Herath and Rao, 
2009; Johnston and Warkentin, 2010; Pahnila, Siponen, Mahmood, 2007; Srisawang, 
Thongmak and Ngarmyarn, 2015) and user motivation (Posey et al., 2011; Posey, Roberts 
and Lowry, 2015) studied this theory.      
  The studies applied PMT in the information security field mostly focused on 
vulnerability, severity, users’ habits and prior knowledge as these are more relevant to 
the outcome of information security policy compliance (Herath and Rao, 2009; Vance, 
Siponen and Pahnila, 2009; Zhang and McDowell, 2009).  
  Fear, one of the elements in PMT construct, has been also studied quite frequently. 
For example, Weirich and Sasse (2002) proposed the use of fear appeal in order to 
motivate users to comply with the secure password behaviour. They suggested changes 
in the existing password guidelines by including the punishment regime enforced by 
organisations to inspect any misbehaviour. Some researchers proposed threats as the fear 
elements to turn users’ attention to security compliance behaviour (Xu, Rosson and 
Carroll, 2007). However, the effect of fear elements especially the punishment regime is 
still being investigated since it may differ considering the other factors which influence 
employees’ password-related behaviour. 
The next sections investigate the persuasion elements, approaches and practices 
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in detail.  
3.3 PERSUASION  
Persuasion, which is a form of attempted influence (Cialdini, 2001), aims to 
change a person's beliefs, attitudes, intensions, motivations or behaviours toward some 
idea or another person (Gass and Seiter, 2015).  
Today, persuasion is mostly considered as science rather than art. It is used by 
numerous different organisations from advertising agencies, public relations firms, 
marketing and sale companies as well as social activists and speech writers. This shows 
that persuasion is a powerful tool and when applied correctly it can lead to a beneficial 
outcome for both communication parties.  
Researchers attempt to evaluate and increase its effectiveness in controlling 
behaviour following a systematic procedure (Carlins and Abelson, 1970). In this thesis, 
persuasion is used as an approach towards improving users’ behaviour in the domain of 
password security. 
 
3.3.1 Definition of Persuasion 
Scholars have defined persuasion in different ways. While some communication 
scholars define it as a “conscious attempt by one individual to change the attitudes, beliefs 
or behaviour of another individual or group of individuals through the transmission of 
some message” (Bettinghaus and Cody, 1987), another scholar’s definition of persuasion 
is “a successful intentional effort at influencing another’s mental state through 
communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom” 
(O’Keefe, 1990).   
  As a combination of these definitions, Perloff (2003) defined persuasion as a 
symbolic process where communicators try to convince others to change their attitudes 
or behaviour related to a particular issue via transmission of a message, allowing them to 
do their choice freely. Perloff’s definition has five components as follows:   
1- Persuasion is a symbolic process. 
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2- Persuasion involves an attempt to influence   
3- People persuade themselves.  
4- Persuasion involves the transmission of a message.   
5- Persuasion requires free choice.   
Coercion is another form of attempted influence, which differs from persuasion. 
Coercion is forcing someone to act in an involuntary manner using intimidation, threats 
or some forms of pressure. If people’s perception is that they have no choice but to 
comply, the influence is viewed more as coercive (Perloff, 2008). Persuasion is more 
powerful and effective in a long term as it allows people to participate voluntarily in the 
persuasion process (Miller, 1980), however, coercion has a short-term effect on 
influencing people.  
 
3.3.2 Effects of Persuasion 
Persuasion is a communication process so it involves three main elements; source 
(human), message, and receiver (human). In the human-computer-persuasion model the 
source is substituted by a computer while transmitting verbal and non-verbal messages to 
receiver, users. The source is also called persuader and the receiver is called persuadee in 
the persuasion process.  
Miller (1980) has proposed that communications exert three different persuasive 
effects: shaping, reinforcing, and changing responses.  
Shaping: This means that attitudes are “shaped” by associating some patterns with a 
product, person, idea or situation.  
Reinforcing: This means making attitudes more resistant to change. Contrary to popular 
opinion, many persuasive communications are not designed to convert people, but to 
reinforce a position they already hold.  
Changing: This means changing of people’s response to a specific issue. It is perhaps the 
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most important persuasive impact and the one that comes most frequently to mind when 
the persuasion is considered.  
The potential effects of persuasion by Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2008) which is 
similar to Miller’s (1980) is illustrated in Figure 3.4:  
	
Figure 3. 4 The three possible effects of persuasion (Kukkonen and Harjumaa, 2008) 
 
3.3.3 Persuasive Technology (PT) 
Persuasive technology (PT) which has been introduced by Fogg (1998) is 
designed to change attitudes or behaviours of the users through persuasion. Such 
technologies are commonly used in many field such as sales, politics, public health and 
recently in human-computer interaction and information security.   
PT suggests that computing technologies
 
can motivate and influence users to 
behave in a desired way. Fogg (1998) categorized persuasive technologies by their 
functionality proposing a framework, Functional Triad. According to the framework, PT 
can function as a tool, medium and social actor.  
  As a tool, PT can increase people's capability to perform a target which they could 
not do before by making it easier for them.  
  As medium, the computer can set the format to be easily interpreted by users.   
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As social actors, PT opens the door for computers to apply social influence such 
as following social and dynamic rules such as greetings and apologies or animating 
characteristics such as voice communication or emotions (Fogg, 2002).  
Figure 3.5 shows the overview of the Functional Triad focusing on principles and 
attributes of three functionality elements.  
	
Figure 3. 5 The Persuasive Technology framework (Fogg, 1998) 
In recent years, most researchers in the field of human-computer interaction have 
placed their focus on PT since the framework above does have its limitations and need to 
be improved.  
3.3.4 Weapons of Influence 
Weapons of influence is a persuasion method involving six principles introduced 
by Cialdini (1988). The principles are reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social 
proof, liking, authority and scarcity.  
Reciprocation: The principles suggests that people will treat others the same way 
they are treated. In other words, reciprocation recognizes that people feel indebted to 
those who do something for them. The principle is used by charity organisations by 
sending gifts to potential donators. People who receive a gift are more likely to donate no 
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matter how the gift is. The gift does not have to be expensive or even material; 
information and favours can work too.  
Social Proof:   According to this principle, people tend to look at what other 
people do, before they act in a situation. Social proof has powerful effects on motivating 
people in different activities from charity donations to phobia remission. For example, an 
experiment showed that when children who are afraid of dogs see another child playing 
with dogs, they will be encouraged and willing to play with the dogs after a while.  
Another experiment is conducted by Cialdini (2005) and his team in a hotel where 
visitors were provided different types of cards in their room to convince them to reuse 
their towels. They tested the efficiency of four types of cards on motivating hotel visitors 
(Polanski, n.d.).  
1-  The first card mentioned environmental reasons to encourage visitors to reuse 
their towels  
2-  The second card said the hotel would donate a portion laundry savings to a non-
profit environmental organisation 
3- The third card said the hotel had already given a donation and asked: “Will you 
please join us?” 
4- The fourth card said the majority of guests reused their towels at least once during 
their stay.  
At the end of the experiment, the percentage of visitors who reused their towels were 
per request were as sign-1: 38%, sign-2: 36%, sign-3: 46% and sign-4: 48%.  
The results showed that, when guests found out that most people who stayed in the 
same hotel reused their towels, they were more likely to comply with the request.  
Cialdini (2001) claims that the social proof principle is more powerful under two 
conditions; uncertainty and similarity. When people are uncertain about a course of action 
or if the situation ambiguous they are more likely imitate the others’ decisions and actions. 
Also, people are more inclined to follow others who are similar to themselves (e.g. their 
peers, colleagues) 
In the empirical study presented in the next chapter, this principle is evaluated in terms 
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of its efficiency on motivating employees to adopt good password behaviours. The 
employees are asked that if their colleagues are rewarded or punished for their insecure 
password practices at work, how this situation would affect their motivation to follow the 
password policy.  
Commitment and consistency: This principle suggests that people are more likely to 
do something after they agreed to it verbally or in a written statement. Once agreed, the 
person will behave consistently with that commitment.  
This principle might work in situations where commitment is highly desired. Zakaria 
(2013) conducted a study creating a password guideline framed by this principle to find 
out whether users more likely comply with the password policy.  
Liking: According to his principle, people prefer to say ‘yes’ to others they know and 
like. People are more likely to be influenced by those who are physically attractive or 
similar to themselves (Burger et al., 2004). Marketers commonly apply this principle to 
increase the sale of their products by emphasising similarity factor that increase the 
overall attractiveness and likeability.   
Authority: This principle states that people are more likely to listen to experts or 
follow the lead of experts as they respect authority. Titles or impressive clothing and even 
the expensive automobiles are some proven factors in lending credibility to any individual 
(Cialdini, 1988).  
Stanley Milgram, a psychologist in Yale University, conducted several experiments 
in a study to show the obedience to authority. The study proved the strong pressure in 
society to comply with the request of a figure of authority. Many normal, educated and 
psychologically healthy participants in the experiments are observed to be willing to 
deliver dangerous and severe levels of pain to another person when asked to do so by an 
authoritative figure (Milgram, 1974).  
In the empirical study presented in the next chapter, efficiency of this principle on 
motivation of employees to secure their passwords is evaluated. The employees’ 
password practices were observed when they were given a seminar/training by a security 
expert who also mentions the possible threats.  
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Scarcity: This principle relates to supply and demand. People perceive the things as 
more valuable and want them more when they are less available. This principle is 
commonly used by marketers using the limited number and deadline terms to try to 
convince people that the access of their products is restricted by amount and time.  
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 This chapter presented several related psychological behaviour change theories 
and persuasion approaches. To improve the password security and usability in 
organisations two persuasion strategies have been chosen to be utilised in the empirical 
study presented in the following chapter.  
The authority and social proof principles of Cialdini’s weapons of influence 
(Cialdini, 1988) have been selected to be used to increase users’ adoption of good 
password-related behaviour, thus increase the information security level of organisations. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies in addition to reward and punishment and 
fear appeal strategies on employees’ password-behaviours in the organisations an 
empirical study is conducted. The details of the empirical study are presented in the next 
chapter.   
Next chapter will also identify several other factors including organizational, 
motivational and education and awareness factors affecting user behaviour, and propose 
some possible countermeasures to increase password security in organisations.  
	
 
 
 
 
	
	
 
	 47	
CHAPTER 4 
IMPROVING PASSWORD SECURITY BEHAVIOURS IN 
ORGANISATIONS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Today around the world, information and computing (ICT) systems are 
extensively used, so organisations need to keep them secure. To achieve this, they mostly 
develop and use information security policies that specify ‘correct’ behaviour of 
employees. Numerous researches proved that most employees do not comply with 
specified behaviours. While some of them are not aware of the risks or do not know the 
correct behaviour, most of them do not comply with the policies consciously although 
they know the correct behaviour.  
This chapter concentrates chiefly on human and organisational factors within the 
information security system particularly focusing on password security. The impact of 
personal and organisational factors influencing employees’ behaviour, irrespective of the 
power of technical controls can be drastic (Bishop, 2002). In this aspect, human factors-
based vulnerabilities can occur because of poor security protection such as weak 
passwords or poor usability, and the system may become susceptible to threats. The 
results of useless organisational policies and insecure employee practices causes 
susceptibilities (Besnard and Arief, 2004). 
The chapter addresses the challenges of changing employees’ undesired behaviour 
and practices in password authentication, and proposes possible countermeasures to avoid 
security failures. Changing undesired behaviour require much more than warning users 
about risks and telling them the importance of adopting good behaviour. According to 
Bada and Sasse (2014), first of all people must be able to understand and apply the advice, 
and then they must be willing to do, and the latter requires changes to attitudes and 
intentions. Several psychological behaviour change theories such as theory of planned 
behaviour and protection motivation theory which are presented in the previous chapter 
are used to change employees’ insecure password related behaviours in organisations. In 
addition to these methods, in recent years, persuasion approaches have been commonly 
used to motivate employees to behave in a secure manner.   
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To manage changing user behaviours which undermine password security in 
organisations, the current sources of persuasion along with organisational, personal, 
environmental and social factors need to be identified. There are more determinants such 
as cultural differences which can also influence the users’ behaviour in organisations. 
However, within this chapter we primarily focus on organisational factors affecting users’ 
password habits and practices thus the information security level of the organisations. 
Since the vast majority of behaviours are habitual, IT departments have a key role to 
support users to change from existing habits to better information security habits.   
IT departments must influence and motivate employees to adopt secure 
behaviours. This requires more than simply telling people what they should do and should 
not do. In this chapter, first the factors affecting employees’ password habits and practices 
will be identified. Then an empirical study will be presented to explore which factors 
most affect password security level in different organisations and how the related 
behaviour change theories and persuasion strategies can be utilised to improve the 
adoption of good password behaviour. 
 
4.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING USERS’ PASSWORD-RELATED BEHAVIOURS 
Many organisations apply advanced information security technologies against the 
external threats. However, the main concern is related to internal threats caused by poor 
user behaviours (Leach, 2003). That 80% of security incidents in organisations are caused 
by internal threats is reported in a study (Boujettif and Wang, 2010). This proves that 
employees either intentionally or unintentionally cause many security breaches in 
organisations (Kreicberge, 2010; Siponen et al.,2010).  
In this chapter, the factors affecting users’ password-behaviour in organisations 
are categorized in three groups: organisational factors, motivational factors and education 
and awareness factors similar to the proposed information security framework by 
Soltanmohammadi, Asadi and Ithnin (2013). The following sections details these factors.  
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4.2.1 Organisational Factors 
There are many organisational factors including policies, workload, 
environmental issues and organisational culture influencing information security in 
organisations. Many researchers investigated the significance of policy management, 
impact of effectual security applications and polices on information security and response 
of employees to the requirements of these policies (Fulford and Doherty, 2003; Karyda, 
2005; Pahnila, 2007). Although these policies aim at forcing employees to act properly 
to increase system security (Sarriegi et al., 2006), they mostly have a reverse effect on 
security (e.g strict password policies to cause users to adopt coping strategies). One of the 
reason is that they cause more workload which is considered as an organisational factor 
affecting employees’ behaviour (Kraemer et al., 2006; Kraemer and Carayon, 2007) 
Although, culture and social factors can impact the employees’ behaviour and 
information security systems of organisations significantly, they are not our main focus 
in this study.  
 
4.2.2 Motivational Factors 
If users do not believe the information that is protected by the password 
mechanism accessed by themselves is at risk of being targeted, they will not be motivated 
to behave in a secure manner (Weirich, 2005). If users are educated about password 
security and aware of potential threats, they will behave in a proper manner. However, 
not only education and awareness but also usability issues of authentication mechanisms 
cause employees’ lack of motivation. In most cases, authentication process creates an 
overhead for users. Users tend to cut corners to reduce extra load given a chance if they 
are not motivated to adopt secure password-related behaviours in organisations (Whitten 
and Tygar, 1999). For these reason, designing usable authentication schemes which will 
reduce the overhead is important. 
On the other hand, employees show a better performance regarding security when 
they are controlled or monitored by leaders (Aarons, 2006). Leadership is a process to 
affect and motivate employees to follow rules. Many studies about leadership in 
organisations have revealed that it notably affects the employees’ work performance 
(Kaushal, 2011 and Lo et al., 2010). Therefore, leadership plays an important role to direct 
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users and help them to fulfil with information security policies. IT specialists act as 
leaders regarding information and password security in organisations.  
Personal factors also impact the employees’ security-related behaviours. Their 
knowledge and understanding of security issues as well as their experiences, perceptions, 
attitudes and beliefs are the main influencers on behaviour (Coventry, et al., 2014). 
Personal motivation and personal ability, are the most powerful sources of influence 
(Patterson et al., 2011).  
Rewards and punishment is another influencing method which can be used to increase 
employees’ motivation to follow password policies. Rewarding people to do the right 
things makes them more security conscious. It should be used in conjunction with 
motivational strategies that encourage intrinsic satisfaction and social support (Kohn, 
1994).  However, rewards and punishment can have unintended consequences. Rewards 
for some employees who follow the standards may backfire, causing others to feel 
resentful (Patterson et al., 2008).  
 
4.2.3 Education and Awareness Factors 
Beyond monitoring and controlling employees, information security training has 
an important role on providing information security skills to employees. Users’ 
knowledge and skills can affect their motivation to behave in a security-conscious fashion 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999). Information security training programs provide information 
about the importance of information system security to increase users’ skill and 
understanding towards information security (Koskosas et al., 2011; Martin and Rice, 
2011).  
Information Security Awareness Campaigns:   
Organisations need to secure their information assets and systems, and develop 
policies that specify the expected behaviours for their employees. They encourage 
employees by dispensing advice but major security failures continue to occur (Kirlappos 
and Sasse, 2012; Kirlappos, Parkin and Sasse, 2014).  
Influence strategists need to identify behaviours which they wish to change before 
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they start trying to change them. Equally important is identifying the crucial moments 
when they are most likely to fail in meeting these goals (Patterson et al., 2011).  
Awareness should not be perceived as training only. The purpose of awareness 
campaigns is simply to focus attention on security issues. They are intended to allow 
individuals to recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly (Bada and Sasse, 
2014).  
 
4.3 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: IMPROVING PASSWORD SECURITY 
BEHAVIOURS IN ORGANISATIONS 
4.3.1 Introduction  
A questionnaire and interview-based study has been conducted to investigate the 
impact of several factors on users’ password behaviour. To evaluate the efficiency of 
several persuasion strategies on motivating employees to adopt good password behaviour 
and abandon coping strategies which puts organisations’ information security into risks, 
a case study has also been performed.  
To conduct the questionnaires and interviews an ethical approval was sought and 
obtained from the University of Sussex Sciences and Technology Cross Schools Research 
Ethics Committee (C-REC). The certificate of the ethical approval can be viewed in 
Appendix A.   
The following sections presents the details of the empirical study.  
 
4.3.2 Motivation of the Empirical Study  
The purpose of this empirical study is investigating the reasons for employees' 
lack of motivation about protecting their passwords against potential security failures in 
organisations. There is a wealth of research demonstrating that, despite technical 
precautions taken by people within the organisations, undesired password-related 
behaviours cause organisations to lose confidential information. 
In recent years, researchers started to use persuasion strategies, methods and 
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approaches to change those behaviours to improve information and computer security. 
This study utilised several persuasion strategies to eliminate employees' insecure 
password practices and persuade and motive them to behave in a more secure manner. To 
do this, firstly, underlying reasons to cause users' insecure password practices should be 
investigated and suitable methods should be applied to prevent possible security failures. 
For this purpose, in-depth interviews and surveys have been conducted with employees 
and IT specialists in different positions who use passwords to access important 
information in several organisations in Turkey.  
In the previous chapter, several related behaviour change theories and persuasion 
strategies have been reviewed. Based on the review, several persuasion strategies which 
suit with the aim of the study have been chosen, and the efficiency of these strategies on 
users’ password behaviour have been evaluated in this empirical study.  
To use appropriate persuasion strategies to increase users’ adoption of good 
password-related behaviour, thus increase the information security level of organisations 
is the main purpose of this study. Therefore, this study has utilised the authority and social 
proof principles of Cialdini’s weapons of influence (Cialdini, 1988), in addition to 
rewards-punishment and fear appeal strategies. In order to determine whether these 
strategies have any effect on employees’ password-behaviours in the organisations they 
have been asked related questions in a questionnaire. For example, to find out the impact 
of social factor principle on employees’ password practices, participants of the study have 
been asked if their colleagues rewarded or punished for their password practices, how this 
situation would motivate them to behave. The questionnaire and interview questions can 
be viewed in Appendix A.     
Considering the results of the questionnaire, a case study has been conducted to 
test the efficiency and practicality of these principles in real practices.  
 
4.3.3 Methodology of the Empirical Study 
4.3.3.1 The Design and Apparatus  
The researcher has conducted questionnaires with the non-IT employees and 
interviews with the IT employees in several companies from different sectors. The 
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questionnaire and interview questions are different as the computer and information 
security background of the IT and non-IT employees are different. The study aims to 
reveal the differences of perceptions of the IT and non-IT employees about the importance 
of information security.  
The participants were contacted via email or phone call to make an appointment 
to participate the study. The questionnaires and interviews have been conducted by the 
researcher mostly in the employees’ workplaces.  
The apparatus used in this study are as below: 
- A questionnaire for the non-IT employees  
- Interview questions for the IT employees  
- Consent forms to read and accept for all participants 
All the apparatus is included in the section Appendix A.  
While the questionnaire given to the non-IT employees included 16 questions, the 
IT employees’ interview included 10 questions. The questions were set to cover all 
important issues related to users’ security behaviours from coping strategies to 
organizations’ security mechanisms. The questions were clear to avoid the 
misunderstanding of the users. There are many studies on employees’ security behaviour 
which used the similar approach, materials and questions in the literature (Beautement et 
al., 2016; Herath and Rao, 2009 and Weirich, 2005).  
While the average time to complete the questionnaire was approximately 15 
minutes, time to complete the interview was about 20 minutes.  
 
4.3.3.2 The Procedure 
At the beginning of the empirical study, all participants were given a brief 
information about the study and asked to read and accept the consent forms. For those 
participants who were interested in getting more information about the study researcher’s 
contact information were provided in the consent form. Once the participants had 
accepted and signed the consent forms, they answered the questionnaire or interview 
	 54	
questions.  
There was not any reward / incentive for participating this study.   
The empirical study was finished by thanking to the participants for their 
participation.   
 
4.3.3.3 Demographics 
In this study, employees from different business areas have been asked a number 
of questions to find out the reasons for their insecure behaviours and how they would be 
motivated to behave in a secure manner. 121 participants from six sectors were recruited 
for this empirical study. 25 IT specialists have been interviewed and 96 non – IT 
employees have been given a questionnaire to fill out. In Table 4.1, number of the 
participants from each sector can be seen. Public sector refers to some government-
affiliated institutions such as General Directorate of Highways in the experiment. 
Although the hospital is an organisation from public sector, it is classified as health sector 
in this study. All other organisations are private companies.   
All the employees who participated in the study use passwords to access critical 
information in the organisations they work at. IT specialists who are interviewed have 
also been recruited from these organisations to see if there is a match between their 
perceptions of password security and other employees’.  
The numbers of the employees from six sectors including banking, construction 
companies, health, insurance companies, public sector and software companies indicates 
the numbers of non-IT employees from each sector. However, the number of IT 
employees (N=25) indicates the total number of IT employees from all sectors (see Table 
4.1). The data collected from the IT employees is analysed separately (see Figure 4.8). 
This data is not included in the data analysis of the non-IT employees (N=96) since the 
interview questions of the IT employees and the questionnaire questions of the non-IT 
employees were different. The questionnaire and interview questions can be viewed in 
Appendix A. 
 The data collected from the interviews of the IT employees were also used to 
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conduct the case study (see section 4.3.5). 7 non-IT employees from software companies 
should not be confused with the IT employees. Non-IT employees from software 
companies work in research and development departments and they are not responsible 
for the duties of IT employees.  
 
Table 4.1 Number of the participants from all sectors 
Banking 
Construction 
Companies Health 
Insurance 
Companies Public Sector 
Software 
Companies IT 
14 11     41       7 16 7 25 
 
Most of the participants were male. The demographic details of the participants can be 
seen in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Gender percentages of the non-IT employees 
 
59% 
41% 
Non-IT	professionals
Male
Female
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Figure 4.2 Gender percentages of the IT employees 
 
4.3.4 The Results and Analysis of the Empirical Study  
This section presents the results of the empirical study based on the employees’ 
and IT specialists’ responses to questions.   
 
Frequency of Password Change:  
In all organisations involved in this study, information security and privacy issues 
were quite important and additionally, any hacking or leak would be consequential. For 
instance, while all participants from the hospital can access the private health information 
of patients, participants from banks can view the bank account details of their customer. 
All this information is protected with a password. Changing the passwords used for access 
to organisational information frequently is a requirement for employees. However, 
password change requirements implemented by the systems were different in each 
organisation. For banking employees, password change policies were most strict, they 
were required to change their passwords on a monthly basis. On the other hand, for 
construction companies and health professionals, there were no regular password change 
requirements. Insurance Company and Public Sector employees were changing their 
passwords every six months. And the software company employees were asked to change 
their passwords once per year (see Table 4.2).   
 
76% 
24% 
IT		professionals
Male
Female
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Table 4.2 Frequencies of Password Change Requirements in Each Sector 
Banking 
Construction 
Companies Health 
Insurance 
Companies Public Sector 
Software 
Companies 
Every 
month 
No password 
change 
requirement 
No 
password 
change 
requirement 
Every six 
months 
Every six 
months 
Every year 
 
 
Use of Coping Strategies: 
Employees from six sectors were asked whether they use the following three 
coping strategies; sharing passwords, using similar passwords or reusing the same 
passwords, and writing down their passwords (see Figure 4.3). 
 
	
Figure 4. 3 Preferences of coping strategies with the passwords in each organisation 
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Chi-square analyses yielded significant results only for sharing passwords, 
Likelihood Ratio χ2(2, N = 96) = 30.854, p < .001. This difference mostly comes from the 
hospital and software company employees. 31 out of 41 hospital employees and 5 out of 
7 software company employees reported that they shared their passwords with others, 
while in other groups, half of the participants or less were in favour of sharing passwords.  
There were no significant differences between sectors in terms of password reuse 
behaviour (Likelihood Ratio χ2(2, N = 96) = 3.682, p = .596) or in terms of writing 
passwords down (Likelihood Ratio χ2(2, N = 96) = 7.309, p = .199). 
Apart from the specific coping strategies preferred, the number of the strategies 
used is also important. Only 11 % of the participants who attended this study reported no 
use of any coping strategies. Most of the participants use one or two coping strategies (72 
%, see Figure 4.4).  
 
	
Figure 4. 4 Distribution of employees according to their use of coping strategies 
 
Additionally, the number of coping strategies used by employees of different 
sectors can be seen in Figure 4.5. Most of the construction company employees seemed 
to use two or three strategies (see Table 4.3). Similarly, all health industry employees 
preferred using coping strategies. 
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Training: 
Some people in the sample were trained on the importance of information security. 
Table 3.3 shows the percentages of people who had training about password security.  
 
Table 4.3 Number of Employees with Information Security Training in Each Sector 
Banking 
Construction 
Companies Health 
Insurance 
Companies Public Sector 
Software 
Companies 
71% 0% 7% 0% 44% 71% 
 
Moreover, training impacted people’s insecure password behaviour as Figure 4.6 
illustrates.  
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Figure 4. 5 Numbers of coping strategies used by employees in each sector 
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Figure 4. 6 Impact of password security training on adoption of coping strategies 
 
Chi-square analyses showed that those who had a training on information security 
are less likely to share their passwords such that 72% of those who had training did not 
share their passwords and 59 % of those without a training share their passwords (χ2 (1, 
N = 96) = 7.182, p = .007). Training factor did not yield a significant result in terms of 
reuse of passwords or using similar passwords (χ2 (1, N = 96) = 1.590, p = .207). 
Similarly, training did not make any difference in terms of writing down the passwords 
either (χ2 (1, N = 96) = .558, p = .455). Additionally, most of those who had a training 
(84%) did not consider lack of training as a potential cause of insecure password 
behaviour whereas 65 % of those without training mentioned lack of training as a 
potential cause, and the difference was statistically significant (χ2 (1, N = 96) = 17.635, p 
< .001). 
 
Reasons for Insecure Password Practices: 
Five potential reasons were investigated in terms of their impacts on adopting poor 
security behaviours. In this empirical study, the usability issues of security mechanisms 
refer to password creation policies of the organisations and user interface of used 
authentication schemes. Although, they can be categorized as organisational factors they 
are evaluated separately in this study. Workload is evaluated as the organisational factor.  
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When participants reported whether they agreed or not with mainly five reasons 
for insecure password behaviour (See Figure 4.7), personal factors were the least 
attributed cause among others. 
 
	
Figure 4. 7 The reasons for employees’ insecure password behaviours 
 
Those working in the software industry attributed insecure behaviour least to the 
usability of mechanisms. This trend was quite similar for the IT professional (See Figure 
4.8). Only 16 % of all IT professionals agreed that usability issues were also a cause for 
the insecure password behaviour. Most of the IT Personnel considered lack of education 
(72%) and lack of motivation (56%) as the potential reasons for it. Construction 
companies also followed this trend (64% and 82% respectively).  In the banking sector, 
the main reasons were usability issues (71%) and workload (64%). Health professionals 
rated all factors except personal factor with highest agreement. Across all factors, more 
than 70 % of the health professionals identified the given concerns as potential causes of 
insecure password behaviour.  
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Figure 4. 8 Reasons for employees’ insecure password behaviours according to IT specialists’ 
perception 
 
Improving secure password behaviour: 
Training on password security, usable password mechanisms, personal beliefs on 
ethics to maintain privacy of information as well as several persuasion strategies such as 
social proof, fear appeal and rewards and punishment have been evaluated to find out 
whether they have any effect on motivating employees to adopt good password 
behaviours.  
The question asked to participants in the questionnaire in relation to each 
strategy/method were as follows: 
Which one of the followings would motivate you to abandon insecure behaviours (sharing 
passwords etc.) and adopt the good ones?  
User Education: If you were trained about the password security in organisation.  
Usable Password Mechanisms: If you were using usable password mechanisms (e.g. 
password policies or guidelines which allow you to create memorable and strong 
passwords)  
Reward and Punishment: If you were punished for your insecure behaviours or rewarded 
for the good behaviours. 
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Ethical Issues: If you personally believe that to care protecting privacy of information 
you access via password is an ethical behaviour. 
Fear Appeals: If you received a message from IT department informing you about the 
potential threats to passwords, and consequences of your careless behaviour.  
Social Proof:  If you witnessed that your colleagues care to protect their passwords. 
According to responses, all industries considered training as a potential solution 
more or less (all above 29%). The first three industries in Figure 4.9 believed more in 
training, and the difference were approaching statistical significance, Likelihood Ratio χ2 
(5, N = 96) = 9.437, p = .093.  
 
	
Figure 4. 9 Effect of training on motivating employees from different organisations to adopt 
secure password behaviours 
	
For the usability of the mechanisms, sectors significantly differed (Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 (5, N = 96) = 27.440, p < .001. Banking, Health and Public Sector employees 
reported that usability of security mechanisms would impact secure password behaviour 
(all above 75%) whereas those who worked in more tech related jobs disagreed on this 
solution (all up to 29 % agreement). Figure 4.10 shows the effect of usable password 
mechanisms on employees’ motivation adopting secure password behaviours in each 
organisation. 
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Figure 4. 10 Effect of usable password mechanisms on motivating employees from different 
organisations to adopt secure password behaviours 
 
Other social and personal factors were also evaluated based on participants’ 
responses on the related questions. Results show that, reward and punishment methods 
would be a solution for insecure password behaviour according to employees from all 
sectors except hospital employees (>70% vs. 12%; Likelihood Ratio χ2 (5, N = 96) = 
50.429, p < .001). Participants’ personal beliefs regarding the importance of information 
privacy was a potential motivation for bank employees (71%) and similarly for insurance 
company employees (57%), Likelihood Ratio χ2 (5, N = 96) = 15.353, p = .009. Although 
health information should be kept private, unfortunately less than half of the participants 
from the hospital gave importance to this.  
People from all industries agreed that fear appeals would improve secure 
behaviour (all above 71% and not significantly different from each other, Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 (5, N = 96) =1.581, p = .904). Similarly, most of the participants agreed that 
social proof would improve secure behaviour (all above 57 % and not significantly 
different from each other, Likelihood Ratio χ2 (5, N = 96) =1.582, p = .903). Figure 4.11 
illustrates the effect of the aforementioned strategies on employees’ password-related 
behaviours in each organisation. 
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Figure 4. 11 Effect of other motivation strategies on employees’ password-related behaviours in 
organisations 
 
4.3.5 Case Study: Password Security in the Hospital 
According to questionnaire results and IT experts’ statements, the hospital 
employees are the less motivated participants about protecting their passwords in this 
experiment. Therefore, the researcher and the IT crew of the hospital worked together to 
utilise some persuasion approaches to increase the employees’ motivation. During two 
months, their password practices were observed to understand whether the applied 
strategies made a positive change on their behaviours. 
Most of the employees of hospital and software company reported that they shared 
their passwords with others, while in other groups, half of the participants or less were in 
favour of sharing passwords. The reason of this situation is that the participants from the 
software company mostly work on the same projects so they share their passwords to 
contribute to the project. As they share the responsibility for their work, this might be 
acceptable. However, the situation is quite different in the hospital. The most common 
scenario is that the attending physicians share their passwords with their assistants, junior 
doctors or interns, and ask them to enter the patients’ medical information including 
prescribed medicines to the computer. However, only the attending physicians is 
authorized the prescribe medicines. This sometimes caused the wrong prescriptions 
which put the patients’ health into a serious risk. The IT department alleged that password 
sharing habits did not seem to be decreased although some patients sued the doctors in 
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the past. Probably most of the employees do not think that it happens to them until they 
face the same situation. The IT crew also stated that most employees do not lock the 
computer screen and even unauthorised people can see the patients’ medical information. 
To raise awareness of the consequences of such behaviours, employees have been first 
sent an email informing them about the past password failure events by the IT department. 
The email included advises for employees to choose stronger passwords, and not to share 
their passwords with colleagues. The employees were also informed that in similar cases, 
the employees will be accused of neglecting the privacy of patients’ health information 
and will be reported to the manager from now on.  In the following two weeks 28% of 
the employees in the organisation changed their passwords including the ones who used 
the same password since they started the work.  
The next approach was punishing the employees who did not lock the computer 
screens, sharing their passwords with the colleagues while they are away from hospital. 
However, it was difficult to control these behaviours so no positive change in behaviours 
was observed.   
During the process of motivating employees, the other approach was organizing a 
password security seminar to raise awareness of the password security issues. According 
to IT department, attendance at information security themed seminars was very low in the 
hospital. However, this time the employees were sent an invitation e-mail informing that 
an information security expert will attend the seminar and give critical information about 
the importance of password security to protect patients’ medical records. The attendance 
was at least 20% more than ever.  
These exercises showed that fear appeals and authority principles are effective to 
motivate hospital employees to change their poor password behaviours with the good 
ones. 
 
4.4 DISCUSSION  
The aim of the empirical study is to investigate whether persuasion strategies can 
be applied to promote secure password-related behaviour among employees in 
organisations. Several appropriate strategies are selected in order to suit the aim of the 
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study. The questionnaire and interview results and outcomes of the case study shows that 
two principles of Cialdini’s weapons of influence (Cialdini, 1988), social proof and 
authority, is effective on motivating employees to adopt better password behaviours. 
Apparently, most of the participants are influenced by their colleagues’ secure password 
behaviour and they are encouraged to improve their own behaviours. 
The results of the case study showed that when participants were sent messages 
informing them about the possible threats and mentioning the consequences of their 
insecure password practices, they are more likely to be motivated on choosing secure 
password behaviours. This proves that fear appeal is also a significant motivation for most 
employees almost from all sectors.   
According to results related to training, most of the employees who did not have 
any training about the information / password security before seemed to use two or three 
coping strategies such as sharing passwords or writing them down. For this reason, 
password and information security training must be compulsory for all employees from 
each sector, especially for those who access to the critical information like participants in 
this study. This training might be the part of orientation programs of the organisation 
given to the potential employees before they start to work.  
On the other hand, the motivation strategies should be chosen and applied 
considering the organisation culture and the nature of the jobs. Password policies should 
be specialized for each organisation since requirements of the job and environmental 
factors differ in each organisation.  
The results of the empirical study show that persuasion is a powerful tool for 
attitude or behaviour change, and can be applied in real life practices to promote secure 
password-related behaviour. 
This study contributes to password policy compliance research, so it might be 
influential for IT specialists, experts on awareness campaigns, influence strategists as 
well as policy writers.  
There are, however, some limitations of this study. There is a possibility that a 
proportion of participants might have underreported their bad password behaviours 
undermining information security in the organizations.  The presence of the researcher 
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while collecting the data may have affected the participants’ answers. This means that 
taking self-reports on past and future behaviour of the participants at face value might 
have reduced the accuracy of the results. Also, it would be better to conduct this study in 
some organisations in another country to be able to make a comparison with Turkey. In 
the most organisations involved in this study, there was not adequate training on security 
awareness so most of the employees were either untrained or poorly trained about the 
information security. An empirical study conducted with employees with a solid 
background in security awareness might yield different results.  
 
4.5 SUMMARY  
This chapter primarily identified the factors influencing password security-related 
behaviours of employees in different organisations where their password practices are 
under control of the IT departments. Then it focused on the motivation methods to 
persuade employees to abandon several coping strategies with the passwords, and 
improve password security behaviour in organisations. Writing down passwords or keep 
them somewhere accessible, sharing them with colleagues and reusing same passwords 
across different accounts were some of these strategies which potentially cause security 
failures by increasing the chance of obtaining passwords by third parties.  
Weak password selection is also a significant reason of password security failure. 
This study revealed that the password policies and guidelines used by the organisations 
are not adequate to guide users to select strong passwords and adopt good password 
behaviour. On the contrary, using unnecessarily restrictive password rules tend to make 
it much easier for an attacker to compromise user credentials. Therefore, the next chapter 
investigates the problems with the existing password guidelines and propose usable 
solutions to these problems.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CREATING SECURE AND MEMORABLE PASSWORDS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As described in the previous chapter, human factor has a key role in password 
security. However, security problems caused by user behaviour has not been totally 
solved. This chapter investigates the effect of password policy rules on users’ password-
related behaviours and password preferences. As previous studies proved that existing 
password policy rules are not adequate to motivate users to choose strong passwords, this 
chapter presents the idea of including several password creation methods in password 
guidelines and also adding motivating elements to the password creation process without 
enforcing any restriction rules.  
Initially, this chapter presents the previous studies on password guideline 
domains. An empirical study has been carried out to evaluate the efficiency of the 
proposed password guideline. In the study, security and usability of the proposed 
password guideline including a persuasive text message and several password creation 
methods were compared with the usual password policy rules.    
Details of the empirical study including the design, measurements, apparatus and 
procedure will be presented in the following sections. Then the findings will be discussed, 
focusing on the efficiency of proposed password guideline on improving the strength of 
the users’ passwords as well as the compliance behaviour.   
 
5.2 BACKGROUND 
Despite the development of various alternative authentication mechanisms such 
as smart cards, tokens, graphical passwords and biometrics, textual password based 
authentication remains prevalent (Campbell, Ma and Kleeman, 2006). Rather than 
technical problems in the password system itself, human behaviours and users’ password 
practices cause more vulnerabilities.   
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To increase the strength of user chosen passwords, users typically require to 
adhere to a set of rules known as password guideline when creating passwords (see 
section 2.5.2) Users compose their passwords following the specific requirements in 
password guidelines. For example, the password must contain at least eight characters 
including at least one number or one upper case letter, and it should not contain the 
username. There are various password guidelines that are used by organisations. They 
should be written efficiently to provide adequate security levels in the organisations 
(Summers and Bosworth, 2004; Campbell, Ma and Kleeman, 2006). 
Since only a few studies have been conducted about the construction of password 
guidelines so far, there is lack of empirical data on the guidelines and passwords which 
were created complying with them (Komanduri et al., 2011). For example, there is not 
sufficient numbers of experimental studies conducted to evaluate the NIST guidelines 
(Burr, Dodson and Polk, 2006) which are used to produce password composition policies. 
They are still mostly based on theoretical estimates. Zakaria (2013) conducted a 
laboratory-controlled experiment to test the compliance to NIST guidelines by different 
experimental groups which were given different persuasive rationales based on their 
personality differences. Although investigating the effect of personality variables on 
susceptibility of users to persuasion, it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion. Evaluation 
of efficiency and security of some other guidelines are also based on very small-scale 
laboratory studies (Proctor et al., 2002; Vu et al., 2007).  
The content of password guidelines should be created carefully as it is important 
in providing suggestions and instructions to users on how to create good passwords. 
Grawmeyer and Johnson (2011) conducted a study to investigate users’ password 
generation behaviour. All the passwords estimated as highly secure and secure in the 
study were in fact insecure passwords containing a single word. Therefore, the authors 
suggested that password guidelines contained in security policies should be devised and 
founded on a sufficient theoretical understanding of the users’ task. 
Previous research showed that strict password policy rules do not increase the 
password security as what is believed (Inglesant and Sasse, 2010; Komanduri et al., 2011; 
Summers and Bosworth, 2004). Users adopt coping strategies such as writing passwords 
down or sharing them when they are imposed to use those rules to compose their 
passwords. Even if they do not, most of the passwords created by complying with 
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password policy rules are still not strong enough. However, it might be possible to create 
strong and memorable passwords by changing the content of password guidelines.  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to guide users to create stronger passwords 
to improve password security providing several password creation methods in password 
guidelines instead of usual password policy rules. People who are particularly interested 
in doing research to increase the strength of their passwords and create complex 
passwords can find many password creation methods and tips on the web to help 
themselves. However, since most of the users tend to ignore security precautions and they 
are not interested in doing research about the security, including these methods in 
password creation process, should be more influential and efficient. Thus, they would see 
how to create strong and memorable passwords correctly before they create their own. 
The methods provided to users in the study inspire users to create their own formula which 
they can use to turn any simple word to a complex password.  
This study also investigates the effect of a persuasive text provided to users on the 
password creation process to encourage them to create their unique password creation 
formula on password strength. The existing password guidelines only focus on providing 
information on how to compose a good password.  According to Cialdini (2001), people 
will more likely comply with a request when they are provided a rationale. Accordingly, 
a study revealed that a password guideline including a rationale as to why choosing strong 
password is important indeed improved the password compliance (Zakaria, 2013). 
However, this study aims at not only telling people what is important and what should be 
done to increase password security but also show them how to do it. Therefore, users are 
provided a persuasive message along with the example methods. In fact, one of the most 
important component of persuasion is free choice (Perloff, 2003). Accordingly, the 
proposed password guideline allows users to be free to create their own strategy on 
composing passwords. It means that the example methods aim to inspire users to create 
their unique encryption formula. 
Briefly, this study seeks to discover if users will create strong and memorable 
passwords when they are provided several password creation methods along with a 
persuasive message, without imposing them any password policy rules.   
The next section describes the empirical study which was conducted to evaluate 
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the proposed idea.  
5.3 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: PERSUADING USERS TO CREATE STRONG 
AND MEMORABLE PASSWORDS 
5.3.1 Introduction  
A web-based empirical study was carried out to investigate the assumption that 
users can create stronger and more memorable passwords if they are not enforced to 
comply with strict password policy rules. The study evaluates the effect of several 
password creation methods on the strength and memorability of users’ passwords. It also 
explores the users’ password behaviour and practices in either cases: with and without 
following strict password policy rules.  
To perform this study an ethical approval was sought and obtained from the 
University of Sussex Sciences and Technology Cross Schools Research Ethics 
Committee (C-REC). The certificate of the ethical approval can be viewed in Appendix 
B. The following sections presents the details of the empirical study.  
5.3.2 Methodology of the Empirical Study 
5.3.2.1 The Design and Apparatus  
The empirical study used the between-subject design where participants can be 
part of the experimental group or the control group, but cannot be part of both. There is 
one control group and one experimental group in the study. The strength and 
memorability of the passwords created by participants in each group were measured and 
compared to each other. While the participants in the control group were given some 
password policy rules to be followed when creating their passwords, the participants in 
the experimental group were given several password creation methods as examples to 
create their own encryption formula to compose their passwords without being have to 
apply any rules. 
Two websites were created to collect data for this empirical study: one for the 
experimental group and one for the control group. The apparatus used in this study are as 
below: 
- A password guideline including five password composition rules for the control 
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group,  
- A password guideline including three sample password creation methods and a 
persuasive message and important notes for the experimental group 
- A password register/login page of a web site for the control group 
- A password register/login page of a website for the experimental group 
- Two sets of questionnaires: one for the control group and one for the experimental 
group  
- Consent forms to read and accept for all participants 
All the apparatus is included in the section Appendix B.  
Once the participants in each group had signed up their websites, they were 
provided a message and a survey link directing them to another website to fill a 
questionnaire. While the questionnaire given to the control group included 19 questions, 
experimental group’s questionnaire included 30 questions. The questions in the control 
group’s questionnaire were common for both group.  The average time to complete the 
questionnaire was approximately 15 minutes for the experimental group and 10 minutes 
for the control group.  
As stated above, the password guidelines which were distributed to the 
participants are different according to the group to which they were assigned. The 
participants in the control group received a set of password composition rules are as 
below: 
The password composition rules for the control group:  
 - Your password must be at least 8 characters long.  
- Your password must contain at least one upper case, one lower case, one 
number and one special keyboard character.  
- Your password should not contain your username.  
- You should use different passwords across different accounts.  
- Your password should not be easily guessable.  
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The participants in the experimental group were given a persuasive message 
telling them that it is possible to create strong and memorable passwords applying some 
methods. The message attempts to persuade participants to create a unique formula thus 
they could turn even a simple word to a complex password which is hard to crack. In 
addition to this message, participants in the experimental group were also given these 
methods with examples. The password guideline of the experimental group was framed 
using logical reasoning by providing explanations such as the fact that if users create 
weak passwords for ordinary websites, a crafty hacker can obtain that password easily. If 
using the same or similar password is the user’s habit so it would not be difficult for the 
hacker to guess the other passwords created for important accounts such as bank account.   
The password guideline including the persuasive message and password 
composition methods given to the experimental group are as follows: 
  YOU CAN CREATE VERY STRONG PASSWORDS WITH SIMPLE 
AND MEMORABLE METHODS TO PROTECT YOUR ACCOUNTS! PLEASE 
READ CAREFULLY AND UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OR BASES OF THE 
METHODS. 
 
Before signing in, please use the methods given below to create your password. These 
methods offer a high level of security by leading you to create your own encryption 
formula to produce strong passwords from memorable words. Once you have 
understood the encrypting logic behind the manipulation of memorable words with 
equally memorable strings of numbers to create your very own formula, you will be 
able to transform words and numbers that are memorable for you, into very strong 
passwords. Memorable words mixed appropriately with memorable strings of numbers 
leads to strong passwords. 
 
Important Note: You should choose words and numbers unrelated to your personal 
details. For example, don’t encrypt your name or surname. And don't use strings of 
numbers that indicate your date of birth. Even though others do not have a clue about 
your formula, it is risky. 
Remember that password selection is very important to protect your confidential data. 
Without exception, you should care about your password selection for anything from 
ordinary websites to bank accounts. A crafty hacker can easily obtain your weak 
password within seconds. Also remember that if you use very similar passwords across 
different accounts, and, once the hackers have obtained one of your passwords, they 
can easily guess the others. 
Below are examples of workable methods. You should not apply exactly any of the 
examples as your own password. The examples are given only to show the possibilities 
of good encryption formulation that consequently lead you to think of your own 
encryption formulation resulting in a memorable formula. 
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Method-1: 
Step 1: Pick a word. Let’s say, “education” as our plain password.  
Step 2: Specify a number. Let’s say, 347.  
So we have the word “education” and the number “347”. Let’s encrypt them.  
Step 3: Convert the 3rd, 4th and 7th letters of the word “education” to upper case. We 
now have “edUCatIon”.  
Step 4: Place the numbers 3, 4 and 7 after each of the upper case letters. This gives us 
"edU3C4atI7on".  
Step 5: Change the value of each of the numbers in Step 4 by increasing or decreasing 
each. In this case, we will choose to increase each by 2. Therefore 3 + 2 becomes 5, 4 
+ 2 becomes 6 and, 7 + 2 becomes 9. So now we have the strong password 
edU56atI9on.  
That's it! It is almost impossible to guess and very hard to crack. You can even write 
the plain password somewhere to help you remember it. As long as no one knows your 
formula that converts a plain password into a strong password, plain passwords are 
meaningless to them.  
Here's another example. Let's pick a Turkish word and the number 148. Our plain 
password here is "bilgisayar". When we applied the same formula, this plain password 
converts into the strong password B3ilG6isaY10ar.  
 
Method-2: 
Step 1: Choose a string of plain numbers. Let's choose the numbers "12345".  
Step 2: Specify a combination of letters and keyboard characters. Let’s specify 
"m_y_". (Letters separated by underscores).  
Step 3: Mix the string of plain numbers with the combination of letters and keyboard 
characters. In this case, we sequentially alternate the individual numbers of Step1 with 
the letters and keyboard characters of Step 2. Thus, we get the strong password 
1m2_3y4_5.  
 
Method-3 
If you want to use meaningful words and phrases you have to create a very long 
password combining letters, numbers and other keyboard characters. For example, 
"myfavouritechicredshoes-size4". This phrase is meaningful to you, so you can 
remember it easily, but for other people it should be hard to guess. You can combine 
unrelated words which you can associate. An example of this is 
"elephant.zoo.travel.Africa". An elephant might remind you of a zoo and a travel to 
Africa. 
 
Important Notes: 
- You can pick a related simple password or add some more characters to your 
encrypted password to remind you of the site for which you create the password. 
- You should not use the same examples and/or formulas given in the above methods. 
You should create your own. 
- You should use different passwords for different accounts. 
- You should never share your passwords and/or your formula with anyone. 
- You can apply your formula to different words and numbers to create different 
passwords. 
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  The participants were shown a register/login page to enter their username and 
password. At the beginning of the empirical study, the participants were assigned a unique 
ID number. The interfaces of the register/login page are as illustrated in Appendix B.  
The last apparatus involved in the study is the questionnaires of the control and 
experimental group. The control group’s questionnaire contains several questions on 
demographic details of the participants and some questions related to password 
constructions and usage. In addition to these questions, experimental group’s 
questionnaire contains some questions to find out the user satisfaction with the given 
methods and the effect of the methods on users’ password choice. The questionnaires can 
be viewed in Appendix B.  
The questions in the questionnaires were set to understand the reasons for the 
participants’ password practices and determine the influence of proposed password 
guideline on password strength and memorability. A pilot survey was conducted before 
with fewer participants to test the quality of the questions. The content of several 
questions in the preliminary questionnaires were changed to better suit the aim of the 
study. Also, some previous studies were reviewed that used the several materials and 
questions (Shay et al., 2010 and Zakaria, 2013).  
 
5.3.2.2 The Procedure  
At the beginning of the empirical study, all participants were automatically 
assigned a unique id number. This id numbers were used to match the participants’ 
credentials and questionnaire responses. The participants in the both group were given a 
brief information about the study and asked to read and accept the consent form to 
participate. Once they had accepted the consent form, they were able to sign up their 
website. For those participants who were interested in getting more information about the 
study researcher’s contact information were provided in the consent form. As presented 
above, participants received different password guidelines while signing up. After the 
participants signed up the websites successfully, they were asked to click the provided 
link which would direct them to the survey website to fill the questionnaire. Before filling 
the questionnaire, a brief introduction was provided to participants informing them about 
the approximate time which the questionnaire would take. Finally, the empirical study 
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was finished with a message of thanks to participants for their participation.   
The participants were asked to login the websites after a week and a month to find 
out whether they recall their passwords. At the end of the study, five randomly chosen 
participants were awarded £20 for the time and effort in participating.  
The procedure of the study was exactly same for both groups except the password 
guidelines and additional questions in the experimental group’s questionnaire.  
 
5.3.2.3 The Measurements  
There are several measurements involved in the empirical study: password 
strength, password length, memorability, password policy compliance, use of the given 
methods, user satisfaction and persuasiveness. The password strength was measured 
using tools known as the “Password Meter” (Password Meter, n.d.) and “How Secure is 
my Password?” (Collider, 2016).   
Password Meter measures the password strength using a combination of several 
important attributes that constitute a particular password, such as length (i.e. number of 
the characters), the frequency of uppercase, lowercase, numerical characters and 
alphanumeric characters (i.e. punctuation and mathematical symbols).  Password strength 
calculation is made by adding points if the password meets the requirements, and 
deducting points if not. The tool categorizes the passwords by giving scores where the 
maximum score is 100% according to complexity of the password. The passwords will 
be categorized as follows: very weak (0% < password score £ 20%), weak (20% £ 
password score £ 40%), good (40% £ password score £ 60%), strong (60% £ password 
score £ 80%) and very strong (80% £ password score £ 100). The measurement criteria 
and the categorization used to determine the password’s strength can be referred to in 
Appendix B.   
  How Secure is my Password? measures the time in which the password entered 
could possibly be cracked by a computer. The tool takes into consideration the length, 
whether the password given looks like a dictionary word and the character variety while 
measuring the estimated cracking time.  
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The next element that was also measured in this study is the memorability. To 
evaluate the recall rate, the participants were asked to login to the websites after a week 
and after a month. To carry out the measurement of memorability, participants were given 
numbers where 0 indicates that user could not login successfully, 1 indicates that user 
logged in successfully in the first attempt and 2 indicates that user logged in successfully 
after a few attempts.   
The other measurement in the study was password policy compliance. Since the 
participants in the control group must follow the given password policy rules, the 
measurement was conducted to find out whether the participants in the experimental 
group applied these rules to their passwords. Passwords were given scores for each 
requirement where 0 indicates that the related rules had not been applied, and 1 indicates 
that the related rules had been applied by the participant. Briefly, the measurement 
showed how close each participant in the experimental group followed the requirements 
given in the password guideline of the control group.  
Use of given methods, user satisfaction and persuasiveness were measured based 
on questionnaire responses of the participants in the experimental group to evaluate the 
password guidelines given them.  
Next section presents the demographics of the participants in the study.  
5.3.2.4 Demographics 
308 people participated in this study. 152 of them were in the experimental group 
and they created passwords after reading a persuasive text on how to create strong and 
memorable passwords. 156 people were in the control group where they had to follow 
five commonly used instructions to create a password. 142 people in the experimental 
group and 95 people in the control group filled out a follow up questionnaire including 
questions about their password creating habits and their thoughts of given methods.  
Therefore, demographics and survey analyses were run for 237 participants whereas 
password strength, compliance and memorability scores were analysed for all 308 
participants.  
The participants are recruited from college students studying in some universities 
in UK, USA and Turkey. Undergraduate students as well as the postgraduate students 
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participated in the study. Some of the participants have computer science related 
background.  
There were 111 females and 126 male participants. 90.8 % of the experimental 
group and 86.3 % of the control group were aged between 18-35 years. Figure 5.1, 5.2 
and 5.3 illustrate the demographic details of the participants involved in the empirical 
study.  
	
Figure 5. 1 Age profile of the participants 
 
Number of the participants who are currently in an undergraduate programme (n 
= 108) and in a postgraduate programme (n=129) were close. Additionally, most of the 
participants did not have a background in computer science, only 19 % of all participants 
were from a computer science related major. 
	
Figure 5. 2 Education level profile of the participants 
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Figure 5. 3 Education background profile of the participants 
 
This section described the design, apparatus, procedure and measurements of the 
empirical study and presented the full participant information. The next section presents 
the results and analysis of the empirical study.  
 
5.3.3 The Results and Analysis of the Empirical Study  
In the following sections, results and analysis of the empirical study are presented 
in detail.  
 
5.3.3.1 The Password Analysis  
Experimental and control conditions were compared in terms of password 
strength, password length and compliance to the common password policy rules, which 
were compulsory for control condition. The aim was to see whether people in 
experimental condition were also following those guidelines unintentionally while 
creating passwords in line with other methods provided. Table 5.1 presents the password 
analysis of the empirical study.   
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Table 5.1 The password characteristics 
Group Password Strength Password Length Password Compliance 
Experimental Group M =89.08 (SD = 8.84) M = 13.39 (SD = 4.35) M = 4.74 (SD = .91) 
Control Group M =71.95 (SD = 10.36) M = 9.59 (SD = 1.80) M = 6 (SD = 0)* 
* Password compliance score was constant for control group because it was compulsory. 
*Password Strength scores were between 0-100, calculated with the Password Meter tool; 
Password Length is the number of the characters used, Password Compliance scores calculated 
as the total number of rules complied while creating a password, out of 6 rules in total.  
 
Password Strength: 
In this study, password strength was scored out of 100 for each password 
individually. Though almost same number of participants in experimental and control 
groups think they have strong passwords (62.7 % vs. 61.1 % respectively), an independent 
samples t-test (t (306) = 15.617, p < .001, ƞ2 = .44) proved that there was a difference in 
password strength between conditions (See Figure 5.4). The experimental group (M 
=89.08, SD = 8.84) created stronger passwords than the control group (M =71.95, SD = 
10.36). According to the Password Meter, the passwords of the control group and the 
experimental group are categorized respectively as strong and very strong. 
	
Figure 5. 4 The password strength of the experimental and control group 
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According to the results, people are not good at predicting the strength of their 
own passwords. As Figure 5.5 indicates that neither in the control group (t (93) = -1.375, 
p =.172), nor in the experimental group (t (140) = .034, p = .973) there were difference 
in terms of password strength between those who thought their passwords were hard to 
crack and those who thought their passwords were easy to crack. 
	
Figure 5. 5 Differences between users’ perception of password strength and the actual password 
strength 
 
Password Length: 
Password length was also compared between groups with an independent samples 
t-test analysis. As illustrated in Figure 5.6, the results showed that there existed a 
homogeneity of variance problem, such that Levene’s test for equality of variances was 
significant (p < .001). However, the t-test without equal variances assumption was also 
significant (t (200) = 9.986, p < .001, ƞ2 =.33). Experimental group (M = 13.39, SD = 
4.35) created significantly longer passwords than control group (M = 9.59, SD = 1.80). 
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Figure 5. 6 The password lengths of the experimental and control group 
 
Additionally, password length is correlated with password strength. A strong 
positive Pearson’s correlation exists between them, such that the longer the passwords 
the stronger they are (r = .775, n = 301, p < .001). Figure 5.7 demonstrates the relationship 
of number of the characters in the password and the password strength. 
 
	
Figure 5. 7 The correlation of password strength and password length 
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To check for the interaction of experimental group and password length, password 
length scores were recoded as a categorical variable with median split method, where the 
length scores of both groups were divided into two groups: shorter passwords and longer 
passwords. Then, a 2 (experimental group) X 2 (password length) factorial ANOVA was 
computed. This ANOVA yielded significant results both for the password length (F 
(1,304) = 166.079, p <.001) and for the experimental condition (F (1,304) = 334.695, p 
<.001). However, there was not an interaction of the two variables (F (1,304) = .649, p = 
.421). Experimental group was better at creating strong passwords both for longer 
passwords (M = 95.71, SD =8.84 vs. M = 78.56, SD = 8.51) and for shorter passwords 
(M = 83.41, SD = 7.61 vs. M=67.71, SD =10.36). Figure 5.8 compares the strength of 
short and long passwords of experimental and control group. In this analysis, there was a 
homogeneity of variance problem as well. However, when the analysis is repeated after 
data reduction based on outlier analysis with Cook’s Distance values, neither the results 
changed, nor the homogeneity problem was solved. Since ANOVA is considered a robust 
test against the equal variances assumption and since the significance levels reached in 
the analysis were acceptable even at conservative perspective, these results were 
considered acceptable. Additionally, since the unequal variances are almost inevitable in 
this empirical design due to the difference in number of strategies given to the participants 
in both conditions, no data was excluded from the analyses. 
 
	
Figure 5. 8 The strength of the shorter and longer passwords of both group 
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Password Compliance: 
At the beginning of the empirical study, the control group was required to follow a 
password guideline including the following password composition rules: 
- The password should contain; 
1- at least 8 characters 
2- at least one upper case 
3- at least one lower case 
4- at least one numerical character 
5- at least one special keyboard character  
- The password should not contain; 
6- the username  
Most of the web applications require users to apply at least 4 of these rules while 
creating password. However, the participants in the experimental group were not imposed 
them to compose their passwords. Instead, their password guidelines including persuasive 
elements aimed at motivating users to create passwords which automatically provided 
these requirements.  
To see whether experimental group also complied with these rules required for the 
control group, each password was coded in a binary format (1 for compliance and 0 for 
incompliance). Later, passwords were given a score as the total number of compliance 
across six items. Although the experimental group’s compliance score was significantly 
different (t (151) = - 17.199, p < .001) from 6, the score of the control group, still 89.5% 
of the participants in the experimental group complied with four or more password 
creation rules (see Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5. 9 Password policy compliance frequencies for the experimental group 
	
The experimental group’s passwords were stronger than the control group’s 
passwords, which were obliged to comply all the strategies and therefore have the 
compliance score of 6. This result suggested that compliance to the commonly used 
password criteria was not a guarantee of strong passwords (see Figure 5.10).   
 
 
Figure 5. 10 The effect of password policy compliance score on password strength 
 
The relationship between compliance and password strength was rather 
complicated. A univariate ANOVA was run to compare password strength, and the 
compliance scores 2 and 3 were collapsed due to the number of data in each group. So, 
there was a significant difference between groups F (3,304) = 47.905, p < .001. A Tukey’s 
post hoc test showed that this difference stems from the highest compliance group, which 
differed from all other groups with 95% confidence intervals, shown in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 Comparison analysis of the password policy compliance and password strength across 
compliance scores 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   password strength   
Tukey HSD   
(I) compliance   (J) compliance 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3 or less 4 2,35 3,253 ,889 -6,06 10,75 
5 -,48 2,934 ,998 -8,06 7,09 
6 15,07* 2,784 ,000 7,88 22,26 
4 3 -2,35 3,253 ,889 -10,75 6,06 
5 -2,83 2,222 ,580 -8,57 2,91 
6 12,72* 2,020 ,000 7,50 17,94 
5 3 ,48 2,934 ,998 -7,09 8,06 
4 2,83 2,222 ,580 -2,91 8,57 
6 15,55* 1,452 ,000 11,80 19,30 
6 3 -15,07* 2,784 ,000 -22,26 -7,88 
4 -12,72* 2,020 ,000 -17,94 -7,50 
5 -15,55* 1,452 ,000 -19,30 -11,80 
 
Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 114,028. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
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Memorability: 
How likely people were to remember a password they create is another central 
point. In this study, first, memorability of a password after a week and after a month were 
compared across groups with a 2 (time: week vs. month memorability) X 2 (experimental 
group) factorial ANOVA. As shown in Figure 5.11, results indicated that memorability 
significantly decreases as time passes (F (1,306) = 59.712, p < .001). Memorability after 
a week (M =1.31, SD = .83) was significantly higher than memorability after a month (M 
= .85, SD = .81), where a score of 2 indicates correctly remembering a password at first 
trial, score of 1 indicates correct remembering at many trials, and a score of 0 indicates 
failing to remember. Additionally, the chances of correct retrieval were higher for 
experimental group (M = 1.27, SD = .05) than the control group (M = .90, SD = .05; F 
(1,306) = 28.320, p < .001). This result is in line with experimental group’s predictions 
about memorability, where 86 % of participants thought they would remember the 
password correctly after a week, and 76% of them thought they would remember correctly 
after a month (see Figure 5.12). Hence, no interaction between experimental group and 
time was found (F (1,306) = .425, p = .515). 
 
	
Figure 5. 11 Memorability of the passwords of experimental and control group 
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Figure 5. 12 Users’ predictions of memorability in the experimental group 
 
To investigate how the conditions were distributed across retrieval levels, two chi-
square analyses were run. For the memorability of a week, the chi-square test was 
significant, χ2 (1, N = 308) = 15.487, p < .001, which meant that experimental group and 
control group differed from each other at retrieval performances (see Figure 5.13). 
Grouped comparisons supported that the significance stemmed from differences at all 
levels. In a week period, the experimental group was better at both correct retrieval at first 
trial (101 vs. 69 participants) whereas the control group either failed to remember more 
than the experimental group (28 vs. 45) or retrieved correctly at many trials with higher 
frequency (23 vs. 42).  
The second chi-square analysis showed that the experimental group (57 vs. 25 
participants) again performed better at correct retrieval at first trial, χ2 (1, N = 308) = 
20.147, p < .001. Similarly, the control group failed more to remember their passwords 
correctly (49 vs.80 participants) after a month. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Very	unlikely Unlikely About	as	likely	as	
not
Likely Very	likely
Nu
m
be
r	o
f	P
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
Guesses	for	the	Likelihood	to	Remember	
Predicted	Memorability	for	Experimental	Group	
After	a	
Week
After	a	
Month
	 90	
	
Figure 5. 13 Attempts to recall passwords after a week and after a month 
	
Use of Password Creation Methods in the Experimental Group: 
Among the 142 participants who took the follow up questionnaire, 3 participants 
were excluded from the following analyses since they selected more than one option at 
the same time. Among the remaining participants in the experimental group, most of them 
preferred the third method (34 %) (see section 5.3.2.1 for the details of the given 
methods). Distribution can be seen in Figure 5.14. 
 
	
Figure 5. 14 Preferences for the given methods in percentages 
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Moreover, password creation methods were compared in terms of how strong 
passwords the participants created by applying these methods (see Figure 5.15). A 
univariate ANOVA showed that passwords created by different methods were 
significantly different, F (3,135) = 30.097, p < .001.  
To understand which methods are creating the difference, a Tukey’s HSD post 
hoc test was run, and resulted that the passwords created by applying any of the methods 
are stronger than the passwords created without applying the given methods (stated as 
none of them in the figures), with 95 % confidence interval (see Table 5.3). Additionally, 
passwords created with the method three were slightly stronger than the passwords 
created with the method two (p = .047). 
 
	
Figure 5. 15 Password strength by methods 
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Table 5.3 Comparison analysis of the password strength among the given methods 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   password strength   
Tukey HSD   
(I) methoduse (J) methoduse 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
First Method 
 
 
Second Method 2,32 1,700 ,525 -2,11 6,74 
Third Method -1,86 1,576 ,639 -5,96 2,24 
None of them 14,63* 1,895 ,000 9,71 19,56 
Second 
Method 
First Method -2,32 1,700 ,525 -6,74 2,11 
Third Method -4,18* 1,589 ,047 -8,31 -,04 
None of them 12,32* 1,906 ,000 7,36 17,28 
Third Method First Method 1,86 1,576 ,639 -2,24 5,96 
Second Method 4,18* 1,589 ,047 ,04 8,31 
None of them 16,50* 1,796 ,000 11,82 21,17 
None of them First Method -14,63* 1,895 ,000 -19,56 -9,71 
Second Method -12,32* 1,906 ,000 -17,28 -7,36 
Third Method -16,50* 1,796 ,000 -21,17 -11,82 
 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 49,817. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
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Password Cracking Times: 
To measure the strength of the passwords in the experimental and control group 
in another way, a tool namely “How Secure is My Password” was also used. This tool 
measures the estimated cracking time of the created passwords.    
When the passwords were analysed based on the time required to crack them, data 
indicated that only control group participants and the participants in the experimental 
group who did not utilize any of the given methods created passwords which are easier 
to crack (i.e. passwords which could be broken in less than a year). Additionally, when 
the experimental methods were compared to each other, most of the participants who used 
method two created passwords to be cracked in decades, as opposed to the participants 
who preferred the first or the third method. This result is in line with password strength 
results, which indicated method two created slightly less strong passwords than methods 
one and three. Estimated password cracking times for both groups’ passwords are shown 
in Figure 5.16. 
	
Figure 5. 16 Estimated password cracking times 
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any password security failure before. Moreover, only 39.4 % of the experimental group 
and 31.6 % of the control group reported that they do not write down their passwords 
anywhere while 41.5 % of the experimental group and 38.9 % of the control group write 
their passwords somewhere safe and 19 % of the experimental group and 29.5 % of the 
control group prefer somewhere accessible.  
Results also showed users’ password preferences across different accounts vary. 
As seen in the Figure 5.17 most of the users tend to choose stronger passwords for their 
personal email accounts than the work emails.  
 
	
Figure 5. 17 Users’ password preferences across different accounts 
 
User Satisfaction: 
Participants in the experimental group were asked about their experience of using 
the new methods presented to them. As illustrated in Figure 5.18, most of the participants 
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the future (79 %). 
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Figure 5. 18 Participants’ opinion about the usability of the given methods 
	
Additionally, they rated their experience further in terms of fun and easiness. Most 
of the participants agreed that using the provided methods was easy (61%) and more than 
half of the participants evaluated the methods as fun to apply (54 %). A larger body of 
participants (80%) reported that using the given methods to create secure passwords are 
worth the time spent on them. Moreover, most of the participants (85 %) agreed that these 
methods were more efficient than the commonly used strict password creating rules, in 
terms of creating strong and memorable passwords (see Figure 5.19).  
	
Figure 5. 19 User satisfaction with the new methods 
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Persuasiveness:  
Finally, it seemed like the methods provided to the experimental group persuaded them 
not to use any of the coping strategies (see Figure 5.20). Most of them reported they would 
not write down their passwords (76 %); not share their passwords with other people (75 
%) and not reuse the passwords they created once (73 %).  
 
	
Figure 5. 20 The given methods’ persuasiveness to abandon coping strategies 
	
5.4 DISCUSSION  
The details of the web-based empirical study are presented in the previous 
sections. As stated at the beginning, the aim of this study was investigating whether users 
can create stronger and more memorable passwords if they are not enforced to comply 
with strict password policy rules. The study examined the efficiency of a persuasive text 
along with the three password composition methods on motivating users to create stronger 
and memorable passwords.  
The results indicate that passwords created by users who receive password 
guidelines including a persuasive text and sample password creation methods are stronger 
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applied the given methods, remembered their passwords better than the ones who 
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followed the usual password policy rules.  
Thus, these findings suggest that it is a good idea for providing a message in the 
password guideline to persuade users to create their own password composition formula. 
When the message is supported with the example methods of password composition, it 
becomes possible to create strong passwords without burdening their memory to 
remember them. In this study, most of the participants in the experimental group spent 
time to read the information and applied the given methods to produce passwords, maybe 
just to help a research study by participating. However, in real life, users may not make 
an effort to read the information provided in the password guidelines unless they have to. 
Zakaria (2013) suggested that one possible way to overcome this is to make reading and 
understanding the password guidelines compulsory before constructing a password. 
Especially if the systems or applications require a high level of password security, this 
might be a reasonable solution. Another solution is visualization of password attacks in 
password guideline to make users aware of the threats (Zhang-Kennedy, Chiasson and 
Biddle, 2013). Ur et al. (2015) stated that password advice should focus on promoting 
human algorithms for developing passwords, in addition to visualizing threats in the 
password guideline.  Some researchers claimed that users should be guided to save their 
limited mental capacity for passwords for high-value accounts (Florencio, Herley and van 
Oorschot, 2014; Nithyanand and Johnson, 2013; Ur et al., 2015).   
The methods given in the password guideline of the experimental group allowed 
users to create passwords which spontaneously meet the requirements of the password 
policy which was given to the control group as password guideline. In other words, most 
of the participants created passwords which are longer than 8 characters, including upper-
lower cases also numbers and special keyboard characters. However, the study showed 
that complying with these rules does not always guarantee creating strong passwords.  
There are more attributes such as password length and not including meaningful 
words in passwords that affect the password strength. Therefore, two tools were used to 
measure password strength considering the frequency and variety of characters as well as 
the similarity to the dictionary words. Although, the results of the measurements 
performed with the Password Meter showed that the control group’s passwords are less 
strong then the experimental group’s, they were still in the ‘strong’ category. However, 
the difference between the cracking times measured with the “How Secure is my 
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Password” is huge. Most of the passwords of the control group categorized as strong 
seemed likely to be cracked in a day. The reason of this difference is that the second tool 
takes into consideration whether the password looks like a dictionary word besides 
measuring the character variability. The passwords including meaningful details such as 
dictionary words are likely to crack in short times even if they are composed of different 
characters. As a result, both measurement yielded results in support of password guideline 
including persuasive message and the example password creation methods.  
Furthermore, questionnaire responses showed that the given methods are efficient 
to persuade users to abandon coping strategies to remember their passwords. Users in the 
experimental group seemed to be willing to comply with the password guideline and 
apply the given methods. However, a little more than half of the participants (54 %) found 
the methods fun to apply. To increase the user satisfaction and lessen more the memory 
burden, images can be included in the password creation process.  
There is lack of ecological validity in generalising the findings to real life as the 
study is not conducted with a real application in use. The participants knew that the 
websites created for a research study and they created passwords for helping the study. If 
users created passwords for a real website to perform their own tasks, quality of the 
passwords and compliance with the guidelines might have been different. On the other 
hand, the password guideline including several password creation tips provided to the 
experimental group is somewhat long to read. Therefore, users might not be willing to 
read it when they create a password in real life. This reduces the practicability of the 
proposed guideline. Another issue about the study is the unusual demographics of the 
experimental group. The participants were randomly assigned to the experimental and 
control groups. However, number of the participants who have high education level in 
the experimental group is more than the control group. This situation might have affected 
the password strength rates in the experimental group.   
Thus far, the results generally have shown some promising findings; however, the 
practicability of this new password guideline may be an issue in real world, as stated 
above. The password guideline can be improved adding visual elements in the guideline 
to make reading the given information process interesting. Further discussion and 
suggestions can be found in the conclusion chapter.  
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5.5 SUMMARY  
A web-based empirical study conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed password guideline including a persuasive message and several password 
creation methods on password strength and memorability is presented in this chapter. A 
follow up questionnaire was also conducted to investigate users’ password creation 
habits, persuasiveness of the given methods, and the user satisfaction. Several 
measurements have been performed to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed password 
guideline, and the results and findings have been discussed in the chapter.  
The password guideline study provided the opportunity to see the effect of 
password policy rules on users' password choices and compare it with alternative 
password creation methods set as examples for users to create better passwords.  
While motivating users to create their own strategy to compose passwords by the 
proposed guideline yielded good results regarding password strength and memorability, 
the password creation process should be easier and more enjoyable for users. The 
participants who have been persuaded to create their own password creation formula to 
turn simple words to complex passwords may still have difficulties to remember their 
passwords and even their formula as days move on. To find a better remedy for 
remembering complex passwords to lessen the memory burden, and to avoid a dull 
password creation process, new solutions are required.  
Therefore, the next part of the thesis focuses on the other form of knowledge based 
authentication: graphical passwords. As human memory is better at remembering images 
than texts, graphical passwords can be included in the authentication systems. The 
graphical passwords are promising alternatives to textual passwords as they are relatively 
easy to use and cheap to implement compared to biometrics and tokens. However, they 
don’t seem likely to replace the text passwords everywhere since most of the systems still 
use the traditional text-based password authentication. Therefore, including images with 
the text-based password authentication mechanism as an assistance tool for users to 
remind their passwords might be a good idea. In recent years, especially, many 
authentication schemes integrating text and graphical passwords have been proposed.    
In the following chapter review of the alternative authentication systems by 
specifically focusing on graphical passwords will be presented.  
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CHAPTER 6 
REVIEW OF THE USER AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As computer technology has become more essential for everybody day by day, 
providing safe and secure ways to authenticate users to access confidential information 
or networks on different systems becomes increasingly important too. As authentication 
is a requirement for almost all IT systems today, its reliability is significant for computer 
and information security. While most of these systems require a classical password to 
give access to users, some of them use hardware e.g. tokens or users’ biometric 
information for authentication. Before such development of computer technology, a 
simple password was sufficient for verifying someone who claims to be the right person 
to access privileged information and resources. However, in time, as the computers’ 
computation power increased significantly, brute force attacks became possible in a short 
period. Therefore, developing more secure systems is necessary.    
As users have to authenticate themselves on many systems which require a 
password or PIN they encounter some difficulties to remember such information. The fact 
that the passwords should be complicated enough to resist hacker attacks make 
memorizing even harder. This situation generally results with users’ bad password 
practices such as choosing poor passwords or writing them down. Thus, these passwords 
become vulnerable to social engineering and brute force attacks. To make the 
authentication process easier and more secure, several novel authentication systems have 
been created or the existing approaches improved by researchers in the past few decades. 
However, these alternatives still have their own shortcomings.  
One of the past few research papers about secure authentication by Morris and 
Thompson (1979) described a design of the password security scheme on a timesharing 
system which is accessible remotely. Their design was for countering attempts to 
penetrate the system. They presented the password algorithm and invited attack instead 
of attempting to hide the security aspects of the operating system. They suggested that a 
time-sharing system must perform in a hostile environment believing that this approach 
would minimize the troubles. However, that design was a compromise between security 
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and ease of use. Brostoff (2004) in his PhD thesis reconceptualised how to create 
memorable but secure passwords as how to improve password system effectiveness. He 
modelled password system performance by using Reason’s (1990) Generic Error 
Modelling System (GEMS) as a basis (Brostoff, 2004).  
In this chapter, existing authentication methods have been reviewed and their upsides 
and shortcomings presented. The main reason of this review is to find out whether a good 
alternative authentication method(s) to replace traditional text-based password exists. 
Also, this chapter aims to determine the most effective authentication system by 
comparing all the alternative mechanisms based on security and usability criteria.    
 
6.2 EXISTING AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS  
The goal of authentication mechanisms is ensuring the data is to be transmitted to 
the person who is supposed to receive the data without being lost and modified.  The data 
should also be confidential between the sender and receiver. For confidentiality, the 
efficiency of the authentication mechanism is important. If the data is sent to others than 
the target person it might cause pecuniary loss and intangible damages. To avoid this, 
many researchers who are aware of the serious security problems of the authentication 
systems, developed a wealth of different methods. However, none of these methods are 
currently perfect and problem free.        
This section focuses on a broad overview of the available alternatives in 
authentication systems. These alternatives will be discussed considering their 
implementation as well as their advantages and disadvantages. So, the overview presented 
here will provide a general understanding of the existing alternatives which allows this 
thesis to focus on the best alternative(s) to elaborate the research future.    
A classification schema was proposed by Renaud (Renaud, 2003) and used by 
some researchers (Yampolskiy and Govindaraju, 2006; Yampolskiy, 2007) to categorize 
the alternative mechanisms. Renaud, in her paper, considered the location of users as one 
of the possible approaches while determining the quality of authentication mechanisms 
contrary to other researchers. However, users’ location information was still thought as a 
questionable way of authenticating (Renaud, 2003). According to the aforementioned 
schema, the authentication approaches can be categorized under four sections which 
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depend on what the user has, who the user is, where the user is located and finally what 
the user knows. There are also some multifactor authentication schemes which use 
combinations of two or three authentication methods.  
6.2.1 Token-Based Authentication  
This authentication approach is based on the idea of using a physical token 
which should be hard to obtain or falsify. There are a few alternative devices that users 
can use.   
6.2.1.1 Memory Cards 
Memory cards are the first possession based authentication alternative which has 
a magnetic strip which holds user information within and relies on a reader in order to 
process the information. The authentication basically requires users to insert their cards 
into the reader and then enter a set of credentials. ATM (automated teller machine) card 
is one of the most commonly used memory cards. It works when the user pops the card 
in the ATM machine and then enters his PIN number. The card supplies the private user 
information and then the user enters the secret code (PIN), together providing a credential 
set (Zakaria, 2013). Also within many companies, employees will often carry ID cards 
which is mostly a PIN hashed and stored on the magnetic strip on the cards. Employees 
must enter a PIN number and swipe the card through a reader when they enter the 
company building. The reader hashes the entered PIN number and compares it to the 
value on the card itself. If they match, the access is granted. 
 
The advantages of using memory cards is that it can be carried everywhere easily as its 
size is small enough to fit into most wallets. Although the size is small, it has large data 
storage capacity which works easily and fast.  Also, it is quite cheap compared to other 
similar alternatives. However, the main drawbacks of it is that it can easily get corrupted 
and cause the loss of data so it should be handled carefully. 
 
 
6.2.1.2 Smart Cards 
Another quite similar alternative is the smart card which is a version of memory 
card by its ability to process information as it has a microprocessor and integrated circuits. 
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When the user inserts the smart card into a reader which has electrical contacts that 
interface and activate the smart card processor. The user will then enter a PIN value which 
gives access to the information within the smart cards. A smart card could be worked in 
different ways such as holding user’s private key, generate a onetime password or respond 
to a challenge-response request. 
 
The advantages of smart cards are being much more secure when compared to 
memory cards as they can lock themselves if several false PIN are entered. In this case, it 
would require the user to contact the vendor to receive a new PIN value to unlock the 
card again. The downside that both smart cards and memory cards have is the extra 
expenses of creating new cards and purchasing the required readers which must be 
included in their implementation and lifetime costs (Chadwick, 1999). 
 
6.2.1.3 Security Tokens 
A token device is usually associated with one-time passwords which is generated 
and supplied to a user by the system itself. These passwords can be used to prove a user’s 
identity once only. After the password is used, it is destroyed and not accepted for 
authentication any longer. If the attacker somehow manages to obtain the password 
during transmission, he would have a limited time to try and use it, and most probably it 
was already used once thus rendered useless to the attacker. This is one of the advantages 
of one-time passwords used in token devices which significantly reduces the chance of 
success of someone sniffing network traffic to obtain passwords and trying to authenticate 
him as an actual legitimate user. Also, password guessing, replay attacks and electronic 
eavesdropping can be eliminated by token devices. 
 
Nevertheless, the drawback of token devices is that they can be exposed to 
masquerading attacks. This means an attacker might gain control of the token device and 
use it to impersonate the actual user. This is the reason for which many token devices 
require the user to enter a proper PIN value before it is used. 
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6.2.2 Biometrics-Based Authentication 
Biometrics-based authentication is one of the promising alternatives which take 
the advantage of the uniqueness of details in a person’s anatomy or behaviour to prove 
that the person is the one who is supposed to be. Fingerprints, retinal patterns, signatures, 
iris scans, keystroke dynamics and voice properties are some examples of unique personal 
attributes which can be used to verify a user’s identity.  If the anatomic or behavioural 
characteristics of a user match the electronic equivalent of those characteristics recorded 
in the computer, it is accepted as valid. 
 
Within biometric systems, the user has to go through an enrolment period first. 
During this period, personal attributes are captured and stored in a file to be held in a 
database or a biometric template of a smart card. This enables a user to input his identical 
information (e.g. finger print) onto the reader in order to access the system. If the image 
matched the one in the database, the user will be successfully authenticated and allowed 
to enter the system. 
 
The uniqueness of biometric systems is that it gathers a lot of personal information 
which is hard to imitate, so they provide a higher level of security compared to other 
authentication technologies. However, biometric systems are usually more expensive 
than other mechanisms and are not usually adopted by society since it is perceived as an 
intrusion of one’s personal information. Moreover, biometrics are generally associated 
with usability problems. For example, because of a sensitive and time consuming process 
through the enrolment phase, users might have difficulties to stay calm in such a 
controlled environment (Briggs and Olivier, 2008). 
 
6.2.3 Knowledge-Based Authentication 
This is the most popular approach to authenticate users based on what a user 
knows to prove his identity. Within knowledge based authentication scheme, users and 
system administrators have some confidential information such as passwords, usernames 
and answers to secret questions. If this information revealed by the users to prove his 
authenticity matches the information in the system’s database, the system administrator 
is able to verify the user’s identity and allows him to access the system.  
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The aim of knowledge-based authentication (KBA) is to find a balance between 
privacy, security and usability. While it is also called "secret questions," KBA is often 
used as a backup or retrieval system for users who forgot their passwords. When a user 
forgets his password, he can get in contact with a KBA system. The system prompts the 
user for the answer to a secret question which could be selected and answered by the user 
previously (static) or asked by the system itself by gathering data in the public records 
(dynamic). In static schemes, if the question is answered correctly, the system either 
retrieves or resets the password. This can be done through a link on a web site, or over 
the phone through a customer service or help desk representative. Users often set up the 
answers to their secret questions at the same time as their user ID and password. After a 
while, when they are asked to answer a secret question, they generally forget the secret 
answer which defeats the whole point of KBA. Briefly, both static and dynamic schemes 
rely on the given answers to the secret questions. If the answer is correct then the 
respondent’s identity is confirmed.  
 
The problem with static KBA questions is that if the user in some way shared his 
private information e.g. on a social media site, the answer can be easily guessed. Although 
the answers to dynamic questions could be searched, it would take a long time which is 
not given to the answerer. If the respondent does not answer the dynamic question within 
a certain time, the question is discarded and treated as a wrong answer. The dynamic 
scheme still has security flaws just as the static scheme has. While the security of ‘shared 
secrets’ (static KBA) is a very important issue for computer systems, it is beyond the 
scope of this study. Within this study, specifically security and memorability of 
passwords will be focused on.  
 
The knowledge based authentication mechanisms can be divided into two main 
classes: Text based Passwords and Graphical Passwords.   
 
6.2.3.1 Text-Based Passwords 
Text based password authentication is the most commonly used authentication 
mechanism in computer systems. It basically requires creating and then using a password 
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which is an array consisted of keyboard characters for authentication. Either this password 
can be created by the user himself or chosen by the system automatically.    
Text based approach can be subdivided into three groups which are syntactic, 
semantic and one-time methods. Within all these methods, the password is basically a 
string of keyboard characters. The difference between them is the way the string is 
created. 
Traditional text based passwords and passphrases are the example of the syntactic 
method in which a user is expected to recall a sequence of keyboard characters or words 
which was created before. The sequence can be composed of characters in only one of 
the groups of letters, numbers or signs as well as combination of the characters in several 
groups such as “John”, “John78” or “John78!”. However, for most of the systems, the 
initial of the password must be a letter. Syntactic passwords can be produced by the user 
himself or generated for him by the system (Renaud, 2003). The main disadvantage of 
this method is that in most cases, users’ information can be attained by unauthorized 
people easily. This is because the users tend to share their passwords or make them 
available for others. The fact that users’ ability to remember complicated passwords is 
limited and, multiple passwords for different accounts make it even harder for them. In 
this case, authentication may cause problems for users. Alternatively, easy to remember 
passwords are generally predictable so they decrease the level of security.  
Actually, users are aware of the importance of the password security since most 
of them are frustrated by their experiences with traditional passwords (Dhamija and 
Perrig, 2000). Even if they want to behave in a secure manner, they often do not 
comprehend what constitutes a “secure” password since the guidelines for the creation of 
secure passwords are generally inadequate (Weir et al., 2010). Even with good password 
policies in use, users will prefer to choose the path of least resistance e.g. choosing simple 
passwords, storing them in plain text on their mobile devices or using the same password 
for different accounts because of human nature (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Bes-Asher et 
al., 2011). According to findings of Ives, Walsh and Schneider (2004) this is 
understandable since even an ordinary user is expected to recall an average of 15 different 
passwords on a daily basis. Due to limitation of human memory, users can normally 
handle maximum four or five passwords (Adams and Sasse, 1999). 
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Some methods such as mnemonic passwords, character substitutions or persuasive 
technology have been developed by the researchers to make memorizing complicated 
passwords easier for users (Singh and Singh, 2011). Check-off Password System (COPS) 
(Bekkering et al., 2003) is one of the distinctive examples which allows user to enter the 
characters of his password without regarding the sequence order. Therefore, user can use 
many alternative ways to memorize his password. Each user must select eight different 
characters in sixteen most commonly used letters. They are also allowed to use any letter 
more than once which might help to form stronger and more memorable passwords. It is 
claimed that COPS provides the advantage to form better passwords over the regular ones.  
Semantic or cognitive passwords are created in the manner of asking questions to 
a user and treating the user’s answers as a key to authenticate him. Renaud described an 
approach which relies on asking user some clarifying questions until he gives expected 
answers that match the system’s ones (Renaud, 2003). Another provided technique 
expected user to answer a set of fact-based or opinion-based questions.  These approaches 
are not user friendly as it most probably takes a long time for user to give the desired 
answer. Since users are willing to spare as short as possible time for authentication 
process, the cognitive based methods seem unlikely to be popular in computer systems.      
One-time passwords are mostly used in some systems where protecting data is 
crucial such as bank accounts to provide higher security. It specifically provides a solution 
against the security vulnerabilities caused by user’s behaviour like sharing passwords or 
writing down and leaving them somewhere accessible. It is also usable since the user is 
not expected to memorize complicated passwords. If hacker somehow obtains the 
password, he would not be able to reuse it after the first time.   
 
6.2.3.2 Graphical Passwords 
Graphical password authentication basically works like any other knowledge 
based authentication mechanism. The user is required to provide knowledge of a secret 
which he shared with the system beforehand. Contrary to the textual passwords, graphical 
authentication relies on visual memory. In both mechanisms, the user has to provide that 
secret in stored memory to the system (Renaud et.al, 2013). The fact that human’s visual 
memory capabilities are far superior to their ability of remembering a string of characters. 
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This is because remembering information which is not part of a context is difficult for 
human brain. However, an image generally presents a context by itself (Bensinger, 1998). 
There are some studies that substantiated the ability of the human brain to recognize 
images easily. In the first study of Standing, Conazio and Haber, (1970) a group of 
participants were shown 2,560 photos for a few seconds. The users were then asked to 
examine a set of images consisting the previously seen ones and the new images. 
Participants could identify the images seen before with 90% successful recognition rate. 
Another study was performed with a similar principle (Standing, 1973). The participants 
were shown 10,000 images in two days and they performed a recognition rate of 60%.  
 
From the users’ point of view, creating memorable passwords is preferred so they 
can recall it later. Similarly, in a graphical password scheme, a user needs to choose 
memorable click locations in an image (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005b). There are two 
important points about remembering those locations: first one is the nature of the image 
itself and the second one is the sequence of the click locations. Studies indicated that 
people have some difficulties to recognize individual objects in a mixed-up image. Images 
which have semantically-meaningful contents are easier to memorize since remembering 
arbitrary things is difficult for the human brain (Norman, 1988). The long-term memory 
stores a meaningful interpretation of the image instead of the image itself. This means 
unnecessary visual details will be lost. Users are free to find their own way to encode the 
information in their brain so they can recall the information to find the correct locations 
on the image later. However, to create a strong memory, information should be processed 
in a deep and meaningful way; so, it can be stored in long-term memory.            
 
In terms of remembering, graphical passwords have been considered as a possible 
alternative for traditional passwords. Numerous studies have been done and various 
graphical password schemes proposed so far.  
 
The first graphical password scheme was proposed by Blonder in 1996 (Blonder, 
1996). Within this scheme, pre-defined tap regions were used on an image to create a 
password. The user had to enter his password by clicking on these regions in a specific 
order. This scheme has significant security drawbacks as it is vulnerable to shoulder 
surfing attacks and has a pre-determined and very small password space. However, this 
scheme formed the basis for some of the best graphical password schemes designed later.  
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Commonly, graphical passwords are classified into three categories which are 
recognition-based, recall-based and cued recall-based. In the following sections, several 
graphical password authentication schemes using different techniques will be reviewed. 
For each scheme, its design implementation, advantages and disadvantages will be 
discussed. Where appropriate, relevant studies conducted about the schemes will also be 
discussed as a foundation to understand the bigger picture of graphical passwords as the 
nearest alternative to traditional alphanumeric passwords.   
 
 
5.2.3.2.1 Recognition Based Graphical Passwords 
In recognition-based systems, users have to memorise a set of chosen images 
during password creation and then recognise their pre-selected images from among many 
different ones in order to log into the system. This type of scheme relies on exceptional 
human memory to recognise previously seen images, even those seen quickly. Currently, 
proposed recognition-based systems use images such as faces, random art pictures, daily 
objects and icons. The most extensively studied graphical passwords are Passfaces 
(Passfaces, 2009) and Dejavu (Dhemija and Perrig, 2000) and Story (Davis, Monrose and 
Reiter, 2004). The following sub-sections will discuss each scheme in detail. 
 
Passfaces: 
 
The first example of a recognition-based scheme which uses human faces as a 
verification tool for authentication process is Passfaces. In this technique, users see a grid 
of nine faces and selects one face previously chosen by the user as shown in Figure 6.1.  
It offers two-factor authentication to provide a higher level of security which can 
be easily integrated into existing systems in different working areas such as financial, 
government, healthcare and corporate networks (Passfaces, 2009). Passfaces was based 
on the fact which is proven by some research and experimental studies which reveals that 
viewing and recognising faces leaves an impact on one’s memory recognition. Hadyn et 
al. (1992) explain that face recognition is a kind of different process from general object 
recognition in the human brain; since neurological measurements indicate that our brains 
have a special component, a unique function, to recognise faces specifically. In addition, 
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the human brain does not need any conscious effort to commit faces to memory and it 
recognises the faces not recalls.  
  
In order to enrol in Passfaces, users are first presented a number of faces (could 
be three to five faces) to view. In the familiarisation process they are required to 
familiarise themselves with these presented faces. The process begins with examining 
each face and trying to find similarities between the shown face and people they may 
know. Then they are asked to go through a face recognition exercise which requires them 
to select one of the presented faces from a grid of nine faces. Once the user has 
successfully recognised the correct faces, they are allowed to log in.  
 
	
Figure 6. 1 Example of Passfaces 
 
Davis et al. (2004) indicate that allowing people to choose the faces to create their 
password can lead to predictability issues since more attractive faces are most probably 
chosen frequently, thus significantly reducing the security. Dunphy et al. (2007) consider 
the social engineering attacks, by the way users are convinced by the attackers to describe 
the images in their portfolio. Their study results show that 8% participants could log in 
obtaining the portfolio images based on verbal descriptions. The results also indicate that 
if more or less similar decoy images to the portfolio images are used to reduce social 
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engineering attacks, it causes usability issues since recognising the correct portfolio 
images become difficult. 
 
Later, Everitt et al. (2009) preferred to investigate the Passfaces scheme in terms 
of the effect of frequency access on a graphical password. They examined interference 
effect resulting from interleaving access to multiple graphical passwords and patterns of 
access while training. In a five-week period users were directed to log on to four different 
accounts according to different schedules. The results demonstrated that users who logged 
in more frequently were more successful at remembering their passwords. This study is 
the first of its kind in graphical password domains looking into the issues and effect of 
having multiple graphical passwords, as people commonly need more than four 
passwords. Thus, the effects of interference are even more crucial in a widespread 
deployment of graphical passwords. Unlike similar studies that examine only single 
graphical passwords, these findings discuss more realistic evaluations of multiple 
graphical passwords usage. 
 
DejaVu: 
 
DejaVu was proposed by Dhamija and Perrig (2000) to point the drawbacks of traditional 
alphanumeric passwords and PINs. In general, DejaVu consists of three major phases; 
portfolio creation, training and authentication. During the portfolio creation phase, users 
select a specific number of images from a larger set of images presented by the server. 
Figure 6.2 shows some images from the image selection phase in their proposed prototype 
system. Dhamija and Perrig suggest that the strategy of choosing images from random art 
instead of photographs reduces the predictability of the portfolio, hence increasing the 
security of the system. They believe that the images of random art are more difficult for 
users to write down as their password or to share with others by describing the images 
from the portfolio.  
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Figure 6. 2 Selection of random art images in DejaVu scheme (Dhajima and Perrig, 2000) 
	
Next phase is a training phase, where users choose the images in the portfolio 
containing a set of decoy images. A secure environment must be provided during the 
selection and training phase to guarantee that no other person can see the image portfolio. 
Then in the authentication phase, a user will be validated if he manages to identify all 
portfolio images correctly among the decoys. In the prototype system, a panel of twenty-
five images is displayed, five of which belong to the user’s portfolio. The authors of this 
scheme propose that a fixed set of 10,000 images is adequate, but the attractive images 
should be hand-selected to increase the likelihood that images have similar probabilities 
of being selected by users. 
 
Since it uses abstract images which help to decrease the risk of social engineering 
attacks which is trying to gather enough information to log in by tricking the user into 
verbalising their password, DejaVu scheme is advantageous. Similarly, it would seem 
difficult to identify images belonging to a particular user based on knowing other 
information about the user; however, problems resulting from predictable user choice 
remain possible, whereby users might make their choices based on favourite colours or 
shapes. Moreover, the usability issue was raised due to the fact that no feedback was given 
when users click on particular images, making it difficult for a user to be certain whether 
an image has been selected, which is obviously for security since providing too much 
feedback might lead to security being compromised. 
 
Story: 
Story is another recognition based graphical password scheme which is similar to 
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the Passfaces scheme. In the Story scheme, users create their passwords by selecting a 
sequence of k images from a single set of n>k images to make a “story”. Each image is 
drawn from a distinct category of image types which are capable of producing n! / (n – 
k)! choices (Davis, Monrose and Reiter, 2004). The image category of the Story scheme 
is based on nine categories; animals, cars, women, food, children, men, objects, nature 
and sports. Example of images in Story scheme can be seen in Figure 6.3.   
	
Figure 6. 3 Example of images in Story scheme (Davis, Monrose and Reiter, 2004) 
 
 
6.2.3.2.2 Recall Based Graphical Passwords 
These passwords are required for users to extract the information from their 
memory just as the traditional password authentication does. Since recall is a cognitively 
difficult task for users, they tend to adopt coping strategies. Different recall-based 
graphical password schemes will be presented above.  
 
Draw-A-Secret: 
 
The first example of recall based graphical password authentication mechanism is 
Draw-a-Secret (DAS) which was proposed in 1999 (Jermyn et.al, 1999). The approach 
expects a user to draw his authentication secret to be allowed to access an application. 
These should be more memorable than passwords because they take advantages of 
human’s visual, lexical and kinaesthetic memory power (Renaud and De Angeli, 2009). 
DAS relies on the underlying grid sectors rather than drawings from a semantic 
perspective. According to Thorpe and Oorschott (2004), symmetrical graphical secrets 
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are the main concern as symmetrical drawings can be recalled more easily. They argue 
that an attacker could create a dictionary of possible symmetrical secrets and use it to 
compromise DAS which would take only six days to crack if the password is symmetrical. 
Then Nali and Thorpe (2004) conducted a user study with 16 participants to see if DAS 
secrets generated by users demonstrated any patterns. Some patterns are observed as the 
result of the study. While 45% participants created symmetrical drawings, 56% of them 
created centred ones. 80% of the drawings used less than three strokes. Considering these 
results as symptomatic of a larger user-base, the authors argue that DAS have a much 
smaller, practical password space. Figure 6.4 illustrates an example of DAS algorithm. 
 
	
Figure 6. 4 An example of Draw-a-Secret (DAS) algorithm (Jermyn et.al, 1999) 
 
Grid Selection: 
Thorpe and van Oorschot (2004) proposed the Grid selection algorithm as a recall 
based graphical authentication scheme (see Figure 6.5). According to their design, users 
choose a small grid for drawing within a larger selection grid which increases the 
complexity of the password. After this, users zoom in their selected small piece of grid 
and create a drawing like in the Draw-a-Secret (DAS) scheme. This technique increases 
the password space however, it increases the users’ memorability burden and input time 
of the password. It increases the security by sacrificing the password usability and 
memorability (Suo, Zhu, Owen, 2005; Sreelatha et al., 2011).  
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Figure 6. 5 An example of Grid Selection Algorithm (Thorpe and Oorschot, 2004) 
 
GrIDsure: 
 
An authentication scheme called grIDsure (see Figure 6.6) is another recall based 
approach that relies on knowledge of a secret pattern as well (Brostoff, Inglesant and 
Sasse, 2010). It presents a 5x5 grid to users and requires them to create a sequenced 
pattern on the grid. The users use the same grid during authentication, but the values 
between 0 and 9 in each of the 25 cells are changed since these values are randomly 
generated for each authentication attempt and are not unique to a cell. The user-generated 
secret pattern is applied to the grid to create the authentication secret. Bond (2008) 
identified some critical security deficiencies in this scheme and managed to identify the 
user’s secret using only two fake authentication grids.  
 
	
Figure 6. 6 An example of GrIDsure algorithm (Brostoff, Inglesant and Sasse, 2010) 
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Android Screen Unlock: 
One of the recent draw-metric mechanisms is the common Android lock-screen pattern 
authentication. Such pattern based authentication mechanisms are also vulnerable to 
shoulder surfing attacks since observations of smudges on the device touch-screen are 
getting to become one of the common attacks (Aviv et.al, 2010). 
 
5.2.3.2.3 Cued Recall Based Graphical Passwords 
These passwords are created based on the information which is extracted from 
memory when users are given cues. The user can also create their password with their 
answers to a set of questions asked by the system like Zviran and Haga’s associative 
passwords (1990). In their scheme users provide some information at the enrolment phase 
and later this information is used by them for reminding their passwords at authentication. 
In this category the most extensively studied graphical passwords are PassPoints and 
Cued Click Points which will be discussed in the following sub-sections.  
 
Passpoints: 
The PassPoints scheme was developed by Wiedenbeck et al. (2005b) based on 
Blonder’s (1996) original idea that achieve solutions to defeat its limitations of needing 
simple, artificial images, predefined regions and consequently many clicks in a password 
(see Figure 6.7). PassPoints allows any image to be used. A user can click on points on 
an image to create a password. The image itself obviously acts as a cue to help the user 
remember their click-points.  
	
Figure 6. 7 An example of PassPoint algorithm 
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Security analysis on PassPoints revealed that the scheme is vulnerable to 
“hotspots” and its users tend to use similar simple geometric patterns with images. 
Hotspots are particular areas in an image which users select more commonly than others 
as part of their passwords. Hotspots are problematic since attackers can predict the 
hotspots in an image to consider the users’ visual perceptions and their image choosing 
tendencies. Then they can build a dictionary of passwords containing combinations of 
these possible hotspots. This is the major drawback of PassPoints which is aimed to 
develop in an amended version called Cued Click Point scheme to overcome the hotspots 
problem. 
 
Cued Click Points: 
 
The technique of Cued Click points (CCP) reduces some of the drawbacks of the 
passpoints. In this method users have to click on one point per image on five different 
images shown in sequence (Chiasson, van Oorschot and Biddle, 2007). After each click 
another image is displayed. The displayed image is determined based on the previously 
selected click point. While logging on legitimate users have to click on the same click 
points in the sequence of image. If users select any wrong click points, authentication 
failure is indicated at the end of the login process (Chiasson et al, 2008; Mathew and 
Thomas, 2013). Figure 6.8 illustrates the implementation of CCP.  
 
	
Figure 6. 8 Implementation of CCP (Chiasson, van Oorschot and Biddle, 2007) 
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Persuasive Cued Recall Points: 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, persuasive technology is an approach to influence the 
people to behave in a desired manner. It is used to create stronger passwords by 
encouraging users to select random points in an image (Forget et al., 2008). Persuasive 
technology is used to reduces the drawbacks of text passwords and the hotspot problems 
of graphical passwords (Chiasson et al., 2008). Results of the studies tested the existing 
CCP schemes showed that hotspot problem remained with them. For this reason, a 
persuasive feature is added to CCP and it is then called persuasive cued click points PCCP 
to overcome the hotspot problem. PCCP (Chiasson et al., 2012) is used to encourage users 
to select less predictable passwords by using a randomly positioned viewport for users to 
click on (see Figure 6.9). Users can only select a click point within that viewport but they 
can use a shuffle button to randomly reposition the viewport in the registration phase. The 
shuffle button and viewport disappear and the images are displayed normally in the login 
phase. To login successfully, the users have to correctly click on the tolerance squares of 
the previously selected points on the image during login stage.  
	
Figure 6. 9 Password Creation in PCCP (Chiasson et al., 2012) 
PCCP increases the security, however, the susceptibility to surfing attacks remains 
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with PCCP. Also, it has some usability issues as it is difficult for the users to remember 
many images in the login phase. There have been many studies conducted recently to 
improve persuasive cued click points. Some of them integrated the scheme with text 
passwords (Ramesh, Venkateswarlu, Raju, 2015; Shrikala, Deshmukh and Pawar, 2013; 
Van Oorschot and Wan, 2009)  
 
6.3 SUMMARY 
Text passwords are the predominant authentication mechanisms in the 
information security field for years. As they have known security and usability issues 
many alternatives have been proposed so far. 
 
Alternative solutions to the password problem such as biometrics, security tokens 
and smart cards resolve the memorability problem of text passwords. However, these 
authentication methods have some issues with privacy, theft, and the huge infrastructural 
costs of deployment and maintenance (Herley and van Oorschot, 2012).  
On the other hand, knowledge-based authentication (KBA) has several 
advantages, being relatively easy to implement, not requiring additional hardware, 
inexpensive implementation and modification, and they are theoretically very secure. 
However, experience and research especially with text passwords has shown that they 
can be difficult for users to remember, which results in a loss of usability and security 
(Forget, 2012). Graphical passwords have also several drawbacks such as susceptibility 
to shoulder surfing and guessing attacks. They are not widely deployed as most users 
adhere to traditional passwords and do not prefer to change their authentication method.    
There have been many different proposed solutions to solve the problems of 
existing text and graphical passwords, including biometrics, novel authentication 
schemes, password managers, single sign-on and one time passwords (OTP). 
None of these approaches have yet been widely adopted by users. Therefore, users 
continue to adopt several coping mechanisms to deal with the memorability problems of 
text passwords. Towards solving this password problem, an authentication scheme should 
support users in creating secure, memorable, and usable passwords.  
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This chapter reviewed the most common alternative password authentication 
methods mentioning both their advantages and drawbacks. The next chapter introduces a 
novel hybrid password authentication scheme integrating text and graphical passwords.  
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CHAPTER 7 
A NOVEL HYBRID PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
BASED ON TEXT AND IMAGE 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
User authentication is one of the most important parts of the security of 
information systems. The most common approach for authenticating human users is text 
passwords. Users generally choose weak passwords to remember them easily (Adams and 
Sasse, 1999; Yan et al, 2005). This increases the possibility of the passwords to be hacked 
by attackers. When users are requested to create long and complex passwords, they resort 
to coping strategies such as writing passwords down or reusing them (Burnett and 
Kleiman, 2006). Therefore, text-based passwords suffer from various drawbacks such as 
vulnerabilities to dictionary attacks, brute force attacks and social engineering.  
Graphical passwords are considered as a good replacement for textual passwords. 
The fact that humans can recognize and remember images easily over text can be a 
solution to the memorability problem (Shepard, 1967). However, they are more 
vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks as compared to textual passwords. Also, the 
graphical password authentication is relatively expensive to implement which prevents it 
becoming widespread. 
To overcome the weaknesses of text and graphical passwords, this chapter 
proposes a hybrid authentication scheme which is a combined approach of text and 
graphical passwords.  
The proposed scheme has many advantages in terms of security and usability. It 
allows users to create and memorize cryptographically strong passwords easily. It 
eliminates the risk of passwords being hacked by dictionary attacks. It also secures the 
passwords against shoulder surfing attacks. It is a user-friendly authentication scheme.  
A hybrid authentication method is proposed to strengthen text passwords by using 
the images as an assistant tool for users to memorize complex character sets. Theoretically 
it is a text password scheme integrating user chosen and system generated characters. 
However, users are allowed to choose images from image portfolios to enter the system 
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generated characters associated with the images.  In this approach, users continue to use 
text passwords, but strong and memorable ones. They do not have to remember complex 
passwords at first or write them down; with the help of the images they will be able to 
memorize them naturally.  
Many hybrid authentication schemes have been proposed in recent years to 
overcome the drawbacks of knowledge based authentication schemes. While some 
researchers integrated different types of graphical passwords (Haque and Imam, 2014), 
others combined graphical passwords with text passwords (Mokal and Devikar, 2014, 
Rao and Yalamanchili, 2012; Sreelatha et al., 2011; Zhao and Li, 2007; Zheng et.al, 
2010). These researchers proposed solutions to shoulder surfing attacks to strengthen the 
graphical password schemes. Rao and Yalamanchili (2012) proposed two authentication 
schemes using graphical passwords called Pair Pass Char (PPC) and Tricolor Pair Pass 
Char (TPPC). These both schemes support two modes of input: keyboard entry and mouse 
clicks. The first mode is the text mode and the other one is the graphical mode. The 
researchers carried out an experiment with 20 graduate students and found that the 
average login times increase as the password length increases in both schemes. The study 
also showed that the login times for TPPC scheme is higher, and rules for this scheme are 
more difficult to be applied. PPC scheme provides passwords as much as that offered by 
conventional password systems and it is greatly enhanced in the TPPC scheme as it uses 
the same character set in three colours. This proves that the login times increase much 
where the password space is enhanced in these proposed schemes. This means that these 
proposed schemes sacrifice the usability for security.  
Zhao and Li (2007) proposed S3PAS which is a scalable shoulder-surfing resistant 
password authentication scheme. S3PAS is designed to be used in client/server 
environments. It integrates both graphical and textual password schemes and aims to 
provide resistant to shoulder surfing, hidden camera and spyware attacks. In this scheme 
two kinds of password are generated: original passwords and session passwords. Users 
create original passwords when they create their accounts and input different session 
passwords in every login process to protect their original passwords from releasing.  
There are some drawbacks in this system similar to other text based graphical password 
schemes. S3PAS schemes include complicated and longer login processes. Thus, the 
researchers plan to design a simplified version of S3PAS with a little lower security level 
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to increase its adoption in the future (Zhao and Li, 2007).  
In another study, two authentication techniques based on text and colours are 
proposed (Sreelatha et al., 2011). These techniques are called pair-based authentication 
scheme and hybrid textual authentication scheme which are suitable for Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDAs). Both the techniques use grid for session passwords generation. The 
researchers claim that these schemes are resistant to shoulder-surfing, dictionary and 
brute force attacks. However, they did not conduct a detailed user study to evaluate the 
security of the schemes. They only measured the registration and login times of the 
passwords created with these schemes by 10 participants. Since these schemes are 
completely new to the users and there is not a proper security and usability analysis of 
them, these proposed techniques should be verified extensively for security usability and 
effectiveness in the future. Similarly, there is not any user study conducted to test the 
security and usability of another text-based shoulder surfing resistant graphical scheme 
proposed by Chen et al. (2013).  
Zheng et al. (2010) also proposed a hybrid password scheme based on shape and 
text. The proposed scheme uses shapes of strokes as origin passwords and allows users 
to login with text passwords via traditional input devices. Although the researchers claim 
that the scheme is resistant to shoulder surfing, hidden camera and brute force attacks and 
that it has variants to strengthens the security level through changing login interface of 
the system, the scheme still has some security and usability drawbacks. It is not familiar 
to users so they may adopt simple and weak strokes. This increases the chance of attackers 
to obtain the passwords. Also, the password creating step is vulnerable to attacks since 
users have to tell the system the original shapes and strokes. Moreover, the login process 
of this scheme is longer than other graphical schemes. For these reasons, more advanced 
authentication system should be proposed to improve this method.  
In a recent study, a comprehensive survey on shoulder surfing resistant text based 
graphical password schemes is conducted (Mokal and Devikar, 2014). This study 
explained the existing security problems, possible solutions and limitations of some of 
these schemes.  
These studies primarily focused on the existing shoulder surfing attacks in text 
based graphical password approach. However, a guessing attack is also a potential 
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problem for graphical password schemes because of the predictability of user-chosen 
graphical passwords (Van Oorschot and Thorpe, 2012; Vorster and Van Heerden, 2015a).  
All the aforementioned schemes have discrete text and graphical password 
creation steps which considerably increase the registration and login times. Compared to 
these schemes, the novel hybrid authentication scheme introduced in this research 
shortens password creation and login times as it has an integrated registration phase. 
Unlike other schemes, in the proposed scheme, images are used as cues to help users to 
complete their complex text passwords instead of creating a second password. Thus, the 
proposed scheme improves recall rate without sacrificing the security against attackers. 
Moreover, the results of the previous studies showed that users have an adoptability 
problem with these schemes as they are unfamiliar to users. However, the proposed 
scheme substantially preserves the login experiences of users who are accustomed to 
traditional textual passwords. As far as is known, the proposed scheme is the first scheme 
in the literature associating the letters of the chosen text passwords with the images by 
using the Tip of the Tongue (TOT) phenomenon. This feature significantly increases the 
memorability of the passwords.  
The next sections describe the proposed scheme in detail considering its security 
and usability aspects. Also results and analysis of an empirical study which is conducted 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the scheme are presented in the following sections. 
 
7.2 THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
Considering the popularity and wide deployment of text passwords, they seem to 
be used as a prevalent authentication mechanism for many years to come. Thus, this 
chapter suggests that effort should be made to enhance text passwords by increasing their 
password space and memorability with an additional mechanism based on images. The 
combination of text and images are likely to increase resistance to some password attacks, 
such as brute force and observing attacks. To this end, a hybrid authentication scheme 
integrating text and recognition-based graphical passwords is proposed in this chapter. 
This authentication scheme can also reduce the phishing attacks because if users are 
deceived to share their key passwords, there is still a chance to save the complete 
password as attackers do not know the users’ image preferences.  
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Beside the security aspect, the proposed authentication scheme aims to increase 
memorability as it gives chance to users not to be have to remember long and complex 
passwords. Thus, with the proposed scheme users will be able to create strong passwords 
without sacrificing usability. The hybrid scheme also offers an enjoyable sign in / log in 
experience to users. The details of the design and security-usability analysis of the scheme 
are presented in the following sections.  
 
7.2.1 Design of the Proposed Scheme  
To test the proposed authentication scheme, a web application which also works 
on mobile phones is designed and implemented. This web application uses ASP as the 
server side programming and JavaScript as the client side programming. MS SQL 
database is used to store the data. 
 
The design process of the proposed authentication scheme is as follows:  
- Identify the Problem: Improving the security and usability in the knowledge-based 
authentication schemes. The challenge, limits and possible solution.  
- Explore: Reviewing the previous related works. Examining the security and 
usability problems in the existing text and graphical based authentication schemes. 
- Design: Designing a hybrid authentication scheme ensuring security and usability 
at the same time. 
- Implement: Implementing the designed scheme.  
- Test and Analyse: Conducting empirical studies to test, analyse and evaluate the 
security and usability of the scheme.  
- Improve: Improving the design according to results of the empirical studies.   
 
The proposed scheme is designed using Persuasion Technologies (PT). PT 
functions as a tool and social actors to communicate with users and increase their 
capability to perform a target by making it easier for them (Fogg, 2002). Accordingly, a 
help feature which visualize the password creation instructions for users is designed in 
this scheme to help users to create passwords easily (see Figure 7.3).  
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User authentication process in the designed scheme has two main steps: 
registration phase and login phase. The registration phase consists of creating key 
passwords and image selection. The reasons behind key design decisions and how they 
relate to security and usability considerations are explained at every stage of the 
registration and login phases in the following sections. The flowcharts of the registration 
and login phases of the proposed authentication is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
  
 
	
Figure 7. 1 The flowchart of registration and login phases 
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7.2.1.1 Registration Phase 
. In the first step of the registration phase, users are asked to enter their username or 
email address in the username field.   
. Then they are asked to create a key text password called key characters. The only 
restriction about the key password is that its first 4 characters should be 
alphabetical which can be either upper or lower cases allowing for users’ 
preferences. The reason why the minimum length of key password is set to four 
characters is that every user can remember it easily. The theoretical password 
space calculated in this way have satisfying results to provide high security.  
. After creating the key password, the image selection process begins. This is an 
integrated process of retyping the key password and choosing the images. While 
users retype their key passwords in the “password” field, an associated image 
portfolio appears each time they type a particular letter. For each typed letter, there 
is a related image portfolio consisting of 20 images. This relation comes from the 
idea of choosing images of objects, famous people, activities or known figures 
which their names’ initials is the typed letter. It means, for example, when users 
type “a”, as a character in their key passwords, an image portfolio appears 
including images whose names’ are starting with “a” (the images of alpha, apple, 
Albert Einstein etc.). Then users select the images from the appeared image 
portfolio at their own choices. Users have to select an image from each sets of 
images. This selection will be performed so as users type the characters under the 
images into the password field but not click on the image. There are a set of two 
random characters under each image combining one alphanumerical character and 
one digit or letter. Briefly, users will enter these two-characters after each 
character of their key password. To make it easy for users to recognize which 
characters they should enter, the password field is designed to include small and 
large squares. The small squares coloured in green is to enter each character of 
key passwords, and the larger squares coloured in red is to enter the characters 
under the images. This helps users not to be confused of the order of the 
characters. In this study, users are expected to choose four images in total which 
are associated to four letters in their key password, considering the memorability 
issues. Therefore, there are four small green squares for the first four alphabetical 
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characters of the key password. Also, there are four larger red squares for the two 
sets of characters placed under the images. The last large square is to enter the rest 
of the key password’s characters. 
The number of images in each portfolio is set for the first test of the scheme. The 
theoretical password space calculated in this way have satisfying results to 
provide high security. 
  This progress allows users to create a complex password mixing their key 
passwords and the random characters associated with the selected images. The characters 
under each image change for different users. The registration phase of the scheme is 
illustrated in the Figure 7.2 (a-e) step by step with the example username, user-1, and the 
password, abcd123. 
 
 
a-Entering the username and the key password (key characters) 
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b- Entering the first character of the key password and characters under the selected 
image from the portfolio 
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c- Entering the second character of the key password and characters under the selected 
image from the portfolio 
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d- Entering the third character of the key password and characters under the selected 
image from the portfolio 
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e- Entering the fourth character of the key password, characters under the selected image from 
the portfolio and rest of the characters of the key password 
 Figure 7. 2 (a-e) User registration phase of the proposed scheme 
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  As seen in the figures, the password “abcd123” which is created as the key 
password by the user whose username is “user-1” turned into a complex password “ah*b-
pcJ:d&x123” including upper case, lower case, number and special keyboard characters 
at the end of the experiment. The user chose the images of Abraham Lincoln, bag, cake 
and yellow dress and entered the characters under those images. The user does not have 
to remember the complex, 15 characters long password as remembering the key password 
and those four images will be enough to login successfully. Even if users create four 
characters long password composed of only lower cases, it will turn into a complex, 
unpredictable password including different type of characters when the password creation 
process ends. 
  The proposed scheme has a help feature which visualize the password creation 
instructions for users step by step (see Figure 7.3). When users click on the “help” button 
on registration phase, they will see a slide of instructions to create a password with the 
scheme, which they can pause at any stage.  
	
Figure 7. 3 Slide of password creation instructions for users 
. When creating the mixed password is finished, the sign up button will be active, and 
users are allowed to click it to complete their registration. All the details including 
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username and complete passwords entered in the registration phase are stored into 
the database which will be used during the login phase for the verification.  
7.2.1.2 Login Phase 
. In the login phase users are asked to enter their user name/email and their passwords 
(mixed password). Users will be able to see the images like in the registration 
phase but the order of images within the set will be random at every login time. 
After a while as users continue to login the system, they will be able to memorize 
their complex passwords so they might not need to look at the images. The system 
has a feature which allows users to hide pictures whenever they want. This 
decreases the susceptibility shoulder surfing attacks. In case they have difficulties 
to recall the part of their passwords, they can view the images by simply ticking 
the “invisible pictures” box. The screenshot of the login phase of the 
authentication scheme is shown in Figure 7.4. 
.  
	
Figure 7. 4 User login phase of the proposed scheme 
	
In the login phase, while supplying the username/email and password information, 
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independent of whether or not they match those defined during password creation, the 
image portfolios will continue to appear based on the typed character. Users must 
correctly enter the characters under all images pre-chosen for their accounts in each round 
of password verification. If any information is wrong, the user will be shown a “access 
denied” message at the end of the login phase. Seeing an image portfolio including no 
familiar image allows legitimate users to immediately realize that they entered a different 
character from key password’s characters and gives them chance to fix it. However, this 
prevents an attacker from knowing that the characters tried are invalid.   
. After the successful entries of both username/email and password, the users are allowed 
to access their accounts.   
This section presented the details of the design of the proposed hybrid authentication 
scheme. The security and usability aspects of the scheme is discussed in the next section. 
 
7.2.2 The Security and Usability Analysis of the Scheme 
The following sections presents the security and usability analysis of the proposed 
scheme. Password space of the scheme is formulated and its resistance to attacks is 
discussed under the security analysis. Password creation and login time and memorability 
of the passwords created with the scheme is discussed under the usability analysis.  
 
7.2.2.1 Security Analysis 
A new password scheme should allow users to create passwords which are strong 
enough against guessing, brute-force and observation attacks. The quality of a password 
authentication scheme depends on how it is effective to limit attempts to guess users’ 
passwords either by people who know them or a computer-based cracking program trying 
the possible passwords (Haque, Imam and Ahmad, 2012; Haque and Imam, 2014). 
Password strength is determined by measuring the password space which is the maximum 
possible number of passwords generated by the system. The password space of the novel 
authentication scheme is formulated in the following section.  
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Password Space: 
The strength of the proposed scheme can be evaluated by measuring both the 
entropy of the user chosen key-text password and the graphical password parts. Assume 
that the password space of the key password created by the users in our scheme is P1, the 
length of the key password is “l” and “n” is the numbers of the characters in an alphabet 
from which the key password’s characters are randomly selected such as an alphabet 
including English upper and lower letters, digits and non-alphanumeric characters. The 
key password which is l characters long has an entropy of “l. log2 n” bits. In our scheme, 
however, this should be somewhat lower than this since at least four letters of the key 
password must be either upper or lower case so we calculate the password space of the 
key password in two parts.  
The password space for the key password is: P1= (l-4). log2 n1 x 4. log2 n2.  
To find the total password space, we also calculate the entropy of image based 
passwords. Let P2 be the password space of image based passwords, and c be the number 
of rounds of choosing images from the related portfolios which is 4 in our case since at 
least 4 different images should be chosen from different portfolios. Assume that n is the 
numbers of images in each portfolio, and k is the number of images selected from each 
portfolio. The entropy of a randomly selected images and accordingly the two-character 
sets is: P2 = c · log2 
!!(!$%)!  
The password space of the proposed scheme is: P = P1 X P2 
Choosing different parameters, for example increasing the values of k, n or c can 
increase security, but also decreases usability. We believe that remembering a key 
password and four images from different portfolios consisting of twenty images will not 
be a burden for users’ memory, but it can increase the resistance to dictionary attacks by 
increasing password space in practice.  
Text passwords used in practice are generally far from randomly and 
independently selected. Most of the user passwords consist of only lowercase or digits 
which significantly decreases the entropy. For example, a randomly generated 8-character 
password which is consisting of digits (0-9), lowercase (a-z), and uppercase (A-Z) has 
8.log2 62 = 47.6 bits of entropy if all characters were selected randomly and 
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independently. However, in practice they have far less bits than this (Van Oorschot and 
Wan, 2009). Considering the realistic scenario, the added security from image selection 
parts of the proposed scheme becomes more significant. The integrated scheme 
significantly decreases the possibility of successful dictionary attacks.    
 
Resistance to Attacks: 
As stated above, the proposed authentication scheme decreases the chance of 
attackers to obtain passwords via brute-force and dictionary attacks. The scheme has an 
integrated step of creating complex passwords based on text and images, which increases 
the numbers of possible passwords generated by the system, the password space.   
While selecting the images and entering the associated characters, the input is 
given through keyboard rather than clicking on the images to prevent other people to 
observe the password over the user’s shoulder. Allowing users to use mouse to enter the 
input maybe would make the system more adaptable but also more susceptible to shoulder 
surfing attacks. It supports client-server environment and its main advantage is it’s 
resistant to brute force and shoulder surfing attacks. However, the handicap of the scheme 
is that people who look over the user’s shoulder can find out the previous character of the 
key password when they see the image portfolio. They of course, will not know the 
preferred image as users do not click on the images but this is still a risk for part of the 
password. This might be prevented by not placing images of objects, foods or famous 
people whose names’ initials is same in a portfolio, but we prefer to evaluate its efficiency 
on memorizing images.  
 
7.2.2.2 Usability Analysis 
  The idea of associating the images with the letters in the key passwords to increase 
the memorability of the final complex passwords come from the phenomenon called Tip 
of the Tongue (TOT). The phenomenon refers to failing to retrieve a word from memory 
or partial recall but feeling that the retrieval is imminent (Brown, 1991; 
Encyclopedia.com 2004). It reveals that lexical access occurs in several stages. People 
who experience this phenomenon can often recall some features of the target word mostly 
the first letter, or its syllabic stress and words similar in sound or meaning (Brown and 
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McNeill, 1966; Schwartz and Metcalfe, 2011). The first letters of words are also 
important for coding words. For this purpose, phonetic alphabets are produced including 
code words which are assigned to each letter (Crystal, 2011). Users can code the words 
by assigning them to the letters in their key password to recall later. Associating the typed 
letters with images will help users to recall both the images and key characters.  
  Furthermore, to increase the memorability, the images in each portfolio are chosen 
from different categories including famous people, objects, sport activities, known art 
figures, animals, foods and places to be used in the authentication scheme similar to the 
Story scheme (Davis, Monrose and Reiter, 2004). This allows users to have many options 
in which they can select the most appropriate one to themselves as well as the most 
probable one remember.  
This section discussed the security and usability aspects of the proposed scheme 
in general. To evaluate the effectiveness of the scheme an empirical study was conducted 
with users. The next section presents the details of the empirical study.   
 
7.3 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: EVALUATION OF THE SECURITY AND 
USABILITY OF THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
	
7.3.1 Introduction 
An empirical study was conducted with the students studying in University of 
Sussex in order to evaluate the security and usability of the proposed hybrid 
authentication scheme. Beside the security and usability aspects, the study is also used to 
evaluate the user satisfaction of the proposed scheme.  
To perform this study, an ethical approval was sought and obtained from the 
University of Sussex Sciences and Technology Cross Schools Research Ethics 
Committee (C-REC). The certificate of the ethical approval can be viewed in Appendix 
C.  
The following sections presents the details of the empirical study.  
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7.3.2 Methodology of the Empirical Study  
7.3.2.1 The Design and Apparatus  
A web application was developed to test the security, usability and user 
satisfaction of the designed authentication scheme. The application also works on mobile 
phones enabling users to create strong passwords. The researcher’s portable computer 
was used to collect data from participants during the empirical study. The apparatus used 
in this study are as below: 
- A password register/login page of the designed authentication scheme 
- A questionnaire for the participants  
- Consent forms to read and accept for the participants 
All the apparatus is included in the section Appendix C.  
First, the participants were asked to create an account using the scheme and login 
afterwards. The participants were shown a register / login page to enter their username 
and create a password. The interfaces of the register / login page are as illustrated in 
Appendix C. Once the participants had registered the application, they were given the 
questionnaire to fill out. The questionnaire included 6 questions related to users’ 
experiences and satisfaction with the scheme. Several studies that used similar materials 
to test the effectiveness of their schemes have been reviewed in the section 7.1.   
The average time to complete the study including registration and filling the 
questionnaire was approximately 10-15 minutes.  
 
7.3.2.2 The Procedure  
At the beginning of the empirical study, the participants were assigned a unique 
ID number. This id numbers were used to match the participants’ credentials and 
questionnaire responses. The participants were given a brief information about the study 
and asked to read and accept the consent form to participate. Once they had accepted the 
consent form, they were able to register the application. For those participants who were 
interested in getting more information about the study researcher’s contact information 
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were provided in the consent form. After the participants registered the application 
successfully, they were asked to fill the questionnaire.  
Participants were treated to chocolate and soft drinks during the study. At the end 
of the study, the participants were asked to login the websites after a week and a month 
to find out whether they recall their passwords.  
Finally, participants were thanked for their participation in the study.   
 
7.3.2.3 The Measurements  
There are several measurements involved in the empirical study: password 
strength, password cracking time, password creation and login time, memorability and 
user satisfaction.  
To measure the security of the new authentication scheme, created passwords 
were analysed using the “Password Meter” (Password Meter, n.d.) and “How Secure is 
my Password?” (Collider, 2016) tools same as the passwords created in the password 
guideline-advice study (see chapter 5). While the “Password Meter” measured the 
strength of the passwords created with the scheme, “How Secure is my Password?” 
measured the password cracking times.  
The other elements measured in this empirical study were the password creation 
and login times. The researcher measured these while participants were testing the 
authentication scheme.  
To measure the memorability, participants were contacted approximately after a 
week and a month, and asked to login the system again to understand whether they 
remember or not their passwords.  
User satisfaction were measured based on questionnaire responses of the 
participants to evaluate the authentication scheme.  
Next section presents the demographics of the participants in the study.  
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7.3.2.4 Demographics 
52 students studying in the University of Sussex were recruited to participate in 
this empirical study. There were 29 females and 23 male participants. Undergraduate 
students as well as the postgraduate students participated in the study. While 33 of the 
participants were undergraduate students, 19 of them were postgraduate students. Figure 
7.5 and 7.6 illustrate the demographic details of the participants involved in the empirical 
study.  
 
 
Figure 7.5 Gender percentages of the participants 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Education background of the participants 
47% 53% 
Gender
Female
Male
63% 
37% 
Education	
Undergraduate	Students
Graduate	Students
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Usability and security evaluation of the scheme based on the analysis of the 
collected data is presented in the following sections. 
 
7.3.3 The Results and Analysis of the Empirical Study  
In the following sections, results and analysis of the empirical study are presented 
in detail.  
 
7.3.3.1 The Password Analysis  
Password Strength: 
To evaluate the strength of the passwords created with the proposed authentication 
scheme, an empirical study was conducted with 52 participants. All the passwords created 
with the scheme were between 12 to 16 characters in length. Since eight characters come 
from the selected images provided by the scheme inherently, the length of user-chosen 
key passwords were 6 characters long on average.   
The “Password Meter” is used as a tool to measure the password strength. All 
participants created passwords with this scheme, and all of them were strong passwords 
according to the measurement results. The passwords created by the participants were 
scored out of 100 and the least score was 81, whereas the mean password strength was 
M= 96.50 (SD = 5.96). However, this tool alone is not sufficient to determine the 
resistance of a password to cracking. The user-generated passwords should be strong 
enough to password guessing attacks. The next section discusses the password cracking 
times of the passwords created with the proposed scheme by the participants. 
 
Password Cracking Time: 
To find out the estimated cracking time of the passwords created with this scheme, 
the tool called “How Secure is My Password” is used like it is used for the password 
guideline-advice study in chapter 5. In line with the password strength, all passwords 
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were hard to crack, according to the measurement. Password cracking times were above 
decades and 41 out of 52 passwords would take more than a hundred years to crack.  
 
Password Creation and Login Time: 
The password creation time and login time of the participants were measured by 
the researcher during the experiment. Table 7.1 summarizes the time it takes to create a 
password and to login in seconds. It took about one or two minutes on average to create 
a password or to log in for participants.   
 
Table 7.1 Password creation and login times in the empirical study 
		 Password	Creation	Time	 Login	Time	
Proposed	Authentication	Scheme	 M	=	94.08	(SD	=	19.93)	 M	=	57.40	(SD	=	15.73)	
 
 
Memorability:  
Passwords created with the proposed authentication scheme were remembered 
correctly most of the time. Although there was a slight decrease from a week’s duration 
to a month, still 75% of 52 participants remembered their passwords correctly, and 
successfully logged in to the system. Table 7.2 shows the login success rates after a week 
and a month period.  
Table 7.2 Login success rates in the empirical study 
  
Login Success Rates 
(after a week) 
Login Success Rates 
(after a month) 
Proposed Authentication Scheme     90.38 % (47/52)     75.00 % (39/52) 
 
 
The memorability of the passwords created in this empirical study was compared 
to those in the password guideline study presented in chapter 5. There is a trend of decline 
as time goes by, such that memorability after a week declines across all groups when 
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participants tried to remember their passwords after a month. However, participants used 
the proposed scheme to create passwords were better off in both a week’s period and a 
month’s period (see Figure 7.7). Pearson Chi-square analyses indicated that these results 
were significant both for a week’s period (χ2 (2, N=360) =10.131, p = .006) and for a 
month’s period (χ2 (2, N=360) = 17.963, p <.001).  
 
	
Figure 7. 7 Comparison of the memorability of the passwords created in the password guideline-
advice study and proposed authentication scheme study 
 
7.3.3.2 The Results Based on the Survey Responses  
This section presents the results of the empirical study based on the participants’ 
responses to questions.   
User Satisfaction:	
Participants were asked about their experiences on the use of the novel 
authentication scheme to create an account. 92 % of the participants liked the way of 
password creation with the scheme. 94 % of them considered that it was fun to use, and 
similarly, 90 % of the participants considered that the scheme was easy to use (see Figure 
7.8). The questions of mini survey are presented in Appendix C. 
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Figure 7. 8 Participants’ opinion with regard to the use of the proposed scheme 
	
When it comes to the beliefs of participants in the method used by the proposed 
authentication scheme, results showed that most participants agreed that this method 
created stronger passwords than other commonly used methods (89%). However, 
agreement was less on creating more memorable passwords with this method, though still 
more than half of the participants (58%) agreed that this method would create more 
memorable passwords. Figure 7.9 illustrates the participants’ perception of the proposed 
scheme’s ability to allow users to create strong and memorable passwords. However, 
results of the experiments showed that the actual memorability rates were higher than 
participants expected (refer to Figure 7.7).  
	
Figure 7. 9 Users perception of the proposed scheme’s ability to produce strong and memorable 
passwords 
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In addition to the users’ thoughts of the efficiency of the new authentication 
scheme on creating strong and memorable passwords, they were also asked whether they 
will prefer to use the scheme or not. As illustrated in Figure 7.10, only 5 out of 52 
participants (9.6%) reported that they would not prefer to use the scheme neither for 
important passwords nor for others. On the other hand, 30 participants (32.7%) reported 
they would use the novel scheme for important passwords and 17 participants (57.7%) 
would use it for all passwords.  
 
	
Figure 7. 10 User preferences on use of the proposed scheme 
 
The empirical study yielded results that showed the proposed authentication scheme 
provides usability and security at the same time as well as high user satisfaction rates. 
Next chapter provides an overall discussion of the proposed design.  
 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
Traditional text passwords alone are vulnerable to brute-force and dictionary 
attacks as users choose weak and predictable passwords in favour of memorability. On 
the other hand, graphical passwords alone are subject to shoulder surfing attacks. They 
also introduce usability issues by making password creation process longer for users. For 
these reasons, a hybrid authentication scheme integrating text and recognition-based 
graphical passwords is proposed in this chapter. The design of the proposed scheme 
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differs from other combined schemes since it offers an integrated registration phase rather 
than two or three different steps. It largely preserves the sign in and log in experiences of 
users who are accustomed to use text passwords. The proposed scheme does not suggest 
a discrete graphical password creation step, instead it uses the images as cues to help users 
to create complex text passwords and memorize them easily. This also provides a usable 
authentication method by decreasing the steps of password verification. The proposed 
hybrid authentication method is implemented and an empirical study is conducted to 
evaluate its effectiveness on producing strong and memorable passwords.  
The results of the empirical study which conducted to test the proposed scheme 
showed that this novel design provides an enjoyable user authentication experience 
ensuring usability and security at the same time. Probably the user-friendly design of the 
proposed authentication scheme brings about high user satisfaction. 
It allows users to authenticate themselves in a similar way they do with 
conventional text-passwords, without increasing the registration time unreasonably. 
Considering the participants’ first trial of a novel authentication system, the registration 
time is reasonable to create a password. There is not a significance difference between 
the login time of a traditional password scheme which mostly takes time to create 
passwords following the required password composition rules. The small difference with 
the registration and login time can be tolerated whereas the additional security is added 
to the scheme over the usual text password authentication. In the empirical study, the 
participants used the authentication scheme to log in only twice in a month. When this 
scheme is used for real systems, users’ login times are likely to decrease in time as the 
frequency of logging into the system will be higher. As time goes by, users will also be 
able to memorize their passwords and will not need to resort to images to enter the 
characters.  
  Besides, it is an easy to use scheme and it helps users to create memorable as 
well as strong passwords which are resistant to dictionary attacks. Since the images in the 
registration phase are randomly placed in the portfolio every time, they include different 
characters for different users, and they are chosen by entering the characters under them 
through keyboard but not clicking on them provide a resistance to shoulder surfing 
attacks. It also provides a large password space by combining the text and images to create 
passwords. This reduces the possibility of cracking the passwords for third parties. The 
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results of the study showed that password cracking times are not reasonable to crack the 
passwords for a hacker. This demonstrates that the scheme is effective to eliminate brute-
force and dictionary attacks. 
It can be easily implemented in software alone which increases its chance to be 
deployed widely.  
The results of this empirical study and the password guidelines-advice study are 
compared in the previous sections. The comparison of the results showed that the 
passwords created with the hybrid authentication scheme are stronger and more 
memorable than the passwords created by the participants in the experimental group of 
the password guidelines-advice study. However, the results of these studies should not be 
directly compared as various factors are different. The demographics, design, apparatus 
and procedure of the studies are different which could certainly affect the results. While 
the researcher has conducted this study in person, password guidelines-advice study was 
a web-based empirical study which participants completed the questionnaires online. The 
presence of the researcher could have had a big influence on the participants and affected 
the results.  
 
7.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the design and implementation of a novel hybrid 
password authentication scheme, combining the text and graphical password approach. 
The chapter also analysed and discussed the results of an empirical study conducted to 
evaluate the proposed scheme’s effectiveness on producing strong and memorable 
passwords. The next chapter presents the overall discussion of the thesis and conclusions 
as well as the limitations of the study and future researches.  
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents an overall discussion of this research study and conclusion 
of the empirical studies which have been conducted. It provides comments and 
suggestions about the research findings.  
This chapter also discusses the contributions of this research to the password 
security field, and presents the possible future works and approaches for further 
investigation of usability and security issues which arise in password authentication by 
extending the findings of this research.  
The next discussion part revisits and provides answers to four research questions 
which were set in the first chapter, guiding this research study. 
 
8.2 DISCUSSION  
This section provides the discussion of this thesis by providing answers to research 
questions which determines the aims and objectives of this research. The primary purpose 
of this research is proposing usable solutions to password security problem by considering 
the human factors problems. In accordance with this purpose, four research questions 
were determined on investigating human factors in knowledge-based password 
authentication. Since this thesis investigates both forms of knowledge-based 
authentication, the questions are also divided into two parts: The first two questions are 
related to traditional text password mechanisms, investigating the possible solutions to be 
used to improve users’ password related behaviours. The first question is about whether 
persuasion strategies can be utilised to improve employees’ motivation for adopting good 
password behaviours in organisations. The second research question particularly focuses 
on the efficiency of proposed password guideline supported by an encouraging text and 
several password creation tips on usability and security of password security. The next 
part of the thesis which aims to find solutions to two research questions is related to 
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graphical passwords. The questions in the second part examine the capability of graphical 
passwords to replace conventional text passwords, and effectiveness of a proposed novel 
hybrid authentication scheme integrating text and images.  
The research questions are revisited and elaborated on by providing the critical analysis 
of the related empirical studies conducted as follows: 
1- “How can password related behaviours, which may potentially lead to 
security failures, be changed to improve overall password security in 
organisations?”  
 
The first questions investigated the reasons for employees’ unwanted password-
related behaviours undermining the information security in organisations, and the 
possible ways to motivate them to adopt good practices. An empirical study has been 
conducted with employees from different organisations to understand the reasons of their 
lack of motivation to behave in a secure manner particularly with regard to protecting 
their passwords. Results showed that most of the employees adopted coping strategies to 
handle the password problem in organisations. The cumbersome text password 
mechanisms including strict policy rules and poor designs of authentication schemes 
cause users to overlook the password security. Beside the usability issues of password 
mechanisms, employees’ education and awareness level and, organisational factors such 
as workload also influence their password practices. The study showed that these 
influential factors vary in each organisation. The aim of the empirical study was first to 
identify these factors and then investigate the possible solutions to increase employees’ 
motivation. Therefore, a questionnaire has been conducted with the employees who all 
access confidential information via passwords. Besides, IT specialists have been 
interviewed to determine the reasons of unsecure password behaviours. The IT 
specialists’ perceptions on reasons of these behaviours did not seem to match the 
perceptions of employees who relatively have less computer / information security 
background. In most organisation, while employees blame the password schemes and 
policies they use, IT departments claimed that the most important reason of unsecure 
behaviours is employees’ lack of education and awareness.  
On the other hand, the results revealed the fact that there is a lack of motivation 
to protect passwords among the employees who are already educated about information 
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and password security. Therefore, the study also sought the possible methods to be 
applied by IT departments to improve employees’ motivation to adopt secure password 
behaviours.  
Based on the review of behaviour change theories and persuasion strategies, it 
seems that employees’ can be convinced to protect their passwords and abandon coping 
strategies such as sharing passwords or selecting weak passwords. Efficiency of several 
persuasion strategies, social proof and authority principles of weapons of influence 
(Cialdini, 1988), reward and punishment and fear appeal has been evaluated through 
questionnaire and interviews including questions framed by these possible strategies. 
Also, a case study has been performed to test the effectiveness of these strategies with the 
selected company, a hospital which suffers information security flaws caused by 
employees’ careless password behaviour. The empirical study sought to determine which 
persuasion strategies are more likely to result in influencing employees to adopt better 
password behaviours.  
The results showed that the social proof and rewards and punishment strategies 
can be useful to improve employees’ motivation in some organisations. However, it might 
be difficult to apply those strategies where the IT department is not able to monitor the 
employees’ password practices all the time. The research also yielded results showing 
that the fear appeal is a significant motivation for most employees almost from all sectors. 
Finally, the authority principle seemed to be influential to raise awareness of password 
security among employees. 
The study proves that some persuasion strategies can be utilised to improve users’ 
security behaviour in organisations. However, there is not a guarantee that all strategies 
will work for all organisations. The strategies should be chosen carefully by security 
experts and IT specialists considering their applicability as well as the organisational / 
environmental factors and working conditions the employees confront. Also, the content 
of security training programs should be prepared particularly for each organisation taking 
all the influential factors into consideration. Since there are lots of variables affecting 
password security level in organisations such as organisational culture, password 
mechanisms used, password policy rules, environmental factors, the necessity and 
requirements of security differs for each of them. Therefore, the motivation strategies and 
training/awareness programs should be applied appropriately.   
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2- “To what extent can users be directed and motivated to choose strong 
passwords through password advice?” 
 
Based on the results of the previous study conducted in this thesis and review of 
several studies by different researchers, it seems that users continue to select weak 
passwords despite the applied password policy rules. To evaluate the effect of strict 
password policy rules on password security, an empirical study has been conducted with 
university students. The study also seeks to examine the effectiveness of a proposed 
password guideline including a motivating message and several useful password creation 
tips on users’ password preferences.  
The participants were divided into two groups and each group is asked to login into a 
website. To create passwords to login into the websites they were provided with two 
different password guidelines. Participants in the control group were given common 
password creation rules, and the participants in the experimental group were given the 
proposed password guideline to create passwords. The results indicate that passwords 
created by the participants who receive the password guideline including a persuasive text 
and three password creation methods, are stronger and more memorable compared to the 
ones created by the participants in the control group who were asked to follow usual 
password creation rules. The text was telling them that they can create very strong and 
also memorable passwords by producing their own encryption formula as exampled by 
three methods in the guideline. These methods seem to be effective on inspiring users to 
create complex but memorable passwords. Also, the passwords created by the control 
group were more predictable and easier to crack than the experimental group’s passwords. 
This finding suggests that it is worth informing users that it is actually easy to create 
strong and memorable passwords via a message. The message was not only telling users 
what should they do to create better passwords but also showing them how to do with the 
simple example methods. As suggested previously, persuasion is an effective tool to 
motivate users to improve password security. The message in the proposed password 
guideline indeed coincides with the inherence of persuasion, which attempts to tackle the 
reluctance to motivate users to create better passwords.  
The results show that strict password creation policies reduce the password security 
contrary to beliefs by causing users to create predictable passwords. With regards to the 
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password guidelines, it seems that persuasive message and password creation tips helped 
users to create better passwords. Therefore, this thesis suggests that these kinds of 
improvements should be done to existing password guidelines such as adding persuasive 
elements.  
The studies conducted to answer the first two research questions provides interesting 
insights into possible measures to improve users’ password behaviours as decreasing the 
use of coping strategies with passwords through persuasion strategies and increasing the 
strength and memorability of their passwords through effective password guidelines. 
Although motivating users to adopt better password behaviours through the persuasion 
approach, and improving the usability of existing text password mechanisms may seem 
practical, the vulnerability of text passwords remains an issue. Thus, the second part of 
this thesis focus on an alternative mechanism to the traditional text-based passwords: 
graphical passwords. Graphical passwords are also a form of knowledge based 
authentication which allows users to create their passwords using images and drawing 
lines instead of using letters, numbers or special characters.  
As has been proposed as a promising alternative to traditional text passwords 
regarding memorability problem, graphical passwords have also some usability and 
security drawbacks. These are susceptible to several attacks including shoulder surfing, 
and they introduce usability issues by increasing the registration time. Thus, the next 
research question discusses whether graphical passwords are likely to replace text 
passwords.  
 
3- “Can graphical passwords entirely replace the textual passwords?” 
 
As known, text-based passwords are the most ubiquitous way of authentication. Users 
are accustomed to use them for many years despite its weaknesses. They are vulnerable 
to attacks since users often resort to coping strategies such as choosing weak passwords, 
writing them down and reusing or sharing them with other people. The length and 
complexity requirements of strong passwords causes the memorability problems and 
hence aforementioned coping strategies are adopted by users. Besides the memorability 
issue and vulnerability to brute-force and dictionary attacks, text passwords also face 
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other challenges such as phishing, social engineering and key-logging attacks.  
The alternative authentication mechanisms have emerged due to the weaknesses of 
text passwords. such as graphical passwords. They were introduced due to the human 
memory’s superiority to remember pictures and graphics over text and numbers. They 
indeed reduce the users’ cognitive challenge; however, they also face several challenges.  
Nevertheless, it is worth considering graphical passwords as an alternative 
mechanism since they are employed in two-factor authentication methods in combination 
with other authentication mechanisms to strengthen the security of critical accounts. 
Numerous academic research has been conducted by collaborating with security 
practitioners from industry, to improve the existing graphical password mechanism. 
However, the question of whether graphical password mechanism can replace the 
ubiquitous text-based authentication mechanism has not been answered yet.  
There are several issues that need to be mentioned in relation to replacing moving 
traditional text passwords to the graphical passwords. First of all, it is not easy to convince 
users to move from using one technology which they are familiar with to another. Since, 
text passwords are the most common security mechanisms that users employ when 
confronted with any systems that require access control, it is rather difficult to change 
their routine to something completely new. If this new mechanism is totally different from 
the one to which they are more accustomed this is even more challenging. Users are 
generally reluctant to embrace new mechanisms if they already feel comfortable with the 
existing one. There have not been enough large scale studies conducted to investigate 
users’ opinion of adopting new mechanism to understand their willingness. Only recently 
Vorster and Heerden (2015b) investigated user perceptions regarding graphical 
passwords. The survey they conducted showed that corporate users are not ready to adopt 
graphical passwords within organisations as more than half of the participants stated that 
they will not support the use of graphical passwords within their organisation. Majority 
of participants seemed to be apprehensive to use graphical passwords especially for 
financial transactions. These results revealed that users showed substantial resistance to 
the graphical password technology. However, there is a need for more academic study 
about users’ perceptions regarding graphical passwords. Without such proper 
investigation, making assumption about the likelihood of graphical passwords replacing 
the text passwords is difficult.  
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Another issue which needs to be thought over is compatibility and adaptability of 
graphical passwords. Text passwords are widely used ranging from financial transactions 
to email accounts and social networking sites. It might be challenging to apply a new 
mechanism to all these systems. Although, in many cases text passwords have not been 
suitable to provide adequate security for some services especially for critical accounts, 
stakeholders mostly prefer to employ two factor (2F) authentications to improve security 
rather than changing the entire authentication mechanism to graphical passwords. This 
weakens the possibility of graphical passwords replacing the text password mechanism.  
Affordability is another issue that should be reviewed to decide whether the change 
of authentication mechanism is really necessary. It appears that organisations have 
difficulty in deciding to change their existing password authentication mechanisms even 
though it risks potential password loss incidents. This is because the password loss can 
occur due to the many possibilities including the attacks through tricking users such as 
phishing, social engineering or key-logging attacks. Thus, organisations generally do not 
blame only the text password schemes to the extent that they need to be replaced with a 
new alternative mechanism such as graphical passwords (Zakaria, 2013). To make this 
decision, first reliable measurements should be carried out to determine the actual 
problem since the solution might not be easy or cheap all the time.  
Finally, if the existing password mechanisms are considered problematic, then the 
proposed graphical passwords should be perfect to eliminate all the vulnerabilities of text 
passwords. However, it seems that most of the challenges facing text passwords are 
almost the same for graphical passwords, probably due to their similar nature of use and 
practice. Graphical passwords indeed are a promising alternative to conventional text 
passwords especially as a solution to the memorability problem, they suffer many 
vulnerabilities including the susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks. 
Despite that some security researchers insist upon promotion of alternative graphical 
password schemes; this thesis suggests that the problems of traditional text-based 
passwords can be solved with more efficient and easier ways than replacing by a totally 
new mechanism. Such solutions were investigated in this thesis, and the idea of adopting 
persuasion strategies is useful in terms of motivating users to behave in a secure manner 
thus decreasing the possibility of password security failures in organisation was found. 
This thesis also found that some improvement can be done to existing password 
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guidelines to provide users a secure and usable authentication experience. Such solutions 
require minimal cost to management in comparison with changing the entire existing 
authentication mechanism.  
Considering the mentioned issues, this thesis propounds that graphical passwords are 
not likely to be a substitute for traditional text-based passwords in the near future. 
However, as they have some advantages over text-passwords, they can be used to 
strengthen the existing mechanisms such as in two-factor and (Passfaces, 2009) multi-
factor authentication (Sabzevar, Stavrou, 2008) or hybrid password authentication 
mechanisms. Instead of new alternative graphical password proposals, this research 
suggests that there should be more efforts in finding solutions to improve the existing text 
password mechanisms. Therefore, a novel hybrid authentication scheme based on text 
and images was introduced and evaluated in this thesis. The next and final research 
question aims to answer to what extent can a hybrid scheme solve the password security 
and usability problem. 
 
4-  “Can a hybrid password authentication scheme integrating text and 
graphical passwords be solution to the password security and usability 
problems?” 
 
Based on the previous discussion, the idea of improving text password authentication 
with the help of graphical passwords seems to be better than replacing text-based 
password authentication with graphical password authentication. This question 
investigates the efficiency of a proposed hybrid authentication scheme on improving 
security and usability of user-chosen passwords.  
Authentication procedures are regarded as text passwords for the majority of 
computer users. However, they have well-known usability problems, especially in terms 
of memorability. As stated earlier, that human memory is able to remember pictures more 
easily than text and numbers is proven by many cognitive and psychological studies 
(Jermyn, 1999; Tao and Adams, 2008; Biddle, Chiasson and vanOorschot, 2011). As a 
result, various research has been conducted in both the security and human computer 
interaction (HCI) field in recent years to explore graphical passwords as an alternative or 
an enhancement, to text-based passwords.  
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The categorisation of graphical passwords and several schemes from each 
category were discussed in terms of their advantages as well as weaknesses in Chapter 5. 
The discussion shows that graphical passwords are far from being a perfectly secure and 
usable way of authentication since they are vulnerable to many attacks including brute 
force, guessing and observation attacks. Among others, shoulder surfing seems the main 
concerns against adopting graphical authentication in real use (Suo, Zhu, Owen, 2005). 
This is due to the nature of graphical passwords because while a user login system using 
a graphical password in a public place, their password can be stolen by another person 
who observes the user over their shoulder. In relation to this research, there are several 
shoulder defence mechanisms suggested by researchers to strengthen recognition-based 
graphical passwords. For example, Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme developed by 
Sobrado and Birget (2002) used a huge number of pass-icons to confuse attackers to find 
the correct one. However, Man, Hong and Matthews (2003) proved that this scheme has 
some usability issues as so many objects which have to be fitted on screen seemed too 
small, making it difficult for users to distinguish between pass-objects and non-pass-
objects Another possible technique to provide shoulder surfing resistance is Use Your 
Illusion (UYI) scheme (Hayashi, Christin, 2008) which displays degraded or distorted 
images in order to reduce the visibility of users’ input.  
On the other hand, the traditional text-based passwords are defended against 
shoulder surfing attacks by hiding passwords substituted by asterisks for the password 
characters in the display as the user logs in. However, their vulnerability to brute force 
and dictionary attacks due to the memorability problem is known, as mentioned in detail 
in this thesis. These indicate that text passwords and graphical passwords alone are 
subject to various attacks and, they also introduce usability problems. Therefore, a novel 
hybrid authentication scheme is proposed as a solution to the security and usability 
problems of both authentication mechanisms. The scheme integrates the text password 
with recognition based graphical passwords in a common registration and login phase in 
order to decrease the registration and login time. Basically, it is a text password scheme 
strengthened by recognition-based graphical passwords using images as cues to improve 
memorability of text password character. This is due to the fact that the human brain has 
better ability to remember images over texts. The implementation and evaluation of this 
proposed authentication scheme is presented in Chapter 6.  
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The scheme has many advantages such as resistance to brute-force and dictionary 
attacks since the passwords created with the hybrid scheme has a larger password space 
than text passwords in practice. It allows users to create complex, hard to crack passwords 
which contain different type of keyboard characters without including any meaningful 
details. The empirical study conducted to measure the strength and memorability of 
passwords created with the scheme showed that it indeed allowed participants to create 
stronger and more memorable passwords compared to traditional text-password schemes.   
It also provides protection to shoulder surfing attacks allowing users to choose 
images by typing the characters placed beneath them into the password field rather than 
directly clicking on the images. After a while when users memorised the mixed complex 
password they would no longer need to look at the images so they can hide the image 
portfolios. This provides nearly perfect resistance to shoulder surfing attacks.  
The login and sign in experience of users who are familiar with the text passwords 
are largely preserved. Probably because of this, user satisfaction rates were pretty high 
according the results of the questionnaire conducted to find out the users’ opinions who 
tested the scheme. The scheme is also easy to implement in software which increases the 
chance of large-scale adoption in the internet.  
Based on the results of the empirical study that evaluated the efficiency of 
proposed password scheme, it can substitute or coexist with traditional text-based 
password mechanisms without changing the existing user authentication profile. Thus, 
the scheme has potential to eliminate the weaknesses of conventional text password and 
graphical passwords by taking the advantages of both.  As an answer to the final research 
question, the proposed hybrid password scheme can be a solution to many security and 
usability problems which arise in text-based and graphical-based password 
authentication.   
The discussion of research questions has provided an overview of the security and 
usability issues and possible countermeasures in the knowledge based authentication 
domain. The next section presents contributions of this research to the password 
authentication field. 
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8.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
This thesis has made several contributions to the password security and usability 
field. The first part of the thesis presented solutions to improve traditional text-based 
password mechanisms. First, several persuasion strategies were utilised to improve 
password-related behaviour in organisations. The study revealed the fact that many 
organisations are in a position of suffering password security failures caused by user-
behaviours but still do not apply user-centred solutions. However, with a few simple 
interventions, users can be motivated to abandon the behaviours which undermine the 
information security. To our knowledge, there is not much study that investigated the 
reasons for unsecure password practices in different organisations. The first empirical 
study has demonstrated that there is evidence to support the worthiness of applying 
persuasion strategies in different ways to improve employees’ motivation to adopt secure 
password practices. The findings of this research can be extended by stakeholders to 
arrange compulsory training programs for employees before they are employed, and 
produce new information/password policy framed by persuasion strategies. These new 
regulations are applicable by organisations. They can take preventive countermeasures to 
password failures, if the appropriate persuasion strategies are applied. Briefly, this study 
can conduce to the use of persuasion strategies to motivate employees regarding password 
protection in order to avoid the loss of critical information. Thus, the findings of this study 
can be useful for influence strategists, password policy makers, IT specialists and 
password security practitioners.  
Secondly, the first part of the thesis proposed a new password guideline including 
a motivating message and three sample password creation methods. The security and 
usability evaluation of the password guideline showed that these simple improvements to 
the usual password guidelines consisting of several password restriction rules make 
significant changes on strength and memorability of passwords. The proposed password 
guideline as a low-cost solution can contribute to a significant outcome in terms of 
improving the issues facing the text-based password authentication. 
Results of these studies presented in the first part of the thesis, pointed out the 
importance of human factors that commonly receive little attention from security experts. 
This research focuses on human-factor issues in password authentication, and proposes 
user friendly solutions to these problems. Thus, this research also considers technical 
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solutions by introducing a novel hybrid password authentication scheme to increase 
resistance to brute-force, dictionary and shoulder surfing attacks in the second part of the 
thesis.  The last empirical study has also produced empirical evidence to support the 
applicability of the proposed hybrid authentication scheme both from security and 
usability perspectives. The proposed scheme has been implemented and tested, the 
findings were promising to reduce existing, unsolved security and usability problems. In 
this research, all of the proposed countermeasures have been tested and evaluated in this 
thesis. They require minimal cost to be implemented, and take both theoretical and 
practical considerations into account.  
This research does not claim to provide an ultimate solution to the existing issues 
which is in fact not possible where the human-factors are involved, but significantly 
contributes to the field. The findings create opportunity for interested parties to 
understand the insight behind the reasons for human-factor caused password problems, 
and it can be extended collaboratively to enhance the proposed solutions.  
The next section provides some discussion on the limitations of the research 
undertaken and possible future work relevant to this research. 
 
8.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This research has some limitations and can be expanded with further studies. Thus, 
it creates some opportunities for future research to be conducted. With regards to the first 
study, a larger scale empirical study or experiment with more organisations recruiting 
more employees might be useful to draw more accurate conclusion about the efficiency 
of persuasion strategies on password security. Also, evaluating the effectiveness of other 
persuasion strategies on password security might be interesting.  
Regarding password guideline/advice study, it will be interesting to add visual 
elements in password guideline to instruct users to create complex password. It would 
probably be useful to attract users’ attention and make the password creation process more 
enjoyable. Also, implementing the proposed password guideline into different kinds of 
applications which require different levels of security, and conduct a further empirical 
study with different user groups, involving more participants would be useful. Moreover, 
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the literature on persuasion suggests that persuasion attempts are more likely to succeed 
if the persons are aware of the situation. Thus, adding some attributes to the password 
guideline informing users about possible attacks if they choose weak passwords might 
improve the compliance to password guideline. 
With regards to improving the proposed hybrid password authentication, an 
immediate endeavour that can be carried out is to investigate whether the relation between 
the typed character with the first letters of the names of objects, famous people, activities 
etc. in images affects the security. These relations have been inspired by the Tip of the 
Tongue phenomenon in the hope of increasing the memorability of passwords. In the 
conducted user study, the majority of the participants indeed remembered correctly their 
passwords but yet it is difficult to say if this is caused by the association between the key 
passwords’ characters and image portfolios. While expecting to increase usability, it 
might reduce the security by increasing the chance of shoulder surfing attacks. This is the 
dilemma of proposed scheme that need to be clarified so further investigations will be 
useful to find out the impact of associating typed characters with images on password 
security and memorability. This is an interesting research question as the challenge of 
balancing security and usability remains. It is also worthwhile making slight 
modifications on the scheme in order to increase usability. For example, the characters 
placed under the images can be changed each time even for the same user which means 
creating a one-time password each time. The security and usability evaluation of such 
scheme might yield interesting results.  
The findings of all empirical studies conducted in this research study can be 
helpful and inspirational for other researchers to improve existing password mechanisms 
with further investigations.  
 
8.5 SUMMARY  
This final chapter provides a broad discussion of this research by revisiting each 
research questions. This chapter also highlights several contributions of this research, 
followed by limitations of the research and possible future work to be carried out.  
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- Recruitment Letter  
Re: Improving Password Security in the Organisations  
Dear <<insert name>>  
As a doctoral researcher at University of Sussex, I am writing to invite you to participate 
in an academic study entitled “Improving Password Security in Organisations”. I am 
specifically contacting you because of your wealth of expertise and experience in this 
area.  
With this study, I aim to explore the reasons why employees are not motivated to protect 
their passwords against potential security failures within the organisation. There is a 
wealth of research demonstrating that, despite technical precautions taken by people 
within the organisation, undesired password-related behaviours cause organisations to 
lose confidential information.  
In this study, I will be using some selected scientific methods and approaches to study 
employees' insecure password practices and persuade and motive them to behave in a 
more secure manner. To do this, firstly, underlying reasons that cause users' lack of 
engagement with password security should be investigated and suitable methods should 
be applied to prevent possible security failures. For this, I aim to conduct in-depth 
interviews and surveys with employees in different positions who use passwords to access 
organisational information in several organisations in Turkey.  
Taking part in this research is optional but your extensive knowledge and experience in 
the field is highly valuable to the study. Enclosed you will find the Information Sheet and 
Consent Form, which contain more information about the study and your role, should you 
choose to participate. A follow-up email or a call will be made on <<date>> to answer 
any questions you might have about participating.  
If you wish to opt out of future contact, please email the address at the top of this letter to 
request that no further contact be made. Agreement to be contacted or request for more 
information does not obligate you to participate in any study.  
If you would like additional information about this study please email  
M.Yildirim@sussex.ac.uk  
Thank you for considering this research opportunity.  
Best Regards,  
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Merve Yildirim  
Doctoral Researcher  
Department of Informatics Chichester 2 
University of Sussex Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK  
 
- Consent Form 
Project Title: Improving Password Security in Organisations  
Researcher’s Contact Details:  
Merve Yıldırım 
Doctoral Researcher 	
Department of Informatics  
University of Sussex 	
Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK 	
Email: M.Yildirim@sussex.ac.uk  
Name of Participant ........................................................................................................ 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I 
may keep for my records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing 
to:  
- Be interviewed by the researcher; - Allow the interview to be audio taped; - Make 
myself available for a further interview should that be required. However, I am aware that 
the follow-up is by invitation only and I can refuse to take part at any stage without giving 
an explanation.  
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party.  
 
I understand that I will have an option of seeing the transcript of data concerning me 
before it is included in the write up of the research.  
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I understand that I have given my approval for my role and position in the organisation 
where I work to be used in the final report of the project, and in further publications.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalised or disadvantaged in any way.  
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and 
handled in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998.  
Date:  
Signature of the Researcher:  
Signature of Participant:  
 
 
- The Questionnaire for non-IT Employees: 
 
 
1. Your institution?  
 
 
2. Your job/position? 
 
 
3. Does your job require you to use password? 
 
 
4. Does your job require you to access any critical information? 
 
 
5. Do you think you have enough knowledge about password security and your 
organisation’s information security policy?  
 
 
6. Has your password ever been hacked or have you ever encountered a situation 
that would threaten the security of your personal or company information by this 
time?  
 
 
7. What do you do if your work password is hacked/ What have you done when 
your work password was hacked? 
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8. Does the authentication scheme you use at work direct you to choose strong 
passwords? 
 
 
9. Do you share your work password with your colleagues? 
 
 
10. Do you keep your work password somewhere accessible by others? 
 
 
11. How often do you change your work password? 
 
 
12. Do you use the same password for your work and personal accounts? 
 
 
13. Which one do you care more to choose strong password?  
 
 Your personal accounts  
 Work accounts 
 
 
14. What is the reason for your insecure password practices at work?   
 
 usability issues of authentication mechanisms/password policy rules 
 lack of password security education/awareness  
 that you do not believe the importance of password security  
 workload 
 personal reasons 
 other (please specify) 
 
15. Have you attended any education/training program about password/information 
security at work? 
 
If yes,  
- What was the content of education? 
 
 
- Was it given by an expert? 
 
 
- How useful was it? 
 
 
 
16. What would motivate you to change your insecure password practices at work 
and adopt the secure ones?   
 
 Being punished for the insecure practices 
 Being rewarded for the good practices 
 Usable password mechanisms  
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 Your colleagues’ good password practices  
 Your awareness about the consequences of password failures 
 Personal beliefs on importance of information privacy  
 
 
 
- The Interview Questions for It Specialists 
 
 
1. Your institution? 
 
 
2. Your job/position? 
 
 
3. Can you please mention about your organisation’s password security 
regulations? 
 
 
4. How is the employee’s password selection process in your organisation? Do the 
employees create passwords themselves or do they use system-generated 
passwords? 
 
 
5. What kind of measures does your organisation take to ensure password security? 
 
 
6. Do you think that the authentication scheme you use at work directs employees 
to choose strong passwords? 
 
 
7. Is there any password meter measuring the strength of passwords integrated into 
the system which can be used by employees when they create their passwords? 
 
  
8. Which one do you think threaten the password security most at work? 
 
 Technical issues 
 Insecure password practices 
 
9. Have the employees in your organisation been given any password security 
education? 
 
10. Do you think the measures taken for the password security of your organisation 
is sufficient? What would you suggest for a better security as an expert?  
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APPENDIX B 
MATERIALS RELATED TO THE SECOND EXPERIMENT 
- Certificate of Ethical Approval 
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Date Of Approval 02-Mar-2016
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Name of Authorised Signatory
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requirements and University procedures.
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:
Amendments to protocol
* Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-REC for authorisation prior to
implementation.
Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects
* Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported immediately
to the Chair of the C-REC.
Feedback regarding any adverse and unexpected events
* Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur
during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Social Sciences C-REC. In the event of a
serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.
For Life Sciences and Psychology projects
* The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the committee, indicating the status
and conduct of the approved project. These reports will be reviewed at the annual meeting of the committee.  A
statement by the PI to the C-REC indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the
Approval Expiration Date as stated above.
2/3/2016 Page 1 of 1
	 191	
- Recruitment Letter 
Re: Persuading Users to Create Stronger Passwords  
Hello,  
My name is Merve and I am a PhD student at the Department of the Informatics at the 
University of Sussex. I am planning to invite students to participate in an academic study 
on improving password security through persuasion strategies as part of my PhD work.  
I am doing this research to explore the reasons of students’ unsecure password practices 
and motive them to create strong and memorable passwords. To do this, I need 
participants to sign in the website (link is provided below) and fill the questionnaire.  
If you would like additional information about this study, please email me at 
M.Yildirim@sussex.ac.uk Request for more information does not obligate you to 
participate in any study.  
Taking part in this research is optional but your participation would be very helpful. If 
you decide to join, please access the project’s web site through this link <<website’s 
link>>. Please remember that your participation can provide you beneficial information 
which you can use to produce stronger passwords in your daily life.  
Thank you for helping this research.  
Best Regards,  
Merve Yildirim  
Doctoral Researcher  
Department of Informatics Chichester 2 	
University of Sussex Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK  
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- Consent Form 
 
Project Title: Persuading Users to Create Stronger Passwords  
Researcher’s Contact Details:  
Merve Yıldırım 	
Doctoral Researcher 	
Department of Informatics  
University of Sussex 	
Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK 	
Email: M.Yildirim@sussex.ac.uk  
Participant’s Declaration:  
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I 
may keep for records.  
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party.  
I understand that I have given my approval for the name of my town/community and / or 
the name of my workplace to be used in the final report of the project, and in further 
publications.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalised or disadvantaged in any way.  
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and 
handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
Date: 	
Signature of the Researcher: 
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- Common Survey Questions for the Control and the Experimental Group 
 
Your age? 
Less than 18 years 
18-25 years 
26-35 years 
36-55 years 
More than 55 years 
 
Your gender?  
Female 
Male 
 
Your current university? 
 
   
Your current course/degree? 
Undergraduate (BA, BSc etc.) 
Postgraduate (MA, MSc, PhD, Postdoc etc.) 
 
Your faculty? 
Science, Agriculture and Engineering 
Humanities & Social Sciences 
Medical Sciences 
  
Do you have a degree in computer science, information technology, computer 
engineering or a related field? 
Yes 
No 
 
Have you ever had any password security failure experience? 
Yes, my password has been hacked or stolen at least once in my life. 
No, I have not had any password security failure experience. 
 
Have you ever written down your passwords and kept them somewhere easily 
accessible? 
Yes, I write down my passwords somewhere accessible (on a notebook etc.). 
No, I write down my passwords somewhere safe (in a file which is encrypted etc.). 
I never write down my passwords as I keep them in my mind. 
 
Have you ever shared your passwords with someone else? 
Yes, I share my passwords with others. 
Yes, I share my password only with my family and friends. 
I share my passwords only if I have to. 
No, I never share my passwords with anyone. 
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Have you ever reused your passwords? 
Yes, I use the same password for different accounts. 
Not exactly the same one but I use similar passwords for different accounts. 
No, I never use same the password for different accounts. 
 
 
For which account(s) do you care to choose strong passwords?  
For all my accounts 
For all websites 
For my personal email accounts 
For social networking sites (facebook, twitter etc.) 
For online banking 
For online shopping 
For online booking 
For the accounts which hold my credit card information (PayPal etc.) 
For my work emails 
None of them 
 
How do you normally create your passwords? 
Dictionary words or meaningful details (name, birth date, team you support, flower 
name, phone number etc.) 
Combination of meaningful details (Sharon1978 etc.) 
Common passwords (password123 etc.) 
Common patterns (12345, qwerty etc.) 
Mixing keyboard characters with words (p@ssw0rd etc.) 
Random combination of characters (Th7&3.?we etc.) 
Other 
I prefer not to answer. 
 
If you try to choose strong passwords which rules would you apply? 
  
At least 8-character long 
Including lower case letters 
Including upper case letters 
Including special keyboard characters 
Passwords which don't contain name, surname, birthday etc. 
Passwords which don't contain meaningful words 
Passwords which don't contain common patterns (password, 12345 etc.) 
I would not use any rules. 
I prefer not to answer. 
 
What do you think about password policy rules (at least 8 characters long, 
including upper case and special keyboard characters etc.)? 
  
I don't find them useful and necessary. I don't like to apply them. 
Password creation rules make it difficult creating my passwords. It is annoying and 
time consuming so I don't like to apply them. 
I believe they make my passwords stronger but still I don't like to apply them. 
I find them useful and I believe they increase the security level. I like to apply them. 
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Do you think your passwords are hard to crack or guess? 
Yes, I think my passwords are strong enough. 
No, I do not think my passwords are strong enough. 
 
Do you use password manager or browser extension to store your passwords in 
order to avoid forgetting them? 
Yes, I use password manager to store my passwords. 
Yes, I use browser extension to store my passwords. 
No, I don't use any program to store my passwords. 
 
Do you use any authentication mechanism other than traditional passwords such 
as graphical passwords or biometrics? 
Yes, I use graphical passwords. 
Yes, I use token based authentication systems. 
Yes, I use biometrics. 
Yes, I use one time passwords (SMS based etc.). 
No, I only use traditional text-based passwords. 
 
Is the password you have just created for this website that you have used in the 
past? 
Yes, I used this password before. 
No, I did not use this password before. 
Not exactly the same one but I used a similar password before. 
I prefer not to answer. 
 
 
- Specific Survey Questions for The Experimental Group 
 
Have you used the given methods to create your password for this website? 
  Yes, I have used the first method. I have specified a formula and used it to turn an 
ordinary word to a strong password. 
 Yes, I have used the second method. I have mixed a number and a string thus 
created a strong password. 
 Yes, I have used the third method. I have picked several meaningful words and 
combined them with keyboard characters thus created a very long and strong 
password. 
 No, I have not used any method to create the password. 
 
 
Do you think the given methods are useful and they help you to create stronger 
and memorable passwords? 
Yes, they are useful and helpful to create strong passwords. 
No, they are not useful and helpful to create strong passwords. 
 
Applying the given methods to create password was easy. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree? 
Strongly agree 
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Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
Applying the given methods to create password was fun. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
Creating strong and memorable passwords is worth the time and effort spent to 
apply the given methods. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
How likely do you think you will be able to remember the password you created 
for this website after a week and a month? 
After a week 
Very likely 
Likely 
About as likely as not 
Unlikely 
Very unlikely 
After a month 
Very likely 
Likely 
About as likely as not 
Unlikely 
Very unlikely 
 
 
Do you think the given methods and advice persuaded you not to write down your 
passwords? 
Yes, I think so. 
No, I do not think so. 
 
Do you think the given methods and advice persuaded you not to share your passwords? 
Yes, I think so. 
No, I do not think so. 
  
Do you think the given methods and advice persuaded you not to reuse your passwords? 
Yes, I think so. 
No, I do not think so. 
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I think applying the given methods to create strong and memorable passwords is 
much more efficient than following strict password policy rules. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
 
 
Will you use the given methods and advice while creating passwords in future? 
Yes, I will use them. 
No, I will not use them. 
 
 
What would you recommend to improve password security? 
 
 
 
- Information Page for the Participants 
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- Sign in / Login Page for The Control Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Sign in / Login Page for The Experimental Group 
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- Password Strength Measurement Tool 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MATERIALS RELATED TO THE THIRD EXPERIMENT 
 
 
- Certificate of Ethical Approval 
 
 
Certificate of Approval
Reference Number ER/MY68/3
Title Of Project Evaluation of Security and Usability of a Novel User Authentication Scheme
Integrating Text and Graphical Passwords
Principal Investigator (PI): Ian Mackie
Student Merve Yildirim
Collaborators
Duration Of Approval 1 month
Expected Start Date 14-Dec-2016
Date Of Approval 13-Dec-2016
Approval Expiry Date 23-Dec-2016
Approved By David Reby
Name of Authorised Signatory
Date 13-Dec-2016
*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will
lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor
requirements and University procedures.
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:
Amendments to protocol
* Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-REC for authorisation prior to
implementation.
Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects
* Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported immediately
to the Chair of the C-REC.
Feedback regarding any adverse and unexpected events
* Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur
during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Social Sciences C-REC. In the event of a
serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.
For Life Sciences and Psychology projects
* The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the committee, indicating the status
and conduct of the approved project. These reports will be reviewed at the annual meeting of the committee.  A
statement by the PI to the C-REC indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the
Approval Expiration Date as stated above.
13/12/2016 Page 1 of 1
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- Recruitment Letter 
 
 
Re: Evaluation of Security and Usability of a Novel User Authentication Scheme 
Integrating Text and Graphical Passwords  
Hello,  
My name is Merve and I am a PhD student in the Department of Informatics. As part of 
my PhD study, I am planning to evaluate security and usability of a novel authentication 
scheme integrating text and graphical passwords. To do this, I need participants to try this 
new authentication scheme.  
Neither knowledge of computer security nor experience with graphical passwords is 
required for the experiment. It only takes 10-15 minutes and should be fun and useful to 
participate.  
The experiment will take place at Chichester 2 2R306 between 14th December and 
23th December 2016. You can choose to come any time between 10.00 am and 6.00 
pm to join the experiment. You will also have free chocolate and drink for joining the 
experiment.  
I will look forward to hearing from you. If you are interested in participating, please email 
M.Yildirim@sussex.ac.uk  
Many thanks.  
Best Regards, Merve Yildirim  
Doctoral Researcher  
Department of Informatics  
Chichester 2 2R306  
University of Sussex Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK  
 
- Consent Form 
 
Project Title: Evaluation of Security and Usability of a Novel User Authentication 
Scheme Integrating Text and Graphical Passwords  
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Researcher’s Contact Details:  
Merve Yıldırım 	
Doctoral Researcher 	
Department of Informatics  
University of Sussex 	
Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK 	
Email: M.Yildirim@sussex.ac.uk  
Name of Participant ........................................................................................................ 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I 
may keep for my records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing 
to:  
1. Create a password and login the mobile application of the novel authentication scheme 
using the mobile phone provided by the researcher.  
2. Allow the researcher to make some measurements (measuring login time etc.) during 
the experiment.   
3. Complete a short questionnaire including questions about user satisfaction, efficiency 
and usability of the new authentication scheme after I test the scheme.  
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in any reports of the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party.  
I understand that I have given my approval for the experimental data I provided to be used 
in the final report of the project, and in further publications.  
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary so I can refuse to complete any 
task, and I can withdraw at any stage of the experiment without being penalised or 
disadvantaged in any way. I can also stop at any time and ask the researcher any questions 
I may have.  
I have read the above information. All of my questions regarding the experimental 
procedure have been answered to my satisfaction.  
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I consent to participate in this research study. I understand that my personal information 
will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the UK Data 
Protection Act 1998.  
I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older.  
Date:  
Signature of the Researcher:  
Signature of Participant:  
 
- Sign in Page of the Implemented Authentication Scheme 
 
 
 
- Login Page of the Implemented Authentication Scheme 
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- Survey Questions for the Participants 
 
Do you think it is easy to create a password using the new authentication scheme?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you think it is fun to create a password using the new authentication scheme?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Did you like the new authentication scheme?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you think it will help you to create stronger passwords?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you think it will help you to create memorable passwords?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you prefer to use the new authentication scheme to create passwords for all 
your accounts or only the important ones (bank account e.g.)?  
 I prefer to use it for the all passwords 
 I prefer to use it only for the important passwords 
 I do not prefer to use it at all. 
